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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal sustainability is present when the current government debt equates to the present 
value of future budget surpluses or their excess over deficits but since 1970 the EU 
countries on average had a surplus budget only in one year. The first aim of the thesis is to 
see whether Europe has achieved fiscal sustainability, whereas the second aim is to analyse 
the effects of Maastricht and the Stability and GrO\yth Pact to this end. Another research 
aim is to present a formal fiscal sustainability assessment for the EU accession countries. 
Finally, the thesis bridges fiscal and external sustainability and studies the economy-wide 
sustainability separately in 'old' Europe and the accession countries. 
For 'old' Europe, sustainability seems an unrealised goal no matter if the fiscal bal~ce is 
considered alone or in a unified analytical framework with the current account. Neither 
have Maastricht, the Stability and Growth Pact or the Euro been instrumental in shaping 
sustainable policies. The analysis of accession Europe broadly confirms the hypothesis of 
successful fiscal adjustment there but this conclusion is only valid for the group of 
accession countries as a whole, whereas the empirical evidence is less optimistic for each 
country individually. Finally, in the open-economy setting, the economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe do not exhibit any economy-wide sustainability. 
The new fiscal sustainability analysis of fourteen 'old' EU members is the first contribution 
to the literature. Then the thesis proposes a way to assess fiscal sustainability convergence 
over time, in addition to the hypothetical Maastricht regime change. Another contribution is 
the most comprehensive so far assessment of fiscal sustainability in the accession countries, 
using a new set of data and some recent advances from the panel cointegration literature. 
Furthermore, the thesis puts forward a theoretical model relating the fiscal and external 
sustainability dimensions, as essentially an open-economy fiscal sustainability approach. 
That model is illustrated with separate empirical applications on 'old' Europe, including an 
adaptation of the convergence modelling, and accession Europe. 
KEYWORDS: fiscal sustainability, convergence, current account sustainability, European 
Union, accession countries, panel cointegration. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The budget should be balanced. the Treasury refilled. public debt reduced. the 
arrogance of officialdom tempered and controlled. and the assistance to 
foreign lands curtailed, lest Rome become bankrupt. 
- Marcu, Tulliu, Cicero (\ 06 BC - 43 BC) 
The bankruptcy of the Treasury of a country is a most visible sign of economic policy 
failure. The recent budget deficits in several of the world's advanced economies are a 
daunting reminder that historically some states have failed to service their debt 
obligations. As the last decades of the twentieth century provided for a first time long 
and relatively reliable data records, and modem research methods have surged, both 
analysts and policymakers have sought new answers to the long-standing concerns 
about the sustainability of fiscal policy. Should governments have imposed limits on 
how much they can borrow and can continuing budget deficits be sustained? 
In modem terms, fiscal sustainability is associated with the ability of a government to 
bear the costs of existing debt, that is to stay solvent, and with any constraints over time 
needed to keep or restore that solvency. The current fiscal stance is deemed sustainable 
when it does not lead to bankruptcy in the future, even if solvency is not an imminent 
issue. More technically, fiscal sustainability is present when the current government 
debt equals the present value of the future budget surpluses or their excess over deficits. 
The intertemporal budget constraint thus defined implies that in some periods a 
government can safely issue new debt to finance its deficits. Solvency of the Treasury 
remains the focal concern but there is no need to keep the budget balanced in every 
period, contrary to Cicero's intuitive suggestion. 
The theory of fiscal sustainability from the last two decades has correspondingly 
distilled a distinct strand of literature, where the statistical properties of various fiscal 
series are explored to yield empirically testable conditions. If the past data meet these 
conditions, the government will be able to payout its debt and fiscal sustainability is in 
place. Two assumptions rest behind such methods: fiscal policies are assumed to remain 
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unchanged and the data from the past are regarded as representative of the long-run 
infinite future. 
Practitioners and policymakers however may be less willing to rely on long-term 
outcomes. So another distinct strand in modem fiscal sustainability analysis advocates 
the need to confine current deficits and debts within straightforward numerical targets. 
The fiscal convergence criteria of the European Union exemplify that approach. 
Although requiring balanced budgets only over the economic cycles, the European 
fiscal rules are nevertheless closer to the spirit of the ancient Roman thinker. 
So it is fascinating to note that two millennia after Cicero's words the definitions of 
fiscal sustainability and the policy implications thereof have remained divergent, while 
the fear of insolvency has not ceased to plague the European economies. Since 1970, 
the European Union countries on average have had a surplus budget only in the year 
2000. The Stability and Growth Pact was introduced over a decade ago to safeguard 
fiscal discipline and promote sound national public finances, particularly in the 
countries bound by the monetary union. Yet the advent of the common currency in 1999 
spurred an ardent debate about the need to reform the Pact. Instead of ensuring fiscal 
discipline while at the same time facilitating growth and the smooth operation of the 
c<;>mmon market and the new monetary regime, the Pact was allegedly breached by 
important European economies. It was amended in mid-200S but it is still debatable 
whether the countries are following fiscally sustainable paths. Recently the European 
Commission proposed the new Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, launching the last 
cycle (2008-2010) of the Lisbon Strategy, which in 2000 promised to make the EU the 
world's most dynamic and competitive economy by the end of the decade. In the new 
guidelines, the Commission again admonished Member States to 'pay particular 
attention to fiscal sustainability of their public finances in full compliance with the 
Stability and Growth Pact' (EC, 2007). 
It is intriguing therefore to embark on an analysis to see whether Europe has achieved 
fiscal sustainability or not, and this is the first aim of this thesis. The European Union's 
multi-country experience, especially with the single currency, must be revealing for 
both the definition and practice of fiscal sustainability. Favouring the formal definition 
outlined above, the thesis analyses past data to uncover evidence whether the recent 
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fiscal practices in the European economies, if continued into the future, guarantee that 
existing debt will be repaid eventually. 
This perspective clearly differs from simply checking compliance with the exact 
numerical rules introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Yet fiscal sustainability concerns may be expected to be accented in the case of a 
monetary union where members, while retaining fiscal independence, transfer the 
conduct of monetary policy to a supranational independent authority. Fiscal policy is 
then elevated beyond maintaining the solvency of the Treasury: it remains the only tool 
for an independent national stabilisation policy. So the second aim of the thesis is to 
analyse in particular if the road to the Euro and its subsequent adoption have induced 
fiscal consolidations in line with the intertemporal budget constraint. 
A thorough analysis of fiscal sustainability in Europe will be incomplete if it does not 
consider the last two waves of enlargement of the European Union. The new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe must comply with the Stability and Growth Pact rules 
and will eventually have to adopt the Euro. Four of them already joined the monetary 
union and others are scheduled to follow soon. Thus a third aim of the research agenda 
here is to apply the formal methods of long-run fiscal sustainability analysis to the 
accession countries. Data limitations usually explain why the region has so far received 
limited research attention. To fill that gap, novel applications from the recently growing 
field of panel time series econometrics are utilised to examine if the fiscal series satisfy 
the statistical conditions for fiscal sustainability. 
Furthermore, and as a fourth major research questi?n, the thesis extends the assessments 
for both pre-2004 'old' Europe and accession Europe to incorporate the issue of current 
account sustainability. I explain why in an open-economy world both the fiscal and 
external constraints matter. A country's fiscal policies may be defined as sustainable but 
if the current account is persistently in deficit, and so foreign debt is accumulated, the 
threat of external insolvency may require policymakers to resort to fiscal tightening. 
The latter, even if promoting fiscal consolidation in the short run, may slow economic 
growth and because of diminishing budget revenues in the future undermine long-term 
fiscal sustainability. The thesis proposes a new model to test for overall sustainability 
and applies it first to the European Union consisting of its pre-2004 members. There 
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again the focus is on the effects from the fiscal rules of Maastricht and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The model is then applied separately to assess whether the dual pressures 
of transition and accession have resulted in overall sustainability in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
In summary, the thesis puts forward the following contributions to the literature: 
• It analyses the historical fiscal sustainability in fourteen 'old' European 
Union members. Few European fiscal sustainability studies have covered such a 
comprehensive set of countries. The long data series, spanning almost four decades, 
bring new evidence to compare to the often contradictory findings from previous 
studies. 
• It proposes a way to assess fiscal sustainability convergence over time, to 
reveal when and how countries have achieved or deviated from the fiscally sustainable 
path. Existing fiscal sustainability studies have come up with ways to model structural 
shifts in the data generating processes: but the exact timing of fiscal sustainability, 
conditioned on the intertemporal budget constraint, has remains unclear. The 
assessment of the evolution in fiscal sustainability is based on several complementary 
methods: cointegration regression analysis, recursive estimation of the cointegrating 
parameter, and Maastricht regime shift tests for disentangling any influences from 
Maastricht, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the Euro. 
• It conducts one of the first and certainly the most comprehensive so far 
fiscal sustainability analysis for accession Europe. To that end, recent advances in panel 
unit root and panel cointegration tests, and panel cointegration estimators are reviewed 
and adapted from other areas of economics and finance. The thesis is among the first to 
employ a panel fiscal sustainability approach. To overcome a limitation common to the 
earlier panel cointegration tests, the assumption of cross-sectional independence is 
relaxed. 
• It designs a theoretical model relating fiscal and external sustainabiIity, 
as essentially an open-economy fiscal sustainabiIity approach. A simple testable 
condition is derived to ascertain whether data respect the economy-wide intertemporal 
constraints. An interpretation of the different scenarios and possible policy implications 
are suggested. 
• It illustrates the new overall sustainability model with an empirical 
application to the set of 'old' European economies. Furthermore, the fiscal sustainabiIity 
ID 
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convergence approach is extended to produce the first evidence for any gradual changes 
in the overall sustainability in Europe, before and after the introduction ofthe Euro. 
• It applies the overall sustainability analysis to the accession Europe panel 
to complement the findings from the assessment of fiscal sustainability alone. 
The analyses of fiscal and overall sustainability in this thesis are based on original 
datasets compiled for the entire set of EU countries and these datasets are available 
upon request. The panel cointegration tests and estimators applied here have until now 
been unavailable in Stata and the research community using that software might benefit 
from the tailor-made codes written for the empirical applications in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five. 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two offers a unifYing 
classification for the fiscal sustainability concepts in order to set the theoretical 
background, place the subsequent applications in a broader context of the literature and 
to justifY the choice of methods. The original taxonomy presented intends to disentangle 
the theories and offer a straightforward guide for the rest of the analysis. It first presents 
the simple arithmetic of the intertemporal budget constraint, the building block of fiscal 
sustainability theory. Diverse approaches from the last two decades are reviewed and 
narrowed down to two broad groups. One major strand of literature advocates the 
imposition of additional fiscal constraints to keep or restore sustainability. Often these 
evolve into measurable indicators or even enforceable fiscal rules, and thus this strand 
seems attractive. A second strand is more backward-looking and deals with the 
statistical analysis of historical data. By definition limited in offering any ex ante policy 
prescriptions, this second 'statistical tests' approach is nevertheless shown to be 
theoretically robust in identifYing the compliance of the recorded fiscal stance with the 
long-run notion of fiscal sustainability. 
Chapter Three addresses the dynamic dimension of fiscal sustainability in Europe. The 
tools to indicate when an economy has achieved or lost sustainability over any 
particular time horizon are applied to the 'old' part of the EU where longer time series 
of data are available. The corollary research question which has, surprisingly, only been 
addressed in a few studies in the existing literature, is whether the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Stability and Growth Pact have contributed to sustainability. The chapter brings out 
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exhaustive evidence, which may be emphasised by some as confirming previous more 
limited studies while by others, as providing new arguments for criticising the fiscal 
regime in Europe. 
Twelve nations from Central and Eastern Europe recently acceded to the EU and that 
group of countries are interesting for their unique transition and accession experience 
which shaped their fiscal practices. Chapter Four analyses the fiscal sustainability of 
accession Europe. Because the region has only rarely been studied with the formal tools 
for historical fiscal sustainability analysis, the chapter represents a comprehensive 
extension of the existing literature on Europe. The literature gap so far is presumably 
due to data limitations and filling it is made possible through the exploitation of recent 
advances in panel time series econometrics. The panel approach is enjoying rising 
popularity in other areas but Chapter Four contributes to an only emerging panel sub-
strand of the literature in the fiscal sustainability field. Taking advantage of a new 
dataset, the evidence for the panel is also distinguished, within limits, from the true 
achievements of the individual countries. 
Chapter Five tackles a related question: what does fiscal sustainability benefit an 
economy running persistent current account deficits? It is argued that the external and 
the fiscal sustainability dimensions need to be bridged and concurrently assessed, to 
overcome an implied closed-economy context. The chapter develops a model for that 
with a simple testable condition. The variables of interest turn out to be generated from 
outside the government sector, and original datasets from the entire EU are duly 
constructed. Two empirical applications are then presented mirroring the previous two 
chapters. For Western Europe, the hypothesis of convergence towards open-economy 
sustainability, with a possible MaastrichtlEuro effect, is tested. For the accession 
Europe panel, the question is whether the recent large current account imbalances have 
affected the long-run economy-wide sustainability. The chapter findings may be of 
interest on their own or as complementary to those from Chapters Three and Four. The 
policy implications could be viewed as a first approximation to how open-economy 
sustainability should be interpreted. 
The concluding chapter summarises the evidence from across the thesis to answer the 
concern which cuts through it: has Europe achieved fiscal sustainability or not? Key 
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points from the proposed models and empirical strategies are highlighted, some 
limitations are acknowledged, and first directions for future research are outlined. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FOUNDATIONS OF FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
Ajourney o/a thousand miles begins with a single step. 
- Lao Tzu (604 BC - 531 BC) 
Out of the many ways to approach the fiscal sustainability area, a less expected but 
insightful one is to emphasize the monetary outcomes from certain fiscal stances of the 
economy. In the wake of an age of high inflation, Sargent and Wallace's (1981) 
'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic' showed that monetary policy cannot permanently 
control inflation when the fiscal authorities set their budgets independently. Public 
sector borrowing then is constrained by the demand for government bonds, so 
seigniorage revenue from money creation may be needed to co-finance the budget 
deficits. Adjusting the stock of money may be incompatible with inflation targets; hence 
prudence on the side of fiscal policy is required. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present the theoretical framework for fiscal policy seeking to avoid insolvency in the 
absence of sources to finance the budget deficits other than government debt. In other 
words, the emphasis is on fiscal sustainability as defined through any particular long-
run constraints in the relationship between fiscal deficit and debt. 
Whereas persistently loose fiscal policies may be inflationary, price stability is the 
primary objective of the European Central Bank. Because most of the 'old' EU 
members belong to the Euro area and the new accession countries are all required to 
join eventually, a natural research question is whether public finances in Europe have so 
far been sustainable. The theory in this chapter aims to provide the main tools for the 
empirical assessment of European fiscal sustainability in the subsequent chapters. 
Analyzing fiscal sustainability in Europe may also be motivated under the opposite 
fiscal-monetary policy regime: when the monetary authority is the first to set its targets, 
leaving the fiscal authority to adjust. The government then is constrained 'by the 
demand for bonds, since it must set its budgets so that any deficits can be financed by a 
combination of the seigniorage chosen by the monetary authority and bond sales to the 
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public' (ibid., p. 2). The monetary target may include setting the growth rate of the 
stock of money but Sargent and Wallace (1981, p. 7) also note the 'alternative monetary 
mechanisms that do impose fiscal discipline ... for example, fixed exchange rates'. On 
the national level, the E(M)U may be viewed as such a regime: without their own 
monetary powers, the individual countries face the stock of money and exchange rates 
as exogenously imposed. Fiscal discipline in each member of the monetary union is 
correspondingly a paramount requirement as set out in the Stability and Growth Pact to 
which the European Union must adhere. 
With this in mind, politicians and academics may be expected to seek to define what 
constitutes a set of 'good' fiscal policies. Are budget deficits necessarily inflationary or 
how large must they be to be inflationary while keeping the Treasury of the government 
solvent? What are the optimal bounds for an economy's indebtedness and what, if any, 
stable debt paths should be targeted? Such and related queries are sometimes 
conveniently aggregated into the question of what defines the fiscal policy as 
'sustainable'. 
Sargent (1999) discusses the monetary effects from fiscal policies in the simple case 
where zero money growth is targeted. This requires that 'government expenditures plus 
interest payments equal tax collections plus the net proceeds from new issues of 
interest-bearing debt' (ibid., p. 1471). That there are intertemporal bonds constraining 
the sequences of fiscal deficits and debts is a recurring theme in fiscal sustainability 
theory. So it will be most instructive to commence from there as the first single step. 
2.1. The IBC as the major building block 
The intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) is the indispensable starting point for 
analysing fiscal sustainability. The IBC is also sometimes referred to as the present-
value budget constraint, PVBC, or the life-time budget constraint. Among a multitude 
of theoretical and empirical texts on fiscal sustainability, Vieira (1999), Chalk and 
Hemming (2000), Ley (2003) and Burnside (2005) present conveniently concise 
treatments of the IBC arithmetic. With unavoidable adaptation, these are largely 
followed below. 
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The !BC has as its building block the 'static' (Chalk and Hemming, 2000) or 'flow' 
(Burnside, 2005) budget constraint, given by: 
(2.1) B, = R,B'_1 + D, 
where R, is the real interest factor during period (, B,.I is the quantity of debt outstanding 
in the beginning of ( (hence, bonds), and D, is the primary fiscal deficit (Le. excluding 
interest expenditures). Equally, (2.1) can be augmented by including seigniorage as a 
separate governrnent revenue source: 
(2.2) B, = R,B'_1 + D, - MJ, 
Above, AM, denotes the change in base money. Because R, = 1 + r" where r, is the 
constant real interest rate on debt, (2.2) is equivalent to: 
(2.3) B, = (1 + r, )B'_l + D, - MJ, 
Above, r, could also be an average rate, keeping the notation both simple and not too 
remote from reality. Similarly, a common assumption at this point is that all debt has a 
maturity of one period (year): an assumption seemingly acceptable under perfect 
foresight (Burnside, 2005, Chapter 2, Note 2, p. 30). Then (2.3) yields one of the 
popular representations of the 'flow' budget constraint: 
(2.4) 
The latter represents an identity linking the net issuance of debt to interest payments 
during ( for debt outstanding at the end of (-1, the primary deficit (D,) and seigniorage 
revenues between ( and (-1. 
A few preliminary notes are worth making at this stage. There may be varied 
expressions and measures for debt and deficits in (2.1) - (2.4). Government expenditures 
and revenues may also differ in assumptions about the scope of the 'governrnent' and 
the level of theoretical or observational decomposition to be considered plausible. A 
researcher may need to decide in advance on the use of real or nominal values. Finally, 
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the relevant interest rate in the constraint is often corrected for, or combined with, the 
output growth rate as shown further below'. 
The !BC arithmetic may be discussed against that background. Thus, (2.1) was given 
without any explicit reference to the degree of consolidation/size of the government 
sector. The question of whether to include, in addition to the central government, local 
governments and/or state-owned enterprises and even banks may have different 
relevance for different countries, depending on their economic structures. Buiter (2004) 
argues in favour of including the central bank's assets and liabilities in the overall 
country's fiscal-sustainability balance. Even if the central bank is operationally 
independent from the 'government of the day, it is always an agent of the state' (ibid., p. 
5). The bank enters the boundaries of the public sector because ultimately the state is 
responsible for its debts and because the state appropriates its profits and covers its 
losses. 
There may be a range of fiscal decentralisation schemes across countries and regions, 
and the consolidation of state-owned entities within the state budget may depend on 
both national accounting conventions and degrees of the entities' de facto autonomy. 
The appropriate size and coverage of the public sector is discussed at length in IMF 
(2002). 
As for the choice of real vs. nominal values, it could be argued that the flow 
government budget constraint of (2.4) is not entirely correct for empirical purposes 
since the fiscal-monetary variables are not observable directly in real terms. Assuming 
that B, D and M are nominal, equation (2.4) can be corrected as: 
(2.5) AB, = i,B'_1 + D, - flM, 
with i, being a nominal interest rate. 
There are then two useful ways to proceed with the flow budget constraint equation: one 
is to normalise it and another is to solve it forward by recursive substitution. 
Normalisation is done 'by some measure of the government's ability to service and 
I For the time being, this discussion is abstracted from any continuousMtime or stochastic settings. The 
open economy is also regarded as an extension only. 
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repay its debt' (Ley, 2003, p. 2). This is usually done by scaling (2.5) by ODP or other 
measure of the size of the economy. For example, if the sustainability analysis 
discriminates between the geographic sources of government revenues, then gross 
national product (ONP) may be used instead (Buiter and Orafe, 2004, tb. 15, p. 77). 
According to Bohn (1991a, p. 344): 'Since the nation's productive activity provides the 
basis for all taxation and since the government sector is presumably bounded by the size 
of the whole economy, it seems appropriate to use ratios of fiscal variables to ONP.' To 
keep the exposition simple here, ODP will be used as it is the 'most common choice 
used for nonnalising government debt' (Ley, 2003, p. 2). 
We can therefore rescale (2.5) by dividing by nominal ODP, i.e. by period t real ODP 
(Yi) multiplied by its deflator (P,): 
(2.6) B, . (I + i, )B'_l D, t.M, --= +-----P,~ P,~ P,~ P,~ 
In turn, (2.6) equals: 
(2.7) B, (I + i, )Bt-l D, t.M, -= +-----P,~ {I + (;I,){l +Jr,)P,-l~-l P,~ P,y, 
The denominator in the first right-hand side term of (2.7) 'discounts' nominal ODP one 
period back by taking account of real output growth rate (;I, and the inflation rate '/C, 
measured as the rate of change of the ODP deflator. The real interest rate could be 
expressed as r = i - n: - in:, so that (J + i)/(1 + '/C) = (1 + r)/(1 - "?). The latter 
approximates to (1 + i)/(1 + '/C) '" (J + r) when n: is small, e.g. less than 0.1, and hence 
(2.7) reduces t02: 
(2.8) 
where b, = BI(P,YJ, d, = DI(P,YJ and !!.m, 
(1+rJ/(1+(;IJ, (2.8) becomes: 
(2.9) b, = p,bH + d, - /!.rn, 
!!.MI(P,YJ. Substituting p, for 
2 This note resembles Ley (2003, fn. 3, p. 2). There he terms (2.6) - (2.9) the 'law of motion of the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio'. 
18 
This flow constraint can then be used to derive the final expression for the !BC. Solving 
the difference equation (2.9) forward by recursive substitution results in: 
(2.10) b - -(j+I) b _.,j..., -(HI) (d - /).m ) , - P t+ }+I L P 1+1+1 1+1+1 
1=0 
Thus (2.10) relates the initial-period debt outstanding to the debt accumulated between 
periods 1 and 1+(j+1) with jE {O .. oo}, as well as to the future primary deficits, or 
surpluses when d < 0, and seigniorage revenue. If the sequence of debt ratios is to be 
bounded in an infinite-horizon setting, then the present discounted value of terminal 
debt should be non-positive in the limit: 
(2.11) I· -(j+I)b /0 Im j--+<Jtl P I+}+I :::. 
This is the transversality condition for the difference equation (2.9). Provided that (2.11) 
holds as equality, (2.10) turns into the intertemporal budget constraint of the form: 
(2.12) h, =-:i:p-(I+I)(dt+J+l -f:Jml+i +l ) 
1=0 
What the !BC thus states is that government debt in period 1 should be equalled by a 
corresponding, in present value terms, sequence of future primary surpluses (or at least 
an excess of surpluses over deficits) and seigniorage revenues. If taken as an accounting 
identity, the !BC of(2.10) - (2.12) may be considered to hold permanently, or somewhat 
more precisely ex post (Blanchard, 1990, p. 13). That consideration is fundamental for 
the research approaches to fiscal sustainability, although interpretations may differ 
substantially. First, one may wish to focus on the specific changes envisaged ex anle in 
order to satisfY the !BC, and to also sometimes 'augment' them by further collateral 
constraint( s). A second popular approach to study sustainability is to test empirically 
past fiscal performance: to see if the !BC has actually been observed, and ifnot whether 
some fiscal adjustments are inevitable in the future. Broadly speaking, those two 
approaches have inspired the two distinct categories of fiscal sustainability studies via 
the !BC, treated in detail further below. 
Deriving the constraint's arithmetic through forward recursive substitution might 
suggest applying it readily for forecasting purposes, i.e. to draw implications for fUlure 
fiscal sustainability. That may, however, prove difficult in practice as the !BC variables 
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are supposedly uncertain and perhaps also endogenous. The simplifying assumptions 
before deriving the IBC above did assume perfect certainty and perfect foresight, and 
the relations were formalised in a seemingly rigid way: so after all implying that the 
IBC is an accounting identity. Therefore the simple IBC arithmetic in (2.10) - (2.12) 
should indeed be emphasized as an ex post appearance of the fiscal stance. Still, there 
remains ground not only for the backward-looking research but also for more normative 
endeavours to analyse sustainability: because 'a most fertile source for insight is 
hindsight' (Ley, 2003, p. I). IBC applications in that regard, sometimes evolving into 
specific sustainability indicators, are reviewed later. 
The exposition of the IBC is also at the core of a debate about the proper defmition of 
the budget deficit/surplus. In a seminal contribution McCallum (1984) described how 
the IBC allows for a permanent sequence of primary, exclusive of interest, deficits only 
if the latter were financed by money creation. Conversely, McCallum showed that if the 
permanent deficits were defined as incorporating interest expenditures, the IBC will not 
be violated even if seigniorage was non-existent. Intuitively, such a scenario is 
illustrated with a government running in each period a primary surplus just sufficient to 
cover some of the debt-service costs (Chalk and Hernming, 2000, p. 5). Then there will 
be an overall deficit, but debt will grow less than the rate of interest: in the framework 
above, debt will grow at a rate less than r in (2.8), thus satisfying the transversality 
condition (2.11)3. 
McCallum's (1984) analysis also contains an early perspective on the contentious 
Ricardian properties of the !BC. The 'monetarist' hypothesis tested by McCallum is 
whether bond-financed changes (reductions) in tax revenues ultimately have no effect 
on the price level. Such a 'Ricardian' regime implies that the monetary authority sets its 
targets independently, with the fiscal authority seeking a fiscal balance compatible with 
the demand for bonds by the public. Thus the 'Ricardian equivalence theorem' 
examined by McCallum (1984) essentially requires the government to observe its IBC 
in the absence of undesired inflation4• A similar example of policy sequences is when 
the monetary authority is to 'move first and thereby impose discipline on the fiscal 
authority' (Sargent and Wallace, 1981, p. 7). 
3 Abstracting for a moment from the growth rate of the economy (et = 0). 
4 For a fairly recent literature review on the 'Ricardian equivalence' see Ricciuti (2003). 
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Afonso (2005a) confirms the Ricardian regime hypothesis for the EU countries between 
1970 and 2003. As noted at the outset, the monetary policy dominance necessitating 
fiscal discipline is to be expected in the supranational monetary framework in Europe. 
Although assessing European fiscal sustainability however, this thesis does not 
explicitly test which policy regime dominates. This is compatible with the theoretical 
caveat that the !BC can also allow for the opposite 'fiscal dominant' regime where 
monetary policy adjusts to fiscal policy rather than vice versa. The monetary 
adjustments occur through seigniorage, therefore affecting the price level to restore the 
!BC in cases when 'irresponsible' fiscal policies have led to a deterioration in the debt 
and deficit. So, with this argument one may go further to assume that it is in fact fiscal 
policy that determines prices: this is the message of the fiscal theory of the price level. 
Then the !BC may not even be regarded as a constraint but as a tool for valuing 
government debt. 
That 'valuation equation' perspective gives the following altemative interpretation of 
the !BC. There is no constraint as such on the government to borrow more, but it is 
rather that the nominal government debt in combination with the (expected) present 
value of future surpluses determines the price level. In this regard an expression akin to 
(2.12) turns out to be 'the government valuation equation, formerly known as the 
govemment budget constraint' as Cochrane (2005, p. 526) asserts. Cochrane contends 
that the fiscal theory of the price level 'does not mistreat' the !BC exactly because the 
theory regards a relation such as (2.12) as a valuation equation without imposing an 
alternative constraint. 
The reasoning behind condition (2.11) ought to be re-assessed then, for it is central to 
the !BC. Examining (2.11) further reveals how (2.12) creates a true constraint on fiscal 
policies. 
The transversality condition (2.11) was imposed as a non-positive limit to terminal 
government debt, also known as the no-Ponzi game restriction for the government. In 
1920 in Boston Mr Charles Ponzi set up a business of attracting public deposits with the 
promise to pay substantial interest. The promise was delivered upon by covering interest 
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and principal payments with newly-attracted public funds, until this 'pyramid' scheme 
eventually collapsed. 
Without that restriction (2.10) shows that the government could roll its current debt over 
forever. Such an opportunity of continuously rolling over both principal and interest 
payments is also known as a 'rational Ponzi game' policy (O'Connell and Zeldes, 
1988). It relies on the proposition that the government would always be able to sell its 
bonds, i.e. that in the infinite horizon the public, or at least one individual, will be 
willing to hold bonds. But that is deemed infeasible as long as lenders are of finite 
number and represent infmitely lived consumers with their wealth not growing at a rate 
faster than the rate of interest. O'Connell and Zeldes call the alternative of allowing 
individual wealth to grow faster than interest 'consumption inefficiency': then it is 
possible for an individual on the lending side in some period to raise consumption 
without lowering it in some other period(s) (ibid., pp. 435-436). To put it intuitively, 
without such 'inefficiency' for at least one period an agent on the lending side would be 
giving up consumption. For that individual, the 'option of holding a debt that will be 
continuously rolled over is strictly dominated by that of holding no debt at all' (Chalk 
and Hemming, 2000, p. 4). At the aggregate level the transversality condition can be left 
not satisfied, and so the government may play the Ponzi game, only if there is infinite 
number of individuals entering the economy and the lending market over time. 
It should then be argued why (2.11) was taken to hold as an equality in order to derive 
the !BC in (2.12), since the transversality condition (2.11) required the discounted value 
of terminal debt to be only non-positive. The equality, as the 'standard' transversality 
.condition, arises from a combination of two conditions: (a) that individuals rule out 
being on the lending side, i.e. (2.11) is non-positive, and (b) that individuals also rule 
out being on the borrowing side, i.e. (2.11) is also non-negative. The latter observation 
is again found in O'Connell and Zeldes (1988, p. 437): not ruling that option out would 
enable individuals themselves to run 'rational Ponzi schemes' against the government. 
O'Connell and Zeldes contend that it is in a dynamically Pareto inefficient economy 
that the government might run a 'rational Ponzi game". That is why a further important 
set of implications for the !BC in (2.12) is derived related to the dynamics of p. 
5 An assessment of dynamic efficiency is presented in Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989). 
More on dynamic efficiency and debt roll·over under uncertainty: in Blanchard and Weil (1992). 
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Whenever the real growth rate of the economy is less· than the real interest rate, p 
exceeds unity and thus the system characterised by the first-order difference equation 
(2.9) becomes unstable (Hamilton, 1994, pp. 1-3). The debt-ratio b path becomes 
explosive as a result of any single impulse change in the primary deficit less 
seigniorage. That provides another way of justifying why in order to have an upper 
bound on the debt ratio sequence the limit in (2.11) should be approaching zero. And as 
long as the sequence of future primary surpluses plus seigniorage revenue is also 
bounded, the !BC of(2.12) may also exist in its limit'. 
Opposite reasoning applies when the economy grows at a real pace faster than that of 
interest and so p is less than I. The system of (2.9) is stable, meaning that the sequence 
of debt ratios could to some extent be compatible even with permanent primary deficits 
minus seigniorage. Putting it less formally, when the economy grows faster than debt 
the denominators in the ratios of (2.9) adequately 'support' Ihe whole of the rise in debt 
in period I due to interest expenditures on previous-period debt, and some of the rise in 
debt in period I due to primary deficits less seigniorage in period I. Viewed from 
another angle, when (J persistently exceeds r the debt/ODP ratio b may be declining 
because output growth exceeds debt growth: even though under those circumstances the 
inverse of the discount factor in (2.11) will be above unity and the 'standard' 
transversality condition necessary in the present-value model will not hold. The latter 
may be regarded as a 'paradox' of the !BC of (2.10) - (2.12): but that 'paradox' exists 
only as long as a negativeinterest-growth differential is plausible in reality. 
An economy where the growth rate exceeds the interest rate is termed 'dynamically 
inefficient'. Following Diamond (1965) that is an economy where the investment return 
is below the economy's growth rate. The '!BC paradox' above explains why O'Connell 
and Zeldes (1988) regarded dynamic inefficiency as allowing the government to run the 
'rational' Ponzi game. Under such circumstances 'an increase in current debt has no 
implications for future surpluses' (Wilcox, 1989, p. 291). 
It may therefore be concluded that, regardless of whether dynamic inefficiency is being 
ruled out or not, the transversality condition and the !BC alone do not rigorously impose 
an upper limit on government debt ralio. Neither is the debt ratio required to decline. 
• For the analogy of the 'market fundamentals' solution see Hamilton (1994, p. 39). 
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What sufficiently bounds a government's -fiscal policies under the !BC is for the 
debt/GDP ratio asymptotically to approach zero. 
But the debt ratio may approach zero in the limit even with a rising debt leveL The latter 
may happen in both of the following two cases: (a) imposing the transversality 
condition with dynamic efficiency, when the debt ratio discounted by the growth-
corrected real interest rate declines in the long run; and (b) under dynamic inefficiency. 
In case (b), the system in (2.9) is stable but perpetual rollover of the debt level becomes 
possible and the transversality condition for ruling out Ponzi-type financing of 
continuous deficits cannot be imposed. 
Even if a constraint similar to (2.10) - (2.12) is analogously derived when fiscal 
variables are not expressed as ratios to GDP, the !BC again imposes no bound on the 
level of debt. Then, transversality would only require that debt does not grow faster than 
the discounting factor. 
The possibility of a rising level of debt casts a shadow regarding the fiscal sustainability 
concerns. The controversies surrounding the !BC translate into two essential questions. 
First, does adherence to the !BC imply any particular concept of fiscal sustainability? 
Second, to what extent is the !BC sufficient to impose fiscally sustainable behaviour, i.e. 
is there a need to complement the simple arithmetic above by additional (collateral) 
constraints? 
The !BC is taken by and large as the cornerstone in nearly all forms and variations of 
fiscal sustainability analysis. Therefore the answer to the first question only requires 
drawing the subtle distinction between the two concepts often interchangeably used: 
fiscal sustainability and fiscal solvency. 
The second question is addressed from section 2.2 onwards. 
One common broad definition of fiscal sustainability is that current debt should be 
matched by the present value of future primary surpluses. This definition corresponds to 
the !BC of(2.12) above. From this perspective, as just discussed, sustainability does not 
either bound the debt level or require that debt decline over time. The debt ratio may 
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also vary and stay high over long periods, provided that it approaches zero in the limit 
following the transversality condition. 
Fiscal solvency, on the other hand, is often used to apply to a government being capable 
of serving its debt without defaulting on it. Hence an informal alternative to defining 
fiscal sustainability is a fiscal policy stance which neither currently nor in the future if 
kept unchanged is to jeopardise solvency. Buiter (2004, p. 4, fh. 3) provides a somewhat 
weaker condition, re-stating the 'sustainability criterion' 'in an uncertain world' as 
when government policies do not 'result in an unacceptable risk of insolvency'. 
Burnside (2005, p. 12) contends that even when a government is 'likely to remain 
solvent ... its fiscal policies may be costly' and fiscal sustainability may refer to the 
'ongoing costs associated with a particular combination of fiscal and monetary 
policies' • 
Such nuances in delineating fiscal sustainability and solvency may ultimately be 
amalgamated and reduced to much coarser pragmatic explanations. Thus Ley (2003, p. 
5) states that fiscal policy is sustainable 'if the government's solvency condition is 
satisfied', where the 'solvency condition' refers to a variant of the !BC in which the 
present values of government debts and surpluses are balanced. Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay (2005, p. 5) presumably share a widespread practitioners' belief that 
'a solvent government is one that satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint'. 
In what follows, notions of fiscal sustainability that are as closely as possible associated 
with the !BC will be discussed. It might be noted in advance that derming sustainability 
distinct from solvency echoes the more profound discrepancies that mark the theory and 
practice of fiscal sustainability analysis. On theoretical grounds, one may argue that 
solvency would be ensured through the inevitable ex post fiscal adjustments: because 
the !BC always holds. Even sometimes those adjustments could, or should, be estimated 
in advance. However, satisfying the long-run !BC may not in the real, short-term, world 
suffice for fiscal policies to score as sustainable: e.g. some limitations on the 
government debt or deficit should be imposed. The latter may also turn into indicators 
for benchmarking a sustainable fiscal stance. Those concerns explain why 'there is 
something of disconnect between the theoretical work that has been done on fiscal 
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sustainability and assessment of fiscal sustainability in practice' (Chalk and Hemming, 
2000, p. 24). The differing attitudes towards sustainability have also shaped the distinct 
strands of the theoretical literature, as shown next. 
2.2. The 'constrained sustainability' approach 
The theoretical and practical controversies around the fiscal sustainability concept(s) 
have given rise to a multiplicity of approaches. Those may be classified into two broad 
categories. One such category has evolved a diverse area of formal backward-looking 
statistical tests employed to study fiscal sustainability. They are discussed in section 2.3. 
Gauging fiscal sustainability constraints 
A second strand in the literature may be defined to comprise all works that stem from 
the understanding that 'just waiting' for an ex post realisation of the IBC is by itself not 
sufficient to assess a past, existing or expected policy mix as 'sustainable'. That attitude 
is rooted in at least two propositions: one of a more positive and one of a more 
normative nature. First, allowing government debt (or debt ratio) to grow without 
bounds as long as its discounted value asymptotically converges to zero (as implied by 
an IBC's transversality condition) may be unrealistic in practice. There may be 
limitations either to a government's capacity to tax (Kremers, 1989) or to the 
willingness of the public to buy and hold government debt (Sargent and Wallace, 1981), 
or to both. In a 'dynamically inefficient' economy, the debt ratio may be declining and 
yet still be unable to satisfy the transversality condition. In that case the fiscal stance 
would still be classified as 'unsustainable'. Hence, there is a need to derive special 
fiscal sustainability rules based on indicators used to 'strengthen' the basic IBC 
arithmetic. 
Second, even if the IBC is satisfied, policies and external conditions may change in the 
future. A focus only on past perfonnance and whether the borrowing constraint has 
been satisfied, though convenient for empirical purposes, may prove of little value for 
assessing the future evolution of sustainability. Moreover, the 'trivial' IBC approach 
may not readily be employed to yield concrete quantitative recommendations about 
policy changes ex ante. But it is desirable to analyse past and current fiscal perfonnance 
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so as to spot indications for future adjustments needed to restore any deviations from 
the !BC. An alternative would be to introduce simple rules to constrain fiscal policies 
even beyond the !BC (a low ceiling on permissible debt would be an example). In both 
latter cases, the fiscal authority would be motivated to impose some constraints today, 
and to act pro-actively notwithstanding the positive belief that the !BC would always 
hold in the end. 
The arguable limitations of backward-looking-only fiscal sustainability analysis have 
thus justified the need either to calculate ex ante the ex post adjustments that will occur, 
or to augment the !BC of the (2.12) type by further (stronger) sustainability criteria. 
That constitutes a popular divergent strand of the fiscal sustainability literature in the 
last two decades. In more practical terms, the emphasis there is on the need to adhere to 
(or achieve) fiscal sustainability through certain sustainability indicators or rules. 
Somewhat loosely terming it the 'constrained sustainability' approach, a selection of 
literature examples that are best acknowledged or most expressive are presented now. 
B1anchard's fIScal Indicators 
In an influential contribution, Blanchard (1990) put forward a set of indicators for fiscal 
sustainability. His intent was to address sustainability as one of the aspects of fiscal 
policy, expressed by the questions 'Can the current course of fiscal policy be sustained, 
without exploding - or imploding - debt? Or will the government have to increase taxes, 
decrease spending, have recourse to monetisation, or even repudiation?' (ibid, p. 10). 
That set of adjustment options are the possible scenarios in order for the !BC to be 
satisfied ex post always: the indicators are essential for giving a measure of the 
adjustments required. 
The first indicator is based on a rule that keeps the current debt/GDP ratio constant, thus 
imposing directly the non-increasing debt (ratio) as a fiscal sustainability criterion. The 
emphasis is put on the primary deficit needed to achieve that. Resembling the 
expression in (2.9) above, Blanchard's first indicator looks like: 
(2.13) d-d, =-[(r, -B,)b, +d,] 
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This time d denotes the primary deficit needed to stabilise the debt ratio, 
d =-(r,-B,)b,. For rand e, one possibility suggested by Blanchard was to use their 
actual values or their averages for some period back. 
This first 'primary gap indicator' of fiscal sustainability could not easily be used for 
assessing sustainability ex ante, because no future changes are envisaged for the 
government revenues and expenditures or the economy as a whole. That is why two 
further indicators are proposed. 
Looking at the tax-to-output ratio, rather than the deficit (surplus), needed to stabilise 
the current debt ratio, Blanchard derives the 'sustainable tax rate'. That is the tax/GDP 
ratio that for some years ahead keeps debt unchanged, given a future sequence of 
government expenditures (G) as a share of output: 
(2.14) - 1 " t =- Lg'+I +(r -B )bo 
n 1+1=1 
where g, = Gff,. The first term in the right-hand side of (2.14) shows the average over 
the current and the next (n+l) years, and r and e are assumed not to be large'. 
Blanchard's second indicator is the 'medium-term tax gap'. It measures the difference 
between the 'sustainable' tax rate for the next three years and the current tax/GDP ratio: 
(2.15) 
- I 2 
t,-t, = - Lg,+, +(r -B)bo -t, 3/:0 
Blanchard (ibid., p. 15) admits that the choice of three years is arbitrary, depending 
ultimately on the period for which projections for government expenditures are 
available before averaging them as in (2.15). That is how the third, 'long-term tax gap' 
indicator is suggested: 
(2.16) - I 49 t,,-t, = - Lgl+l +(r -B)bo -t, 50
'
•0 
1 Blanchard's original expressions differ slightly from here, in that the tax indicators are derived from a 
continuous-time setting and government transfers are added to expenditures 
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That indicator is similar to (2.15) but the 'sustainable' tax rate over a longer time 
period, say fifty years, is used instead. Such a forward projection is admittedly hard to 
construct, as it would have to account for 'possibly significant future changes in 
expenditures, transfers and other likely fiscal or fiscal-related government expenditures. 
Blanchard's fiscal sustainability indicators are elaborated on in a subsequent paper by 
Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990). Two important points are made 
about the tax-related second and third indicators. First, it is affirmed that despite the 
'symmetry of treatment' between the components of primary deficit the indicators are 
inspired by an assumption that a government is more likely to be committed to the 
current expenditures programmes, hence taxes are more likely to be used for 
adjustment. Still, a positive value of tax gap indicators does not imply that taxes should 
be increased: 'the index is agnostic as to whether the adjustment should come from 
increased taxes, or decreased spending and transfers' (ibid., p. 13). 
Two assumptions central to those indicators are also acknowledged (ibid., p. 14): that 
the interest-growth rates differential is positive, and that the debt/output ratio is bounded 
to converge to a certain value in the long run. The latter suggests imposing the familiar 
transversality condition, and not totally ruling out an increasing debt (ratio). 
Imposing the assumption of a non-increasing debt/GDP ratio, or one which converges to 
some particular value, confirms the rationale for classifYing Blanchard's fiscal 
sustainability indicators into the 'constrained sustainability' group. Taken against the 
afore-mentioned controversies regarding both the ex ante assessment of fiscal 
sustainability and the sufficiency of the !BC to define deviations from fiscal 
sustainability, Blanchard's indicators reveal an approach which is intuitively appealing 
and in line with the !BC. Still, the approach has clear limitations. First, it is not entirely 
conclusive about the sustainable debt ratio path: as acknowledged by the author(s), the 
debt ratio could grow as long as it is bounded by a form of transversality condition to 
converge to some limit value. This collateral constraint may not be plausible in reality 
for at least two reasons. The debt growth as earlier discussed may be limited because of 
the economy's capacity to service it or the public's willingness to buy and hold 
government debt. Also the interest-growth rate differential may not sometime be 
positive and then 'the discussion of sustainability would be very different' (ibid., p. 15). 
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Furthermore, Blanchard's indicators alone may not yield uniform conclusions across 
different countries. Positive values of the indicators may have different policy 
implications: in one country the current tax ratio may already be relatively high or in 
another the initial debt ratio may already be relatively high. The former would make it 
both economically and politically harder to raise taxes further; the latter implies a need 
for a larger and/or faster primary surplus adjustment. 
Blanchard's fiscal sustainability indicators may require projections of key variables, 
sometimes far into the future, which are often unavailable or highly uncertain. Finally, 
they are indicative of what is required for policies to stay, or to become, sustainable but 
it is worth noting that when the time for adjustment actually arrives, the constraints 
faced by the government may look different. For instance the indicators give the 
taxation adjustment needed to achieve fiscal sustainability today but if delayed, the 
required adjustment may be higher if debt ratio has increased, i.e. ho changes in (2.14) 
above. 
Some of those limitations are grasped and accounted for by the author(s), and some of 
the limitations are also generic among the whole family of fiscal 'constrained 
sustainability' approaches. It is therefore revealing to stress Blanchard's own 
interpretation that the indicators reflect a belief that the 'issues of sustainability 
basically involve only accounting identities and the use of forecasts' (Blanchard, 1990, 
p.7). 
Buiter's 'permanent' rules 
In a series of papers Willem H. Buiter developed a distinct method for fiscal 
sustainability analysis, which yet markedly belongs to the 'constrained sustainability' 
category. Many aspects of the fiscal stance are taken into account, so the resulting 
indicators reflect further-reaching concepts about a government's policy mix. Yet it is 
the IBC, the deviations from it or the need to impose additional benchmark conditions 
that allow for Buiter's indicators to be taken as exemplifying the more normative' fiscal 
constraints' approach. The following discussion is based on Buiter (1990), Buiter 
(2003), Buiter (2004) and Buiter and Grafe (2004). 
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An intertemporal budget identity similar to the one specified in (2.10) above is arrived 
at in Buiter (1990). To turn that identity into a constraint, the familiar transversality 
condition of a zero terminal (net) debt is assumed. Buiter interprets that to be the 
constraint on solvency which the feasible fiscal, financial and monetary plans should 
satisfY. 
The government may ex ante plan or project a sequence of policies which, if pursued 
effectively, will violate the solvency constraint: and then debt repUdiation would have to 
restore the constraint ex post. Such a hypothetical deviation from the !BC is therefore to 
be the subject of fiscal sustainability assessment, and that has inspired Buiter's 
'constrained sustainability' approach. In Buiter's framework, the role of the permanent 
fiscal indicators/variables becomes central. 
The first such measure is about the 'permanent deficit', defined as a share of trend 
output as: 
(2.17) d P = (r-B)(PVS-NW) 
where r denotes the real interest rate and B is a notation for the real output growth rate 
as before, both currently expected/constant. PVS stands for the present value of the 
spending plans of the government (ibid., p. 68) and NW is the net worth of the public 
sector (ibid., p. 63). Buiter's permanent deficit notion emphasises its measure as a 
'perpetuity equivalent or annuity value' (ibid, p. 68) of the ex ante fiscal divergence: so 
(2.17) reveals an implicit recommendation to measure deficit in market-value terms. 
The concern of whether to value debt and deficits nominally or at some market price is 
an important issue in much ofthe fiscal sustainability literature, as will be seen later. 
While Buiter admits that the permanent deficit will never materialise in reality and not 
even be 'permanent' per se, a constraint like (2.17) depicts the 'permanent adjustment 
that must be made, to spending, to receipts, or to seigniorage, in order to achieve 
solvency' (ibid, p. 68). Similar reasoning could be applied to the next two permanent 
fiscal sustainability indicators. 
The first one defines the 'constant net worth· deficit as a share of trend output: 
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(2.18) d W = G' - (r' - O)NW 
whereas the second one defines the 'permanent income' deficit as a share of trend 
output: 
(2.19) dP! = G' -(r' -O)NW 
Above, (2.19) differs from (2.18) only in that the long real rate, r', rather than the short 
one, r', is used. One of Buiter's interpretations of (2.19) is that it is constructed in an 
effort to smooth out expected time fluctuations of a varying short rate. But the ultimate 
argument behind the 'permanent income deficit' measure is that it concerns a current 
spending programme which mirrors the way households' consumption relates to 
households' permanent income. Thus basically the 'permanent income' deficit 
represents the deviation of government current spending from the constant highest 
possible sustainable spendings. 
The deficit in both latter cases is again expressed as a ratio to output, and is priced as a 
perpetuity with the growth-corrected real interest rate. Unlike the 'permanent deficit' 
measure of (2.17), which merely reiterates the !BC and the permanent ex post 
consistency with it of public sector spending and revenues, the 'constant net worth' and 
the 'permanent income' fiscal deficits centre around additional constraints. These 
constraints are the following: either the net worth is kept constant (2.18) or the net 
worth is associated with the public sector's 'permanent income' (2.19). Unlike the 
'permanent deficit' measure, the latter two rule out any changes in net worth that are 
expected to adjust the ex ante discrepancy in the intertemporal budget identity. 
Regardless of whether extra constraints are imposed or whether the inevitable future 
fiscal adjustments are stressed as in (2.17), the approach calls for a forward-looking and 
pro-active fiscal policy by the authorities. That is what justifies labelling Buiter's (1990) 
definitions 'constrained sustainability' ones. 
Drawing on some of Buiter's earlier ideas, a 'permanent balance' rule is outlined in 
detail by Buiter and Grafe (2004). Initially appearing within the E(M)U context, its 
more general relevance and instructive features call for a separate discussion. Somewhat 
• Miller (1983) and Miller and Babbs (1983) are acknowledged to have proposed the application of the 
(familiar) permanent income approach to public-sector fiscal sustainability, 
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contrary to Buiter's previous permanent measures, especially (2.18) and (2.19) above, 
which are implicitly rooted in a requirement to smooth out the ex ante IBC 
discrepancies through adjustments on the spending side, the 'permanent balance' rule 
allows for a much more flexible and rich set of adjustment paths. 
A 'permanent' primary surplus-to-GDP ratio is defined first as 'that constant primary ... 
ratio whose present discounted value is the same as the present discounted value of the 
actual (or anticipated) future sequence of primary surplus-GDP ratios' (ibid., p. 73). 
'Permanent' counterparts to other indicators are then defined analogously; they are 
given as constants whose present discounted values equal the present discounted values 
of the actual/anticipated future sequences of revenues, expenditures, etc. So a 
'permanent' version of an IBC is arrived at'; 
(2.20) Tt +'I'PkP -gf -g~ -gf 
r P -BP 
The variables are expressed as ratios to GDP and the superscripts denote their 
'permanent' nature. Correspondingly, rf is the permanent primary surplus, r' is the 
permanent long-run real interest rate and f!' is the permanent long-run output growth 
rate. Then i' stands for the permanent total current revenues and is decomposed into the 
'permanent' expressions for the gross financial returns on the public sector 'capital 
stock' (vJ'/f) and for other current revenues (Tt). Total permanent public spending is 
denoted by if, which is in its turn decomposed into permanent transfers and subsidies 
(gf), consumption (gn and capital formation (gf). Essentially (2.20) sets the upper 
limit for the sustainable outstanding debt/GDP ratio, and as such it is a truly 
constraining fiscal rule. 
Further manipulations of (2.20) yield a 'permanent balance' rule for the non-primary 
government deficit, again as a share ofGDP (cl'); 
(2.21) 
9 Appendix 2.B provide~ details about the derivation of equations 2.20 and 2.21. 
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where r' and 8' are the short rates of interest and GDP growth, respectively, and 7C is as 
before the inflation rate. Pairs of variables in (2.21) denote deviations of actual from 
'permanent' values. At first glance this 'permanent balance rule' seems to highlight the 
constraints for the general deficit, but looking at all possible dynamic combinations in 
(2.21) a great flexibility of this version of the !BC is revealed. The 'permanent balance 
rule' for the deficit clearly manifests that a higher debt/GDP ratio permits higher deficit: 
by which the rule is somewhat distinct from the family of rule-based fiscal sustainability 
indicators where the constraint takes a static form. In this sense, (2.21) contains a host 
of dynamic fiscal constraints. 
The flexibility of (2.21) is due to the fact that it accommodates a number of different 
adjustment paths for the fiscal variables. Thus, the debt ratio may be reduced with 
output growth, but also the public sector deficit may safely without threatening solvency 
be increased with the size of the deviation of any component of public spending from its 
permanent level lO• 
The 'permanent balance' rule has the appealing facet to be fully compatible with the 
intertemporal dimensions of solvency constraints without sacrificing the options for 
more diverse fmancing and spending patterns. As seen from (2.21), a government may 
resort both to expenditures in excess of their permanent level and to raising the 
debt/GDP ratio without violating the 'permanent' version of the !BC. Additional 
collateral conditionality may always be imposed though. 
The rule also allows the anti-cyclical automatic stabilisers to operate unrestrictedly. 
This point should be noted because fiscal rules per se may not necessarily induce 
counter-cyclical fiscal behaviour. Fiscal constraints limiting the size of debt and deficit 
may disallow public spending and transfer outlays intended to stimulate recovery, while 
at the same time being irrelevant to pressures during economic upturns for excessively 
expansionary fiscal policies eventually eroding public financesll • This seems not to be 
the case with the 'permanent balance' rule in (2.21). 
lO To limit the risk of default which increases with the debt/GDP ratio, Builer and Grafe (2004) further 
'augment' the 'permanent balance' rule. 
11 Fairly recent overviews of this controversy. as well as exampJes of procyclical fiscal biases, are 
contained in Kennedy and Robbins (2001) and Fiess (2004). More about the role of automatic fiscal 
stabilisers: in Van den Noord (2000). 
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The 'permanent balance' rule represents a coherent and more meticulous endeavour to 
reconcile the !BC-rooted solvency and fiscal prudence with flexibility. Yet its 
conceptual attractiveness does not conceal the practical difficulties in applying the rule. 
Like the first of Buiter's 'permanent' rules, it requires projections and/or long-term 
counterparts for a whole set of fiscal and other variables. The 'permanent' fiscal values 
are not directly empirically observable, hence constructing quantitative indicators based 
on Buiter's rules may require not merely projections but also some form of public 
commitments to follow certain policies, e.g. about expenditures. 
From theory to practice: Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact rules 
The rules of Blanchard and Buiter are based on the !BC framework augmented by 
various auxiliary conditions. They focus on the specific adjustments advocated ex ante, 
hence their classification within the 'constrained sustainability' strand of literature. 
Independently, there have emerged important practical examples of 'constrained 
sustainability' in the fiscal area. The following discussion aims to address neither the 
controversies around the existing fiscal rules in Europe nor the vast literature and 
practices of fiscal rules in general l2• The intent is rather to relate them to the 
fundamental logic of the !BC and the notion(s) of fiscal solvency and sustainability. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was adopted in 1997 by the European Council to 
underline 'the importance of safeguarding sound government finances'. Legally, the 
SGP consists of three 'pillars'. The first one, concerning the political commitroents, is 
in the Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact signed in 
Amsterdam on 17 June 1997 (Resolution 97/C 236101). The second and third 'pillars' 
concern the preventive and the dissuasive elements respectively and are in two further 
Council regulations: Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies, and Council Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifYing the 
12 The area ofjiscal rules, including those not originating directly from an IBC, calls for research on its 
own. For an extensive overview of the reasoning behind and the practical perfonnance of fiscal rules see 
Kennedy and Robbins (200 I), OECD (2002), and more recently Debrun, Moulin, Turrini, Ayuso·i-Casals 
and Kumar (2008). More examples of fiscal rules in practice are presented below. 
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implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. The two regulations were amended 
in mid-2005 (by Regulation 1055/2005 and Regulation 105612005). 
The major SOP fiscal constraint is summed up by the Council in the statement that 
.'adherence to the objective of sound budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus 
will allow all Member States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the 
government deficit within the reference value of 3 percent of ODP' (Resolution 97/C 
236/01). The Resolution makes it clear that the provisions of the SOP do not amend the 
requirements laid down in the Maastricht Treaty regarding participation in the third 
stage of the EMU but try to enhance the budget discipline in that final stage of the 
monetary union through the avoidance of excessive deficitsl3• 
Not amending the Maastricht Treaty means adhering to the two reference values 
described in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty: the 3 
percent for the ratio of planned or actual government general deficit to gross domestic 
product at market prices, and the 60 percent for the ratio of government debt to ODP at 
market prices. It is gross rather than net debt that is referred to in Article 2 of the 
Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure. Inasmuch as the SOP is focused on the 
deficit and not on the debt criterion, it may be argued that the former plays a dominant 
role in EU's perception of fiscal sustainability once the monetary union starts to 
function (Article I of Regulation 1467/97). Buiter and Orafe (2004, p. 89) also infer that 
the debt criterion applies to full-EMU candidates (i.e. those in stages one and two), but 
does not apply to existing EMU members or EU members with the 'EMU-opt-out 
clause' (the United Kingdom and Denmark) 
Thus the Maastricht Treaty and the SOP taken together contain two clear-cut fiscal rules 
or legislatedfiscal constraints. Two sets of arguments could be put forward to assess the 
relevance of E(M}U's rules to the conceptual framework for fiscal sustainability as 
discussed here. First, a review of the historical 'heritage' for the rules may yield an 
indirect clue about the extent to which they are intended to safeguard fiscal 
sustainability. Second, a formalisation of the rules and their direct comparison to some 
IBC-compatible representation used above may provide further insights. 
13 The Maastricht Treaty is more formally known as the Treaty on European Union, signed on 7 February 
1992. 
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As contended by Buiter and Grafe (2004), the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP do not 
expressly explain why those exact fiscal targets were selected. Historical data and 
comparisons are often taken as an informal explanation for the concrete values. Starting 
with deficits, the initial 12 full-member Euro area had an average deficit exceeding the 
3 percent reference value for over a decade prior to 1992, the year of the Treaty (HM 
Treasury, 2004, p. 14, chart 3.1). The EUI2 and EUI5 average public deficits were 
below 3 percent for the first time in 1997, the year of the adoption of the SGP, and have 
remained below 3 percent ever since, though with a deteriorating trend since the year 
2000'4• The latter fact is sometimes interpreted as a sign of the fiscal discipline imposed 
by the Pact. Nevertheless, no historical reference for the 3 percent deficit ceiling, prior 
to its formulation, exists. 
Another explanation relates the deficit criterion to the 'golden rule' featuring in the 
German constitution, according to which public deficit should not go over public sector 
investment. For the twenty years before the Maastricht Treaty, public sector investment 
averaged 2.3 percent of GDP in Gennany (Buiter and Grafe, 2004, p. 90). Considering 
that country's reputation for sound fiscal performance and its role in shaping up the 
EMU, such explanation may be plausible yet it does not reveal any more formalised 
theoretical foundation for the deficit constraint. 
Similarly, the question of why an exactly 60 percent reference value for the general 
government gross debVGDP ratio has been imposed does not elucidate much the fiscal 
sustainability implications of the debt constraint. For the years just preceding the 
Maastricht Treaty the average debVGDP ratio for the Euro area was below 60 percent 
(HM Treasury, 2004, p. 14, chart 3.1). For the debt ratio it does not appear this time that 
the Treaty and SGP have perfonned a stabilising and disciplining role. In fact, the debt 
ratio was going up starting from 1992 and subsequently breached the reference value of 
60 percent. Gross debt to GDP in the Euro area was 70.8 percent in 2003 and 71.3 
percent in 2004 (EC, 2005, Table 1.3, p. 24). The EU as a whole performed only slightly 
better (see Table 4.2 in Chapter Four). 
While 'historical' explanations for the Maastricht Treaty/SGP fiscal targets are of little 
value in justifying how they improve fiscal sustainability, some credit could be given if 
14 The Euro area had a public balance of -2.8 percent in 2003 and -2.7 percent in 2004 (not cyclically 
adjusted numbers; source: BC, 200S, Table 1.2, p. 23; also see Table 4.1 in Chapter Four). 
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the rules can possibly be related to the solvency/sustainability constraints outlined 
earlier. One such instance may be sought in the constraint of (2.8) above. Assuming 
stabilisation of debts (i.e. b, = b,.I ) and deficits (i.e. d,(J +OJ = d,), with output level in 
every next period equal to initial output times (1+ OJ, and if as in (2.7) r '" i -" when 
both i and " are small, (2.8) results in: 
(2.22) b = d +ib (,,+0 ) 
if the seigniorage term (Llm,) in (2.8) is omitted for simplicity. In (2.22) there are no 
time subscripts under the assumptions for stable debt and deficit ratios and constant 
rates of inflation, nominal interest and output growth. Thus if one expects an E(M)U 
member country to have a debt ratio of 60 percent, an inflation rate of 2 percent (the 
annual target ceiling of the ECB) and a real growth rate of 3 percent, then the identity in 
(2.22) requires a non-primary deficit of 3 percent. Such a steady-state relationship may 
over-optimistically rely on a real average and constant growth rate of as high as 3 
percent per annum but is surely compatible with a solvency budget constraint. 
A more direct assessment of the extent to which the constraints of MaastrichtlSGP 
comply with fiscal sustainability criteria is obtained when they are formalised 
algebraically. As in Buiter (2003), the deficit rule is decomposed into: 
(2.23) General deficit rule cf = d + ib ::: 0.03 
(2.24) Medium-term balance rule d; = d, + i,b, :s; 0 
where the subscripts denote cyclically adjusted variables and cf is the total deficit. 
(2.23) is to capture the 'cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit 
within the reference value of3 percent ofGDP' and (2.24) corresponds to the notion of 
'close to balance or in surplus'. 
From (2.22) it follows that Llb = 0 = d + ib - (" + O)b, hence from (2.24) Buiter's 
(2003) expression for the medium-term change in the debt ratio is: 
(2.25) Ab, =d; -(tt, +O,)b 
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with the subscripts denoting cyclically adjusted variables as. before. The cyclically 
adjusted change in debt over some period equals the cyclically adjusted general deficit 
for that period minus the decline of the debt ratio caused by the cyclically adjusted 
nominal GDP growth". 
As the deficit from (2.24) is used, and with a positive real rate of output growth () and 
positive initial value of debt, in (2.25) the debt/GDP ratio will fall steadily in the 
medium term. That is why the Maastricht Treaty/SGP deficit rule 'virtually ensures 
government solvency' (Buiter, 2003, p. 88). A medium-term non-increasing, and indeed 
falling, debt ratio is also compatible with the asymptotical convergence towards zero 
from the transversality condition for fiscal sustainability in (2.11). 
Moreover, the non-increasing debt ratio poses an extra constraint on fiscal policy. It is 
revealing to underline at this point that the falling debt ratio implied by (2.25) is an even 
, 
more rigid policy requirement than the nominal debt rule, algebraically expressed as 
bSO.6. Hence, this would suggest that it is reasonable to classify the MaastrichtlSGP 
fiscal criteria within the family of 'constrained sustainability' rules. 
The UK budgetary rules 
UK fiscal policy in the last decade has evolved along the lines of the two fiscal rules 
which the Chancellor of the Exchequer self-imposed in June 1998 in the Code for Fiscal 
Stability: the 'golden rule' and the sustainable investment rule. Under the first rule, the 
government is allowed to borrow only to fund investment, but not current spending. 
That means that tax revenues should at least equal current (non-investment) 
expenditures. Under the second rule, government's net debt should not exceed a 'stable 
and prudent' ceiling. Currently that ceiling is set at 40 percent ofGDP. 
The golden rule concerns cyclically adjusted borrowing, i.e. it should be observed as an 
average over the economic cycle. That allows for more flexibility: namely, that makes 
the rule compatible with the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers. If the rule were to 
be met uniformly with every budget, the government may for example need to raise 
taxes in economic downturns when the deficit could have widened up due to lower tax 
is (2.25) corresponds exactly to equation 12 in Buiter (2003, p. 88). 
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revenues and higher fiscal spending on unemployment benefits. But by doing so the 
government would aggravate the deterioration in the fiscal stance and in the economy as 
a whole. The flexibility of the golden rule and the fact that it does not interfere with 
automatic fiscal stabilisers are praised as its major advantages (Chote and Emmerson, 
2005, and the 'fifth commandment' in Buiter, 2003). 
Another positive feature of the golden rule is that it aims to limit the tax burden on 
future generations. The government may incur additional public debt only as long as it 
finances investments from which future as well as current generations are likely to 
benefit. That was emphasised by its authors as the 'principle of fairness': one of the 
formal principles laid down in the Finance Act of 1998 and in the Code for Fiscal 
Stability, approved by the House of Commons in December 1998. But it is important to 
distinguish between current and capital spending (HM Treasury, 1998). The golden rule 
is intended to curb the frequent proclivity for cutting public investment spending first 
(Serven, 2005) when fiscal tightening is undertaken: a practice eroding an economy's 
growth potential and jeopardising future fiscal sustainability. 
The sustainable investment rule is also to be met over the economic cycle, thus allowing 
for a breach of the 40 percent ceiling net debt ratio during cyclical downturn. The 
cyclically adjusted allowance for higher debt represents, similarly to the golden rule, an 
opportunity for the smooth operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers. Without cyclical 
adjustment, a forced reduction of public debt would engineer an overall deficit 
reduction as hinted by (2.22) above, which might further exacerbate an economic 
decline. 
The sustainable investment rule imposes a straightforward bound on government debt 
and therefore seems fully compliant with a solvency constraint: hence, ensuring fiscal 
sustainability. Moreover, as the criterion involves net debt, the rule is more binding than 
the SOP debt rule: 40 percent net debt ratio may be lower than 60 percent gross ratio 
(Emmerson, Frayne and Love, 2001, p. 2). Imposing an extra constraint on the path of 
debt also justifies the discussion of the sustainable investment rule as further illustrating 
the 'constrained sustainability' approach to fiscal policy. 
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Whether the UK golden rule also guarantees solvency and the extent to which it 
imposes any further limitations to the !BC, is less clear intuitively. Using previous 
notation, the golden rule may be given as": 
(2.26) 
where g" stands for cyclically adjusted public sector capital spending. If the government 
is allowed to borrow only to fund investment expenditures, then over the cycle the 
current general budget should be balanced or in surplus. Now applying (2.26) to (2.24) 
and (2.25) results in: 
(2.27) .dbe = de + icbe - (n: + 8)be ::;gel- (n: + 8)be 
That is, the cyclically adjusted increase in the debt ratio is bounded by the difference 
between the capital spending ratio and the reduction effect of inflation and real growth 
rates on the debt ratio. As long as n: and 8 remain positive, public sector capital spending 
becomes the variable to watch: if it is too high, the debt ratio may correspondingly grow 
too much and thus, other things being equal, the risk of future unsustainability will be 
higher. In practice, however, the share of government investment in GDP will hardly be 
kept too high. Thus in practice (2.27) implies that debt is again constrained by some 
upper ceiling; hence solvency is secured. As with the SGP deficit criterion, a conclusion 
could be drawn that the UK golden rule imposes an additional constraint on public 
finances. Regardless of whether it asymptotically converges to zero, or some other limit 
value, the cyclically adjusted debt ratio is bounded not to increase much even in the 
medium term. Although the precise limit to debt increase is not revealed directly by 
(2.27) because it is contingent on gel, its existence could be interpreted as strengthening 
the !BC. Hence the UK golden rule also exemplifies the 'constrained sustainability' 
approach. 
The UK fiscal rules are subject to criticism too. Buiter and Grafe (2004) indicate that a 
representation like (2.27) disguises the fact that more capital investment is required with 
the higher GDP growth rate, if the capital/output ratio is to be sustained. The latter will 
partly offset the otherwise (with 8 going up) increased permissible debt level. Buiter and 
Grafe alternatively propose an inflation-and-real-growth-alijustment restatement of the 
cyclically adjusted golden rule. 
16 This discussion is partly inspired by Buiter (2003). 
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Emmerson et al. (2001) suggest more basic reasons to doubt the precision of the UK 
fiscal rules. They are concerned with the arbitrariness of selecting the exact limit value 
of 40 percent in the sustainable investment rule: the government 'could just as easily 
have chosen 38% or 42%' (ibid., p. 2). More recently public attention was alerted to the 
controversies surrounding the very definition of public sector debt, after the government 
decided to exclude the liabilities of the nationalised Northern Rock from the calculation 
of debt in the 2007/08 budget. As for the golden rule, doubt is cast about the economic 
rationale when distinguishing between current and capital spending in the way currently 
done under the National Accounts conventions. A further critique of the UK fiscal rules 
is contained in Buiter (2001), Calmfors and Corsetti (2003) who object to 'golden rules' 
in general, and Serven (2005). Thus the UK fiscal rules are not the perfect tool for 
assessing the fiscal stance in general and fiscal sustainability in particular. 
Further examples offiscal rules 
The literature on fiscal rules is vast and growing. Whereas a complete review of fiscal 
rules in both theory and practice is certainly outside the scope of the current research, a 
brief outline of more currently existing rules and their relation to the concept of fiscal 
sustainability will facilitate the concluding assessment and provide more insights into 
what was termed the 'constrained sustainability' group. 
Examples of fiscal rules are found in Germany, Sweden, Poland, the United Stated, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand and other countries (Kennedy and Robbins, 2001, 
and OECD, 2002, especially Appendix table IV.A.I). Fiscal rules may relate to 
practically manageable concrete indicators or to more general guidelines or regulations 
(Fiess, 2004). 
A common characteristic is that the rules constrain certain fiscal variables, such as the 
budget balance, the public sector net worth or debt, in an effort to boost fiscal stability, 
ensure longer-term fiscal sustainability and enhance the credibility of the government. 
Some of the rules are explicitly aimed at curbing the procyclical bias of fiscal policy by 
being defined in structural terms, as in Chile. The exact numerical targets, where 
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existing, may be legislated or determined on an ad hoc basis according to pre-Iegislated 
or publicly committed policy principles, as in New Zealand. 
While the rules are enforced in countries where medium-term fiscal solvency is not 
necessarily a concern, and while the !BC is always satisfied ex post, a common 
denominator for the fiscal rules in question here is the introduction of verifiable 
indicators constraining the sustainable policy options. Such indicators are derived either 
directly from fixed numerical targets (poland's 60 percent limit of total public 
debt/GDP ratio), or from commitments that may easily be expressed as algebraic fiscal 
relations (Germany's golden-type rule for balanced current federal budget). 
Recently Debrun et al. (2008) review the national fiscal rules in the EU countries with a 
focus on such rules which 'fix targets or ceilings to budgetary aggregates expressed in 
numerical terms' (ibid., p. 301). The operational definition of numerical fiscal rules is 
adopted from Kopits and Symansky (1998, p. 2): 'a permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, typically defmed in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance'. 
Following this definition Debrun et al. (2008) identifY a growing number of fiscal rules 
in the EU: from \3 in 1990 to 57 in 2005. Out of the 25 EU members surveyed only 
Greece, Cyprus and Malta have no rules conforming to the above definition. 
In the year 2005, thirty-three of those rules were stipulated in law or constitution while 
twenty-four were based on political commitment. According to Debrun et al. (2008, p. 
342) 'in the early 1990s, most numerical fiscal rules were applied at local or regional 
levels of government, while rules at the general and central government sector were 
introduced more recently'. Twelve numerical rules are documented at the general 
government level in 2005 and five of them are provided for in a legal act or constitution. 
The national numerical fiscal rules in the EU are shown to have encouraged higher 
cyclically adjusted primary balances. The effect is weaker when the change in debt 
rather than the fiscal balance is the variable to be explained by the fiscal rules in the 
econometric tests performed by Debrun et al. (2008). 
In summary, the fiscal rules imply that some additional fiscal constraint is deemed 
necessary to guide policy-makers through the indispensable fiscal adjustments, if any. 
Those constraints justifY defining all existing fiscal rules as pertaining to this more 
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forward-looking and normative approach to fiscal sustainability: diverse as they are, 
with or without numerical targets, legislated or not. 
Back to theory: recent quests Jor fiscal sustainability indicators 
Parallel to existing fiscal rules in practice, there are further theoretical proposals for 
fiscal sustainability indicators, besides the seminal ones of Blanchard and Buiter. Such 
proposals are again united by a desire to have fiscal targets which are not only easily 
verifiable and enforceable, but are more rigid than what believing in some 'self-
fulfilling' fiscal solvency implies. The 'constrained sustainability' strand may be 
illustrated by more recent examples of specially constructed, and sometimes empirically 
tested, indicators. 
Sustainability is at the core of much of IMF's work particularly with respect to 
emerging markets. The broad experience of the IMF staff in dealing with various 
aspects of fiscal, but also external and financial-sector, sustainability is outlined in IMF 
(2002), where suggestions for a more unified cross-country assessment framework are 
put forward. This framework comprises two sets of indicators: one for external 
sustainability and one for public-sector debt sustainability. They partly relate to the 
concepts of fiscal sustainability broadly defined so far, like for instance the 'indicative 
threshold' approach presented about the level of debt at which stabilisation is required 
(IMF, 2002, Appendix 1). 
Whereas IMF (2002) focuses on selected indicators concerned primarily with debt, IMF 
(2003) contains somewhat more comprehensive approaches to fiscal sustainability, 
particularly for emerging economies. The result is again, generally speaking, 'threshold' 
indicators. Three methods are applied in the IMF (2003) study. First, calculations about 
a debt-stabilising primary balance are done. This approach is close to the ideas of 
Blanchard and Buiter. Second, based on more formal statistical modelling, the 
relationships between fiscal policy instruments and fiscal targets are explored. Thus, 
setting the primary balance as an operational target, the study estimates fiscal policy 
reaction functions on past performance to conclude that the sustainable debt/GDP ratio 
for a typical emerging market economy is only about 25 percent. Third and perhaps 
most evidently related to the !BC concept, the study deals with the issue of whether 
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current debt stocks exceed the present discounted values of future primary surpluses: 
that is, whether governments over-borrow. The latter involves calculating a benchmark 
level of debt and then comparing it to the actual debt. That justifies the inclusion of IMF 
(2003) in the group of 'constrained sustainability' works as it recommends specific 
fiscal adjustments. 
Mendoza and Oviedo (2004) propose a complete probabilistic model of sustainability. 
The model evolves around the 'credible repayment commitment': that the goverrunent 
is able to repay its debt in every state of nature. The debt limit (the 'natural debt limit'), 
over which borrowing is not allowed, is self-imposed by the goverrunent. The 'natural 
debt limit' as the authors point out is similar to the trivial long-run transversality 
condition (ibid., p. 15) but it also accounts for uncertainty in the determinants of the 
fiscal balance and of debt. The model considers the volatilities in the revenues and GDP 
growth series. The debt limit implicitly acknowledges the practical limitations a 
goverrunent faces in servicing its debt, as opposed to relying on debt only 
asymptotically converging to zero; and the very fact of proposing debt limits is a feature 
of the constraints-related fiscal sustainability literature. The 'constrained sustainability' 
approaches may be about limits as well as about values on which fiscal variables are 
targeted to converge. 
Recently Polito and Wickens (2005) proposed an index of fiscal sustainability derived 
directly from the !BC. The index basically computes the ratio between the forecast 
present values of future primary balances and existing debt. For the forecast, a V AR 
model of the economy is constructed, allowing also for changes in policy. If the index is 
less than unity, a change in the fiscal stance is required, hence the 'constrained 
sustainability' emphasis. The comprehensiveness of the model, like the opportunity to 
incorporate changes in the policy regime, and finite as well as infinite horizons, do not 
preclude drawing certain relatedness to Blanchard's and Buiter's rules presented earlier. 
~~ Such succinct outline of some sustainability indicators far from exhausts the ever-
growing appetite for constructing a wide range of sustainability indicators. Different 
indicators are designed to address specific aspects of fiscal sustainability andlor to 
overcome existing deficiencies in areas of fiscal sustainability analysis. A limited 
selection of more examples would include the debt-relief and concessional-lending 
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effects on debt sustainability in Edwards (2003), the value-at-risk approach in Barnhill 
and Kopits (2004), the recursive fiscal sustainability indicator in Croce and Juan-Ram6n 
(2003), the choice of indicative debt-burden thresholds within an operational framework 
for assessing debt sustainability in low income countries in IMF and lOA (2005), and 
the alternative dynamic-stability sustainability indicators in Bagnai (2004). It is fair to 
note, however, that the analysis of fiscal sustainability in emerging markets and low-
income countries is usually equivalent to an analysis of debt, and especially external 
debt, sustainability, often without explicitly referring to any IBC. 
The examples until now are meant to highlight a common feature: that they essentially 
try to introduce additional, and quantifiable, fiscal sustainability points of reference, or 
targets. Those are meant to guide government policies towards achieving fiscal 
sustainability, instead of 'passively awaiting' the ex post inevitable realisation of the 
IBC. 
Some of the sustainability indicators just discussed have been justified through a 
number of formal statistical tests, unlike many of the fiscal 'rules of thumb'. This 
discussion, therefore, is a convenient starting point before proceeding towards the 
second major approach to fiscal sustainability analysis: the more backward-looking 
'statistical tests' approach. Not necessarily yielding additional rules or constraints, and 
so fundamentally differing from the 'constrained sustainability' strand, the statistical 
tests approach is reviewed in section 2.3. 
2.3. The 'statistical tests' approach 
Besides the various methods grouped as 'constrained sustainability' in section 2.2., the 
fiscal sustainability theory and empirical literature have evolved since the mid-1980s 
into a second and quite distinct strand of their own. The core feature of that body of 
literature is that it utilises a number of econometric tools to develop a purely statistical 
framework for testing sustainability, drawing inferences about past fiscal performance 
in an essentially backward-looking way. Unlike the fiscal sustainability notions above, 
even in those cases where formal statistical tests are employed, this second approach 
does not impose extra constraints on the IBC. Neither does it yield specific policy 
recommendations regarding adjustments about the future evolution of the fiscal stance. 
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Based on historical data and focusing explicitly on assessing the past fiscal stance, the 
normative forward-looking implications of the 'statistical tests' approach are negligible, 
in sharp contrast to the 'constrained sustainability' framework. 
The rationale behind statistical tests for sustainability 
A recurring theme in fiscal sustainability analysis is that the mc is always satisfied ex 
post. Buiter (1990, pp. 67-68) asserts that either changes in spending, in revenues, in 
seigniorage, or debt repudiation (insolvency), would necessarily occur in order to satisfy 
the government's intertempora! constraint. Then the first question to ask is: what is the 
meaning and the purpose of statistically assessing fiscal sustainability? What is the 
rationale of testing a constraint which always holds in the end, and even not necessarily 
through debt repudiation? A constructive answer would highlight the essence of the 
'statistical tests' method. 
Cuddington (1997, p. 10) touches upon this question. He tries to set the subtle 
delineation between sustainability and solvency, the latter related to the 'given value of 
current debt'. Cuddington (1997) in the end concludes that the statistical tests should be 
viewed as tests of sustainability, not as solvency tests. 
If as previously defined, fiscal sustainability amounts to the government being capable 
of continuing its current policy mix in the indefmite future without threatening solvency, 
the statistical tests are used to prove whether that is indeed the case. When the sequence 
of fiscal variables from the past, if supposed to be continued into the future, suggests to 
be satisfying an intertempora! present-value constraint regarding current debt as literally 
in (2.12) above, then fiscal policy is deemed sustainable and no changes in it are 
needed. 
However, because the statistical tests are all based on past time series of debts and fiscal 
balances or their components, the focus on current debt may not matter much for 
empirical purposes. The 'statistical tests' approach acknowledges that, based on past 
performance, generally fiscal changes may in the future be required to keep solvency 
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intactl7• No targets are designed or implied for debts or deficits, unlike in the 
'constrained sustainability' approach. Future debt may not be stabilised, just like it has 
not been stabilised in the past, and fiscal policy may still be sustainable. 
Though signalling the need for changes, the backward-looking statistical tests do not 
provide key policy guidance such as about the size of the fiscal adjustments required, 
their timing, or the degree of associated economic, social or political costs if default is 
to be avoided. That contrasts this approach with methods akin to the previous literature 
strand where even statistical forecasts could be made to derive sustainability targets, as 
for Blanchard's indicators and in Polito and Wickens (2005). 
Similar reasoning can be applied to the earlier statistical tests. The research methods 
there invariably reflect a form of understanding of fiscal sustainability resembling the 
one just described. For instance, Ahmed and Rogers (1995, p. 352) admit both that the 
IBC should always hold ex post and that for shorter time series there may be deviations 
from the IBC: so 'using a long span of data is appropriate in assessing whether the 
conditions implied by intertemporal budget constraints are met, because these 
conditions are only required to hold in the long run'. But any past time series may be 
shorter than 'the long run'. That indirectly confirms the rationale behind the 'statistical 
tests' approach: assessing fiscal sustainability on the assumption that past policies are 
kept unchanged and the fiscal sequences are continued into the future. 
Hamilton and Flavin's (1986) basic framework 
The work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is generally recognized as the genesis of what 
is termed for the purposes here the 'statistical tests' approach. Their seminal paper is 
widely cited in that body of literature where the time series properties of past fiscal data 
are tested. Their approach has inspired theoretical extensions, key examples of which 
are presented further below. 
Hamilton and Flavin's (1986) pioneering contribution is at the same time quite 
revealing as an interpretation of what 'testing' the IBC means. Interestingly, Hamilton 
17 Statistically analysing the distinctive 'responsibility' of decreased revenue or increased spending for 
past fiscal deficits and adjustments is another concern: see Bohn (199Ia) or Crowder (1997) among the 
early literature. 
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and Flavin (1986), while proposing an empirical framework for testing the 
intertemporal constraint, do not rule out a possibility that 'goverrunent deficits ... need 
not be balanced with future surpluses' (ibid., p. 811) but may be balanced with 
continually issuing new debt. It is that alternative hypothesis they test: for them a 
violation of the JBC from historical data would just mean that the government has 
chosen the alternative fiscal path, leading to perpetual debt financing. That has 
motivated some analysts to claim that, 'paradoxically', Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
never regarded their own tests as sustainability tests (Vieira, 1999, p. 30, fn. 27). Later 
Wilcox (1989, p. 294) patently opposes such a view, stating: 'By contrast, I regard the 
necessity of the present-value borrowing constraint in a dynamically efficient economy 
as established on theoretical grounds'. 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) begin with the following formalisation: 
(2.28) B, = (1+r)B,./ + D, + V, 
where, in addition to the familiar notation, V, comprises one term for the effect of 
goverrunent bonds excess returns and two error terms accounting for 'the issue of 
intraperiod timing' (ibid., p. 810). Seigniorage is incorpomted into the deficit this time. 
In (2.28) r is the ex post average real interest rate on one-period goverrunent bonds. By 
forward recursive substitution of this specification of the familiar flow budget constraint 
the following life-time budget constraint is derived: 
(2.29) B =_ -f D, +V, (1+r)' BN t £.J ",+ N 1:1+,(1 + r)'- (1+r) 
Clearly (2.29) resembles (2.10) above, in that the current debt is related to sequences of 
future debts and fiscal balances. The important distinction now is that varlab les are not 
scaled in terms ofGDP. Hence the no-Ponzi game condition is equivalent to: 
(2.30) 
where E,[.] denotes creditors', i.e. goverrunent debt buyers', expectations based on 
information available at t. Hamilton and Flavin view (2.30) as the null hypothesis to test 
for an JBC, whereas the alternative hypothesis is equivalent to: 
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(2.31) E,[lim BN N]=Ao >0 
N .... ·(I+r) 
where Ao is a constant. Thus (2.29) is transformed as: 
(2.32) [ 
N D +V ] B, =E, - I 1 I~' +Ao(l+r)' 
1=,+,(1 + r) 
which makes it possible to re-state the null hypothesis of no-Ponzi debt financing as the 
restriction Ao=O, thus conveniently yielding it to statistical testing. That is the approach 
by Hamilton and Flavin who, inspired by an analogous modelling of speculative asset 
bubbles in Flood and Garber (1980), use an empirically testable counterpart to (2.32): 
(2.33) . [ fo D1 ] , B, =E, - L.. i-t +Ao(l+r) +&, 1=,+,(1 + r) 
Above, e, stands for a regression disturbance term. The authors adjust the officially 
reported debt and deficit series prior to applying the Dickey and Fuller (1979) test for 
unit roots. The key idea is that if the disturbance term and the sequence of the first term 
in the right-hand side of (2.33) are stationary processes, B, will also be stationary when 
the null hypothesis of Ao=O above is not rejected: whereas B, will not be stationary if 
Ao>O cannot be rejected. Following such a test, Hamilton and Flavin conclude that the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity of debts and deficits (surpluses) can be rejected, and 
therefore the budget in 1960-1984 has been balanced in keeping with a present-value 
constraint. 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986, p. 816) propose a complementary statistical test for Ao. 
They start with focusing on the first term in the right-hand side of (2.33). Assuming that 
expectations of future deficits are partly conditioned on past deficits and iflagged debt 
is also included 'to eliminate the serial correlation of the resulting error term' the 
testable equation becomes: 
where e', is a residual from the projection of the error term plus the first term on the 
right-hand side of (2.33) on past levels of surplus and debt, and on a constant. OLS 
estimation is done on (2.34) for Hamilton and Flavin's data and the estimate for the 
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coefficientAo turns out not to be statistically significant (and is even negative). The no-
Ponzi condition of (2.30) is empirically supported, hence fiscal policy over the observed 
period is found to be sustainable. 
That pioneering approach to test fiscal sustainability statistically has later been 
challenged. Thus Kremers (l988) argued that the original test was invalid because of 
significant first-order autocorrelation and he re-specified the nonstationarity test by 
adding a second lagged dependent variable. Wilcox {I 989) pointed out that the tests of 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) are limited in their assumptions of a constant real interest 
rate, a constant for the violation of the !BC (the Ao above) and the condition that the 
surplus series be stationary. Kremers (1989) suggested that the time span of Hamilton 
and Flavin's empirical tests may have been too short to yield plausible long-run 
stationarity implications for the debt and deficit/surplus series. Kremers (1989) also 
went further to propose an alternative dynamic econometric modelling, based on Barro 
(1979), with a supposedly better power to assess sustainability; a similar alternative was 
later taken by Bohn (1998). And the question of the need to model breaks endogenously 
has been raised too (Tanner and Liu, 1994, and Quintos, 1995). 
Nevertheless, the empirical framework proposed in 1986 by Hamilton and Flavin has 
boosted the empirical research into fiscal sustainability. Their model,. and sometimes 
their data measurement conventions and the data set, benchmarked the subsequent 
extensions of the statistical tests. Alternative yet invariably related time-series 
approaches have come up. The' following sections briefly present the theoretical 
findings from some landmark papers that have contributed most to the design of the 
'statistical tests' approach to fiscal sustainability. Those papers remain seminal among 
even the most recent empirical studies summarised in the first appendix to this chapter. 
Seminal works In the 'statistical tests' approach 
Trehan and Walsh (1988), using a much longer data span of US annual observations 
from 1890 to 1986, provide an early extension of empirical work to incorporate the then 
recent breakthroughs in the theory of cointegration. Another distinction from Hamilton 
and Flavin's approach is the focus on the deficit process Inclusive of interest payments. 
The one-period budget constraint equation, used as the building-block for the model by 
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Trehan and Walsh (1988), resembles the levels specification of (2.3) above. Taking 
expected values for the variables, it is solved forward to result in: 
(2.35) 
In (2.35) the familiar notation is followed for denoting debt, whereas G, T and rp 
respectively stand for government expenditures net of interest, tax revenues and one-
period seigniorage proceeds. All variables are real and in levels and subscripts denote 
time. The real rate of interest r is assumed to be constant. The no-Ponzi game condition, 
constraining a government trying to roll-over debt continuously, is thus: 
(2.36) 
so that the currently outstanding stock of debt would have to be financed fully by the 
expected discounted value of future primary surpluses including seigniorage. Trehan 
and Walsh (1988) then proceed to derive the restrictions on G, T and rp necessary in 
order to satisfY the IBC with (2.36), by specifYing the dynamics of a vector x,' = (G" T" 
rpJ so that: 
(2.37) [
(I-L)G,] 
(l-L)T, = (l-L)X, = 11 + C(L)e, 
(1- L)rp, . 
Above, L is the lag operator, fl is a 3xl vector of constants, C(L) is a 3x3 matrix of 
polynomials in L, and e, is a 3xl white-noise sequence vector. The matrix 
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C(L) = Ic,L' is assumed to be square summable and normalised, so that the first-
1=0 
differenced process X, is covariance stationary (following Hamilton, 1994, Appendix 
3.A.). Indeed, the model assumes that tax revenues, seigniorage and expenditures are 
nonstationary in levels but their first differences are stationary. 
If a new vector a' = (1 -1 -1) is defined, then aX, describes exactly the primary deficit 
process, the first-difference dynamics of which following (2.37) is given by: 
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(2.38) (l-L)D, = (I-L)a'X, =a'p+a''LC,EEH 
1=0 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) use (2.38) to derive the restrictions on G, T and 'P necessary 
for (2.36). Those restrictions are in their turn proved to imply stationarity of the first 
difference of the stock of debt, (J - L)B,. Because the converse also holds, i.e. 
stationarity of the first-differenced debt implies that (2.36) is satisfied, then stationarity 
of the first difference of the debt stock turns out to be both necessary and sufficient for a 
sustainable fiscal process. 
But the flow budget constrant (2.4) shows that the first difference of debt equals 
primary deficit, inclusive of seigniorage in the framework of Trehan and Walsh, plus 
interest payments on previous-period debt. That makes it possible to end up with four 
equivalent necessary and sufficient conditions for fiscal sustainability: 
• When the first difference of the stock of debt is stationary. 
• When the deficit (inclusive ofinterest payments) is stationary. 
• When the stock of debt and the primary deficit are cointegrated with a 
cointegrating vector (r, I). 
• When the expenditures (but including interest payments), tax revenues 
and seignorage are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (I, -I, -I). 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) applied that theoretical framework to assess fiscal 
sustainability over their sample period for the US. The tests showed that the necessary 
and sufficient conditions were satisfied empirically. 
The possibility of cointegrating debt, net-of-interest expenditures, tax revenues and 
seigniorage was theoretically researched further by Trehan and Walsh (1991). Two of 
their previous assumptions were relaxed: govermnent revenues and expenditures were 
not required to be first -difference stationary and the real rate of interest was allowed to 
vary. 
Regarding the first set of extensions of their earlier model, Trehan and Walsh (1991) 
first keep the assumption of constant expected real rate of interest. The left-hand side of 
(2.38) is there expressed in a quasi-difforence form as (l-U)D, where 0 SA < 1 + r. In a 
similar fashion to the previous dynamic relationship in (2.38), (J-U)D, is assumed to be 
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zero-mean stationary (ibid., p. 209). The latter is a slightly stronger assumption than 
Trehan and Walsh (1988), where as seen from (2.38) (l-L)D, is not necessarily 
stationary with a mean of zero because the elements in the vector f.l may differ from 
zero. 
Then a necessary and sufficient condition for (2.36) to hold, hence for an IBC to be 
satisfied and the fiscal stance to be deemed sustainable, is the stationary linear 
combination of the primary deficit and debt. The latter means that cointegration 
between debt and primary deficit remains a necessary and sufficient condition for 
sustainability . 
That sustainability condition 'provides a simple test of intertemporal budget balance' 
(Trehan and Walsh, 1991, p. 211): if 0 ::; ). < 1, and so the primary deficit D, is a 
stationary process, the debt process should also be stationary to have sustainability; if 1 
::;). < 1+ r, and so the primary deficitD, is a nonstationary process but (l-U)D,remains 
stationary, the debt process should also be nonstationary and should be cointegrated 
with the primary deficit. 
When). equals unity, the case of Trehan and Walsh (1988) correspondingly applies, 
whereas). = 0 is exactly the hypothesis tested by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). 
Regarding the second set of extensions of their earlier model, Trehan and Walsh (1991) 
relax the assumption of constant expected real interest rate. The no-Ponzi game 
condition becomes: 
(2.39) 
J 
where p;+ J = n (1 + >;+/)' as the real interest rate is now assumed to be strictly positive 
i=O 
but stochastic. The stochastic nature of the interest rate prevents deriving a constant 
vector relating the processes of debt and primary deficit, hence unlike previously the 
cointegration test for sustainability is not valid anymore. 
The condition (2.39) where the rate is allowed to vary remains the criterion to test, 
although it differs from (2.36) and certainly from (2.11) earlier where the discount 
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factor was corrected for economic growth. Trehan and Walsh (1991) claim that if the 
first difference of the stock of debt is stationary, (2.39) is satisfied because debt would 
grow at a linear trend rate at most while the interest factor used for discounting grows 
exponentially. Therefore the conclusion is that when the rate of interest is not constant, 
but is only positive, the necessary and sufficient condition for satisfYing the !BC is that 
the first difference of the stock of debt is stationary. The latter is equivalent to a deficit 
inclusive of interest payments being stationary. Trehan and Walsh (1991, p. 215) 
emphasize that 'this last result does not rely on any assumptions about the individual ... 
[debt and primary deficit] ... processes'. 
Trehan and Walsh (1991) applied their framework to test fiscal sustainability on the 
same data set used by Hamilton and Flavin, and concluded that fiscal policy has been 
sustainable but the variable interest rate assumption better fits the empirical data 
The contribution by Wilcox (1989) is also inspired by an effort to extend Hamilton and 
Flavin's approach further, relaxing their earlier assumptions in three directions. First, 
Wilcox allows for a varying real rate of interest. Second, the stationarity of primary 
surpluses is no longer a necessary condition. Third, the limiting value of expected 
discounted debt (the Ao above) could be a stochastic variable. 
The life-time budget constraint in Wilcox (1989) has the following expression: 
(2.40) 
where the original notation is adapted to be uniform to both Hamilton and Flavin's 
(2.33) above and the later Trehan and Walsh's variable real rate assumption as in (2.39). 
The present-value borrowing constraint implies that the second term in the right-hand 
side of (2.40) equals zero. The latter is always satisfied under the following condition: if 
and only if the process of the discounted debt is stationary with a mean of zero. 
The above translates into the following claim: 'the test for sustainability amounts to a 
judgement whether a reasonable forecast trajectory for the discounted debt ... would 
converge to zero' (Wilcox, 1989, p. 300). And, as long as such a 'forecast trajectory' is 
for empirical purposes assumed just to mean that past fiscal policies are kept 
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unchanged, this statistical tests approach to fiscal sustainability as usual relies on 
historical data Testing Hamilton and Flavin's data for nonstationarity of discounted 
debt, Wilcox (1989) concluded that, contrary to their earlier result, recent V.S. fiscal 
policy has not been sustainable. 
Sustainability notions related to certain patterns of cointegration between fiscal 
variables, but differing from Trehan and Walsh outlined above, were proposed by 
Hakkio and Rush (199Ia). Two of their key extensions are the use of sample 
subperiods, as well as the normalisation of expenditures and revenues to GNP and 
population. Hakkio and Rush (1991a, p. 430) motivate the latter with McCallum's 
(1984) assertion that those ratios are more pertinent for a growing economy. The 
collateral constraint of the 'taxing capacity' pointed out by Kremers (1988, 1989) also 
bears upon such an approach. Similar arguments justified the expression in (2.6) at the 
outset of the current discussion. 
Hakkio and Rush's model starts with an intertemporal budget equation of the form: 
(2.41) 
where the original notation is adapted to stay uniform with previous representations. 
The authors note that their government expenditures (G,), though excluding interest 
payments, include transfer payments. T in their notation stands for total revenue rather 
than tax revenue only. The interest rate is allowed to vary and the discount factor is as 
described about (2.39). Hakkio and Rush (1991a, p. 430, fn. 2) state that the interest rate 
used in the model may sometimes not be real. The subsequent assumption of 
stationarity for the interest rate, however, rules out nominal magnitudes since nominal 
rates are not stationary (ibid., p. 435). An !BC implies as usual that the limit term in 
(2.41) equals zero. 
Hakkio and Rush (199Ia) focus their attention on the stochastic properties of the 
processes of primary balance components (i.e. the revenues and expenditures) that 
would condition the expected value of the limiting discounted debt in (2.41) to be zero. 
In the beginning they admit a generic shortcoming of the statistical tests approach to 
fiscal sustainability analysis: ' ... we often know things about the future that are not 
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included in the historical record ... [and] ... this drawback exists in all work that 
focuses on the time series behavior of data' (ibid., p. 431). 
They first assume that the interest rate is stationary around an unconditional mean r. 
Then a new relationship is constructed: 
(2.42) E, = G, + (r,-r)B'.1 
which represents government expenditures plus that part of interest payments on 
previous-period debt that corresponds to the deviation of current interest rate from its 
mean value. Total government expenditures (denoted GG, = G, + r,B'./) are then shown 
to form the following intertemporal counterpart to (2.41): 
(2.43) 
An !BC, i.e. ruling out a Ponzi scheme to issue new debt continuously in order to 
finance deficits, would in (2.43) be satisfied if the limit term there equals zero. That 
equation is central to Hakkio and Rush's derivation of their statistical test. They assume 
that T and E are nonstationary in levels but are stationary in their first differences so as 
to follow random walks with a drift: T, = al + T,.I + 81" and E, = a2 + E,.I + 82,. Those 
random-walk representations are used to rewrite (2.43) as: 
(2.44) GG, = a+T, + lim(1 +rfu+,) B/+} + e, 
}~W 
where a = '2.(1+r)'O·I)( al - a,j and &, = '2.(1+r)'O·I)( 81,- &2'). Equation (2.44) is used to 
regress T, on GG" provided that the limit term equals zero: 
(2.45) T, = a + bGG, + ~, 
Due to the definitions of a in (2.44), in the regression now a is a constant. As long as 
the limit term in (2.44) is zero and hence fiscal policy is sustainable, the null hypothesis 
is that b equals I and T and GG are cointegrated. 
Hakkio and Rush (1991a) alternatively prove that the regression estimate of b could also 
lie between 0 and I, and !BC would still be satisfied. In that case, however, the 
undiscounted value of debt would explode over time, and this would create problems 
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for a government tIying to service its debt against a potentially limited output or 
population growth. The government would find it harder to market new debt. Therefore 
b= 1 remains strictly necessary for sustainability, along with cointegration between 
revenues and total expenditures. 
Applying their model to a sample ofU.S. quarterly data from the second quarter of 1950 
till the end of 1988, and also analysing separately two sub-samples within that time 
range, the authors concluded that fiscal policy has not been sustairiable. In spite of the 
fact that their revenues and expenditures are cointegrated, the former seem to have 
grown more slowly than the latter with b estimated below unity. 
Haug (1991) also employs cointegration in order to derive statistically testable 
hypotheses for fiscal sustainability. His method again draws on Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986) but is more akin to the constant-rate versions ofTrehan and Walsh (1988, 1991). 
Haug's starting one-period budget constraint looks like: 
(2.46) LlB, = rB,.1 + D, + 1':, 
and his life-time budget constraint is: 
(2.47) ~ D +& • B B=-~' '+(l+r)'hm N "~I(1+r)'-' N .... (1 +r)N 
The two expressions strongly resemble Hamilton and Flavin's (2.28) and (2.29) 
presented earlier, with a measurement error term added. It is assumed that the expected 
value of the error term is zero for all t (Haug, 1991, p. 98). The null and the alternative 
hypotheses for sustainability correspond to (2.30) and (2.31), respectively. Taking 
expectations of the right-hand side of (2.47) and under the alternative hypothesis, Le. 
Ponzi-type financing not ruled out, (2.47) and (2.31) yield: 
(2.48) B, =E,[-:t D'I->]+Ao(l+r)' 
,=>+,(1 + r) 
which resembles (2.32) above. Hamilton and Flavin would have claimed that the 
'bubble term' Ao in (2.48) equals zero, and thus sustainability is restored, when both 
debt and primary surpluses are stationary series. Haug (1991), however, is interested to 
explore sustainability conditions when debt and primary surpluses are not stationary: his 
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assumption is that they are nonstationary in levels but their first differences are 
stationary. Rewriting (2.46) one period forward and importing (2.48) into (2.46), Haug 
gets: 
(2.49) 
00 _ DJ) . 
till,., -(I +r)E, L :_1 -/IJ),.,-SI+' = r(l +r)' A. 
1=1+,(1 + r) 
Because by assumption the first differences in debt and primary surplus are stationary, 
then the no-Ponzi condition Ao = 0 in (2.49) would require that the error term 8 be 
stationary too. From (2.46), that would be satisfied when debt and primary deficits are 
cointegrated. Hence, the latter is Haug's (\991) sufficient condition for fiscal 
sustainability . 
Haug tests for cointegration between US debt and primary surplus using quarterly data 
from the beginning of 1960 till the end of 1987. The null hypothesis of no cointegration 
is rejected and thus the !BC seems satisfied. 
Another seminal statistical interpretation of fiscal sustainability is provided by Quintos 
(1995). She builds on earlier work, particularly Hakkio and Rush (199 la) to derive and 
also distinguish between 'weak' and 'strong' sustainability conditions. Using Hakkio 
and Rush's one-period budget constraint and defining similarly the total government 
expenditures, as well as those expenditures denoted by E, in (2.42) above, she uses an 
intertemporal constraint of the following form": 
00 
(2.50) GG, = T, + L(I + r)-(}-')(~T,.} - M ,.}) + lim(1 + rr(}+I) till,.} 
)=0 J-+'¥) 
Quintos proceeds by reiterating Hakkio and Rush's strict sustainability requirement for 
the limit term in (2.50) to equal zero: total expenditures and revenues should be 
cointegrated with a vector (I, -I). The remaining less strict requirement is that the 
estimate of b in (2.45) is positive but less than I. Again, as evident from any standard 
one-period representation of the budget constraint, cointegration between total 
expenditures and revenue means stationarity of first-differenced debt. 
18 Note that the difference operator in the limit value of debt differs from equation 6 in Hakkio and Rush 
(1991a, p. 432). 
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However this time the argument goes that cointegration is only a sufficient condition for 
fiscal sustainability. Assuming a constant interest rate, Quintos (1995) proves that the 
expected value of the limit term in (2.50) reaches zero faster if L1Bt is stationary than if 
L1Bt is 1(1). In the latter case, as is true of any unit-root process, the convergence of the 
stochastic sequence to a zero-mean nonstochastic, i.e. zero-variance, sequence takes 
place at a rate of..fi only (Hamilton, 1994, p. 476). 
Thus in the framework of Quintos (1995) stationarity of L1BI> i.e. cointegration between 
total expenditures and revenue, is not a necessary condition for sustainability, as the 
'bubble term' in (2.50) will still become zero if L1Bt were 1(1), although more slowly. 
Quintos uses the same assumption as Hakkio and Rush (199Ia) of first-difference 
stationarity of total expenditures and of revenue. However, contrary to Hakkio and Rush 
(199Ia) Quintos demonstrates that cointegration between those two series is not a 
necessary but a sufficient condition for sustainability. The necessary and sufficient 
condition is that the regression coefficient from (2.45) above satisfies 0 < b $ 1. 
Quintos (1995) generates the following fiscal sustainability criteria: 'strong', when the 
estimate of the coefficient on total expenditures in (2.45) equals I and total 
expenditures and revenues are cointegrated; 'weak', either when the estimate of the 
coefficient on total expenditures in (2.45) equals I and total expenditures and revenues 
are not cointegrated, or when the estimate of the coefficient on total expenditures in 
(2.45) is positive but less than I regardless of whether revenues and total expenditures 
are cointegrated. Quintos's criteria therefore allow for a varied set of sustainability 
hypotheses to be tested. They have become popular in applied work and are also utilised 
in the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
Based on US quarterly data over the full sample from the second quarter of 1947 until 
the third quarter of 1992, fiscal deficits are found to be sustainable, though only in the 
weak sense. When Quintos (1995) models the same data with breaks, sustainability is 
generally confirmed too. 
The findings from the seminal papers discussed so far in the 'statistical tests' realm of 
fiscal sustainability analysis are summed up in Table 2.1. 
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h f h fi d' h Table 2.1. The statlstlca tests approac : summary 0 t e oun mgt eory 
Paper Assumptions Other assumptions Sustainability condition(s) 
about real 
interest rate (r) 
Hamilton and Flavin Constant (calculated (Discounted) Primary If debt process stationary too. (1986) as average ex post) surplus (exclusive of 
rate. interest payments) process 
is stationary. 
The limiting value of 
expected discounted debt 
(i.e. the violation of the . 
borrowing constraint) is 
constant. 
Trehan and Walsh Constant rate. Expenditures (exclusive of Equivalently, any afthe following: (1988) interest payments). tax I) First difference of stock of debt is stationary. 
revenues and seignorage 2) When deficit (inclusive of interest payments) is 
are nonstationary series stationary. 
but their first difference is 3) When stock of debt and deficit (exclusive of 
stationary. interest payments) are cointegrated with 
cointegrating vector (r. I). 
4) When expenditures (including interest payments), 
tax revenues and seignorage are cointegrated with 
cointeRl'atimz vector (1, -1 -1). 
Trehan and Walsh Constant expected Quasi-differencing the If there exists a stationary linear combination of (1991) rate. primary deficit (D) as (J- primary deficit and debt. 
J.L)D, where When J. "" 0, Hamilton and Flavin's (1986) case 
O!:A < J+r, the process applies. Trehan and Walsh (1988) apply when J. "" J. 
(l-J.L)D is zero-mean 
stationary. 
Variable positive nla Equivalently, any of the following: 
expected rate. I) First difference of stock of debt is stationary. 
2) When total deficit (inclusive of interest 
payments) is stationary. 
Wilcox (1989) Stochastic SurplusJDeficit (exclusive If discounted debt process is stationary with an 
(empirically of interest payments) not unconditional mean of zero. 
calculated as the ex necessarily stationary. 
post rate of return). The limiting value of 
expected discounted debt 
(Le. the violation of the 
borrowing constraint) not 
necessarilv constant. 
Hakkio and Rush Varying stationary Expenditures (including Both of the following: (199la) rate. transfers and interest 1) Total expenditures (including transfers and 
payments for the interest payments) and revenues are cointegrated 
difference between current 2) The estimate of the coefficient on the total 
interest rate and its series expenditures (when regressing revenue on 
mean value) and revenue expenditures) equals 1. (If that estimate is between 0 
are both non-stationary in and I, the IBC is stilt satisfied, but debt may grow 
. levels, but first-difference infinitely in relation to GDP/GNP or population, 
stationary and follow which raises the incentive to default and makes 
random walks with a drift. marketinS!: new debt harder.) 
Haug(1991) Constant (long-run SurplusfDeficit (exclusive Cointegration of surplus/deficit (exclusive of 
equilibrium real of interest payments) and interest payments) and debt. 
rate; empirically debt series are (As a consequence, the error term in the one-period 
calculated as actual individually stationary in budget constraint equation is stationary.) 
average rate on first differences. 
certain bonds over The error term in the one-
the sample period). period budget constraint 
equation is assumed zero-
mean. 
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Paper Assumptions Other assumptions Sustainability condition(s) 
about real 
interest rate (r) 
Quin'o, (1995) Constant rate. Total expenditures Cointegration between total expenditures (including 
(including debt interest debt interest payments) and revenues is sufficient 
payments) and revenues but not necessary condition. The necessary and 
are both non-stationary in sufficient condition is that the estimate of the 
levels, but are first· coefficient on total expenditures (when regressing 
difference stationary. revenues on expenditures) is positive but equal to or 
less than 1: 
1) 'Strong' requirement for deficit sustainability: 
• when the estimate of the coefficient on total 
expenditures (when regressing revenues on 
expenditures) equals I, and 
- when total expenditures and revenues are 
cointegrated. 
2) 'Weak' requirement for deficit sustainability: 
· when the estimate of the coefficient on total 
expenditures (when regressing revenues on 
expenditures) equals I and total expenditures and 
revenues are not cointegrated. or 
· when the estimate of the coefficient on total 
expenditures (when regressing revenues on 
expenditures) is positive but less than I. regardless 
of whether or not revenues and total expenditures 
are cointellrated . 
. . , • 
, . .. , Note. nla means either not apphcable or no Implicit assumptions . 
Bohn's critique 1: modelling susta/nability under uncertainty 
In a series of papers since the early 1990s Bohn persistently argued that fiscal 
sustainability has not been correctly studied statistically in that the analyses are 
confined to a non-stochastic setting. As with all works pertaining to the 'statistical tests' 
approach presented here, the following discussion about the need to incorporate 
uncertainty is limited to a model which neither imposes additional constraints on fiscal 
variables nor advocates ex ante specific fiscal adjustments to restore an !BC. Instead, 
the perspective is one of a standard backward-looking !BC testing. The 'constrained 
sustainability' approach methodologically accommodates alternative models trying to 
account for fiscal volatilities when making forward projections (Mendoza and Oviedo, 
2004, or various references from the IMF). That is, uncertainty is regarded in a narrower 
sense here: uncertainty following Bohn's model below and uncertainty as absent from 
the 'statistical tests' just reviewed. 
Two lines of arguments justify Bohn's criticism. First and foremost, the uncertainty 
approach is more apt for the fact that 'we are living in an uncertain world', so it should 
be puzzling why 'much of the positive as well as normative theory of public finance has 
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been developed in the context of certainty models' (Bohn, 1991b, p. 580). A stochastic 
model would surely be 'more general than a deterministic model' (Bohn, 1995, p. 257). 
Second, empirical evidence has suggested that for the United States interest rates have 
on average been below the economy's growth rates: ' ... historically, U.S. Treasury debt 
has paid a real return of less than I percent while the economy has grown at 3 percent 
annually' (Hamilton, 1991, p. 608). As discussed earlier, this means 'dynamic 
inefficiency' in the economy and a government being capable of running the 'rational' 
Ponzi game. The capacity to service debt would grow with the growth of the economy 
and, if expressed as a ratio to GDP, debt would never explode as seen from (2.9) and the 
!BC would not have to be satisfied. However, that would be valid for a deterministic 
economy only. The efficiency criterion differs in stochastic economies and Abel et al. 
(1989) provided 'strong evidence that the U.S. economy is in fact dynamically efficient' 
(Bohn, 1995, p. 258). 
The assessment of fiscal sustainability under uncertainty requires an altogether different 
intertemporal setting as there are 'almost no restrictions' about the average primary 
balance needed to match outstanding debt: because 'the government can trade off 
primary deficits in some states of nature against surpluses in other states' (ibid., p. 259). 
The generic problem of the statistical tests methods, relying on historical series to draw 
implications for future fiscal behaviour, is even more severe with uncertainty because 
the expectations across the states of nature are not verifiable empirically based on the 
single past realisations of the processes. Bohn's theoretic design takes that into account 
when constructing the no-Ponzi transversality condition. But the empirical application 
of his model remains an issue. 
The states of nature at t are denoted a,. The history of the economy up to time t is h,. 
The period t prices of securities that finance government spending at t+J in a state a,+! 
is given by p(a,+! I h,). Using the familiar remaining notation, Bohn's one-period budget 
equation is: 
(2.51) B, +G, -T, = ~>(aHllh.)B(aHllh.) 
a'+i 
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Discrete-time probability distribution of the states of nature is assumed19• In (2.51) the 
right-hand side describes the market value of all newly-issued state-contingent claims, 
'for convenience' referred to as government debt (Bohn, 1991b, p. 584). In order to 
derive the intertemporal budget equation, Bohn argues that crucial for government's 
ability to market new debt is its ability to find lenders. Thus the analysis needs to 
consider individuals' consumption preferences. Denoting the probability of a history h, 
by n(hJ, each individual i's preference in terms of his utility function is: 
(2.52) 
where C stands for private consumption and P is assumed positive. The Willingness of 
individuals to buy government debt would depend on their preferences over 
consumption, i.e. their readiness to give up current in return for future consumption. 
That readiness is formalised via the marginal rates of utility substitution. Relating that 
to the pricing function in (2.51) leads to: 
(2.53) ( Ih) ( Ih) p U;(C'(h,+,» p at+! , =" at+! ,. . U;(C'(h,» 
Generalising (2.53) for the period t + N is given by P(h'+N I h,}, where: 
N 
(2.54) P(ht+Nlh,} = I1p(at+.l ht+._,} 
n=1 
The specification in (2.54) shows that history h,+N has been realised in effect, for all 
states of nature conditional on past histories. Bohn then assumes homogeneity among 
individuals in the economy, all having equilibrium consumption C, = Y, - G,. There Yi 
denotes the total income constraining the individual budget and the government levies 
taxes T to pay for its expenditures G. So (2.53) and (2.54) imply that the price of 
government debt in view of individual lenders' preferences is: 
(2.55) ( I) ( I) N U' (Y,+. - Gt+N) P ht+N h, =" h'+N h, . P . --;,=--"":'" U (Y, -G,) 
19 A non-discrete probability distribution would require the use of integra1s instead of sums in the model 
(Bohn, 1995, p. 260, fn, 4), 
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As in (2.54) the expression is for the realised histories at t + N. The pricing in (2.55) is 
central in Bohn's uncertainty model as it makes it possible to evaluate the government 
intertemporal constraint. The latter is given, based on (2.5 I), by the uncertainty me 
counterpart: 
(2.56) 
The first term in the right-hand side of (2.56) comprises the probabilistic model of the 
future surpluses priced at t, for realised histories across all states of nature at t + N. The 
second right-hand side term is the limit value of debt, again for realised histories across 
all states of nature at t + N priced at t. Ruling out perpetual debt financing would as 
usual necessitate that the limit term in (2.56) converge to zero. 
If in (2.55) the conditional probability 11: is replaced by expectations and if: 
(2.57) u = pN . U· (Y,+" - Gt+N ) 
',N U'(Y,-G,) , 
then (2.56) becomes: 
(2.58) B, = LE,[u"N ,(T(h'+N)-G(ht+N »j+ liT,. E,[U"N 'B(ht+N)j 
",0 
Bohn (1995, pp. 263-264) underlines that the sustainability model under uncertainty in 
(2.58), while resembling the deterministic versions, does not involve discounted 
expected values. Instead, the fiscal variables are multiplied by an equilibrium marginal 
rate of utility substitution between period-t and period-(t+N) consumption. That is the 
key feature of the stochastic model with risk-averse individual lenders, which makes 
that model distinct from the deterministic world so far. 
Regarding the empirical application of his model, however, Bohn asserts that equations 
(2.56) and (2.58) could hardly be transformed into observable counterparts because out 
of all the possible histories only one would have been realised and observed. Therefore, 
sustainability could be tested only under very strong assumptions about the distribution 
of government debt from a uniquely-observed time series. Recalling the invalidity of 
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deterministic sustainability models in an economy which is dynamically efficient only 
in a stochastic setting, the conclusion is that 'if one is not willing to accept such 
assumptions, one may even argue that sustainability is essentially untestable' (ibid, p. 
.. , 
269). 
Bohn's critique 2: the (un)necessity ojstationarity and colntegration restrictions 
Recently Bohn (2007) launched a further attack on the statistical tests for fiscal 
sustainability. His paper is likely to mark deeply the forthcoming empirical literature, as 
well as the related external sustainability methods2o• No responses to his propositions 
have yet been identified, so the following is a first attempt to justify the continued 
empirical application of unit rootlstationarity and cointegration tests. 
Bohn (2007) derives a formalisation analogous to (2.10)-(2.12) above. He challenges 
the seminal fiscal sustainability papers (Trehan and Walsh, 1988, Quintos, 1995, and 
Ahmed and Rogers, 1995, among others) about the necessity to have first-difference 
stationary debt or cointegration between expenditures and revenues. Bohn does allow 
the standard conditions to be regarded as sufficient if the integration of (first-difference) 
debt and/or the cointegration between the fiscal variables comprising the general deficit 
are not rejected. He proves though that even a rejection does not rule out the 
transversality no-Ponzi condition, hence the !BC. The reason is that any higher order of 
integration of the debt series would satisfy the !BC. Following that logic then, a non-
rejection of unit roots at a lower order 'must be interpreted as inconclusive, not as 
evidence of non-sustainability' (ibid., p. 1846) if a sequential strategy of repeated 
differencing does not follow. But because any higher order of integration would do, 
such a sequential strategy may involve endless number of repetitions. Thus, the unit root 
and cointegration tests are of no use for fiscal sustainability assessment, Bohn (2007) 
claims. 
To this end, he first proves that if debt is integrated of order rn, i.e. is /(m) for any finite 
rn 2: 0, then the transversality condition of zero debt in the limit from (2.11) above is 
satisfied. In that framework, cointegration between revenues and total expenditures with 
20 See Chapter Five. 
66 
a vector (I, -I), if denoting as before debt B, corresponds to LlB - 1(0) or equivalently to 
B - 1(1). 
Regarding the cointegration condition, Bohn (2007) allows total expenditures and 
revenues to be integrated of any order, denoted m, and m, respectively. The two series 
may not be cointegrated and possibly may have different orders of integration, i.e. m, f-
m,. Then debt tums out to be integrated of order m, B - 1(m), such that m =" max(m" m,) 
+ 1. In other words, the !BC will be satisfied in all cases, even without expenditure-
revenue cointegration. 
What therefore could justify the empirical application of the (co )integration tests? Some 
of the answers may be found in Bohn's (2007) paper itself. Above all, he points out that 
his focus is on the infinite-horizon !BC but it may be reasonable to impose 'more 
stringent bounds on the path of debt ... [that) ... are sometimes of economic interest' 
(ibid., p. 1841). The rationale behind fiscal constraints was discussed at length earlier in 
this chapter. The debt series may not require extra bounds only if stationary, i.e. if m = 
O. Although this route, strictly, is outside the 'statistical tests' strand it is intriguing that 
Bohn admits that testing for the null m = 0 against the altemative m ~ 1 still makes 
sense in terms of economics. 
However the revenue-expenditure cointegration, which is commonly adopted in the 
fiscal sustainability literature and will also be adopted in the chapters to follow, implies 
that the null is m = 1. That is, a linear trend in debt, or in the debtlGDP ratio if so 
specified, is allowed. Bohn's (2007) proposition to test for debt integration of any 
higher order is equivalent to allowing at least quadratic debt growth. Admittedly, the 
linear debt growth may be fiscally challenging for the economy: but is to be preferred to 
the at least quadratic growth allowed by Bohn. The latter will hardly be welcome by 
potential government-bond holders. 
Bohn's (2007) condition that m may exceed I is therefore theoretically sound but is of 
no practical significance in the linear empirical world, to which also this thesis belongs. 
There is no need to sequentially test the debt series for orders of integration higher than 
I because fiscal policies resulting in such debt growth most certainly cannot be 
sustained. Furthermore, Bohn's arguments are less inhibiting because of the following. 
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He criticises Quintos (1995) for her assumptions that expenditures and revenues are I( I) 
but in reality most macroeconomic series are integrated of at most that order. To 
preview the results from the empirical chapters at least, the series of interest in this 
thesis are found to be 1(1) if not even 1(0). And if such series are cointegrated and the 
cointegrating vector is (I, -I), the first difference of debt is 1(0) and in Bohn's 
terminology m = 1. If the series are not cointegrated, the first difference of debt is 1(1) 
. and m = 2. The former case corresponds exactly to the 'strong' condition in Quintos 
(1995), whereas the latter equals her 'weak' sustainability condition when the 
regression coefficient estimate on the total expenditures lies between 0 and 121. But 
again, a rational creditor's preference for a linear growth in his debtor's debt will 
always dominate that for quadratic growth. From an economics perspective again, the 
cointegration with a vector (I, -I) of the individually 1(1) series is more desirable. And 
the 'absurdly weak' condition, as Bohn (2007) himself terms his m-th order 
sustainability condition, must be the least desirable. 
To recapitulate, although a stationary levels debt series may be the best option in the 
eyes of creditors, a linear growth in debt which is eliminated through first differencing 
is the second-best option. That is, cointegration between total expenditures and revenues 
with a vector (I, -I) is justifiable as an optimal compromise between economic common 
sense and the otherwise infinite-horizon econometrics of the !BC. If tests confirm such 
cointegration, then fiscal sustainability is present, as even Bohn (2007) would agree. If 
they reject it, on the other hand, and the series are at most 1(1), then the !BC would be 
satisfied but with debt displaying quadratic growth. The fiscal authorities may find it 
problematic to service or market such debt and sustainability is potentially at risk. 
So the only reason for the practising researcher to doubt the (un)sustainability 
conclusion, if she rejects the cointegration null, is the fear of a Type I error. 
Unfortunately, applied econometric analysis is not altogether safeguarded against such 
errors. Then the cointegration-related statistical tests are not only sufficient but remain, 
due to the broader economic considerations, necessary. 
21 For Bohn this limitation on the coefficient is irrelevant. 
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Nonlinear FIScal adjustments 
Even without Bohn's (2007) at least quadratic growth in the series of debt, or 
debt/GDP, the research into fiscal sustainability may incorporate nonlinearities in the 
fiscal policy, following a further strand of the literature. The policy reactions of the 
fiscal authorities may differ in direction and magnitude, depending on how large the 
deviations of the fiscal variables are from some normal/equilibrium level. Intuitively, a 
government may be expected to start to cut spending or increase taxes faster or only 
after exceeding a threshold level of debt or deficits. In other words, the restoration of 
the long-run fiscal sustainability may take place through a nonlinear fiscal adjustment. 
Bertola and Drazen (1993) discuss that fiscal regime changes are infrequent, which 
'may reflect political constraints blocking agreement on fiscal retrenchment', so that 
government expenditures may not be slowed or reversed until a 'significant upwards 
drift' (ibid., p. 16) is experienced. The reduction in spending is triggered only after the 
pre-stabilisation situation has deteriorated (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and 
Grilli, 1993) and spending has reached levels that are regarded as critically high. 
Therefore a current increase in the government spending-to-output ratio 'has nonlinear 
effects on the expected present discounted value of the ratio of future government 
spending to output' (Bertola and Drazen, 1993, p. 19). 
Besides the nonlinear mean-reverting stabilisation, in Bertola and Drazen's (1993) 
model the expectations about future fiscal policy imply another nonlinear relationship: 
between government spending and private consumption. A deficit reduction via 
spending cuts may raise private consumption, provided that it induces expectations for 
lower government spending and lower taxes in the future. But also an increased 
government spending may be expansionary if the private sector expects that 'high levels 
of spending are unsustainable and will soon be cut' (ibid., p. 12). The authors conclude 
that any time series analyses should reflect the presence of the nonlinearities suggested 
by economic considerations. 
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) continue the theme and, concentrating on national 
savings, provide extensive evidence of nonlinear effects of fiscal policy on the 
behaviour ofthe private sector. For the OECD countries, they find that only large and 
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persistent fiscal impulses trigger nonlinear responses by the private sector. The high or 
rapidly growing public debt does not turn out to predict the nonlinear national savings 
dynamics, unlike the evidence in Perotti (1999) where fiscal shocks have stronger effect 
on private consumption when public debt is high. Using a dataset of developing 
countries, Giavazzi et al. (2000) find that national savings respond nonlinearly more 
frequently, to both large fiscal expansions and large fiscal contractions, and that the 
impact of fiscal policy on national savings is smaller during periods of rapidly growing 
public debf'. 
Abstracting from the nonlinear effects of fiscal policy, the emerging literature on 
nonlinear fiscal adjustments has direct implications for fiscal sustainability in the sense 
of satisfYing the intertemporal budget constraint. To that end, Bohn (\998) provides 
evidence that the US primary surplus is an increasing function of the debt/GDP ratio: 
the marginal impact of higher debt on the primary surplus is increasing across several 
estimated nonlinear regressions, despite the difficulty in identifYing the exact form of 
nonlinearity (ibid., p. 959). The positive, and at least linear, response of primary 
surpluses to the debt-income ratio implies that the latter should be a stationary process 
and that the government fiscal policy 'has been on a path consistent with the 
intertemporal budget constraint' (ibid., p. 96\). A decade later Greiner and Kauermann 
(2007) also analyse the response of the US primary surplus/GDP ratio to changes in the 
public debt/GDP ratio and find that it is a positive nonlinear function, thus confirming 
Bohn's (\998) conjecture. 
Cipollini (2001) applies a smooth transition error-correction model (STECM) to UK 
quarterly data. He models a regime shift in the adjustment towards a linear cointegrating 
relation between government spending and tax revenues, with the slope coefficient in 
the cointegrating regression equal to unity. The study finds that the government is likely 
to react only to large, in absolute values, public spending/GDP ratio changes in order to 
contain the deficit/surplus dynamic within a band of desired values. The politicians are 
therefore concerned either with a solvency constraint (cutting spending following a 
significant increase in expenditures and in deficits) or with an opportunistic popularity 
" Later Kamps (2006) challenged the findings of Giavazzi et al. (2000) that the effects of fiscal policy are 
nonlinear. He argues that their evidence is not robust because of the slope homogeneity assumption in 
their panel analysis, as well as because of the incorrectly identified too many episodes of large and 
persistent fiscal impulses. 
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constraint (boosting spending following a significant fall in expenditures and an 
increase in surpluses). 
A more recent analysis of the UK's nonlinear fiscal adjustment is contained in 
Considine and Gallagher (2008). Their assessment of the sustainabiJity of UK public 
finances applies an exponential smooth transition autoregression (ESTAR) 
representation. Based on a long span of annual twentieth century data, a nonlinear 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is detected in the debt/GDP ratio. 
Strong evidence of nonlinear mean reversion of the US debt/GDP ratio is provided in 
Sarno (2001). The debt ratio is modelled by a smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) 
model where the speed of adjustment varies depending on the deviation from 
equilibrium. The government turns out to have reacted more strongly to larger 
deviations from the equilibrium debt/GDP ratio. Furthermore, Sarno (2001) provides 
Monte Carlo simulation results demonstrating that standard univariate tests lack power 
to reject the false unit root null when the true model is nonlinearly mean-reverting. 
Arestis, CipoJlini and Fattouh (2004) also analyse the US case but they model the 
government real per capita deficit as a threshold autoregressive (TAR) process. The 
authorities would intervene by cutting deficits only after a certain threshold, i.e. 
nonlinearly. The empirical results suggest that this threshold is represented by a semi-
annual increase in deficits by more than 0.3 13% between the previous quarter and the 
second quarter before. After such an increase in the deficit is observed, in a given 
quarter, the threshold is crossed and the regime changes so that 'politicians would 
become sensitive to budget deficits' (ibid., p. 220). 
Recently CipoJlini, Fattouh and Mouratidis (2009) have conducted another analysis of 
nonlinear fiscal adjustment in the US, this time shifting from a single-equation setting to 
a multivariate threshold vector error-correction regression model. This approach enables 
them to find both that the authorities intervene only after the deficit reaches a certain 
threshold, and that the adjustment occurs mainly through public expenditure cuts rather 
than through increases in tax revenue. The threshold, above which the fiscal adjustment 
in the real per capita budget deficit begins, is estimated at 8,859 US dollars. 
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Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Esteve (2004) assess the nonlinear fiscal adjustment 
towards sustainability in the dynamic behaviour of Spanish budget deficits. They 
conduct an analysis similar to Arestis et al. (2004) and detect mean-reversion of the 
deficits, once certain endogenously derived thresholds are reached, applying a TAR 
model. The authors find that significant fiscal consolidations would occur when the total 
deficitJGDP ratio in a certain year 'has shown an increase of more than 1.9% between 
the previous year and the 6th year before' (ibid., p. 241). The years when such an 
increase in the deficitJGDP ratio is observed are the 'trigger points', according to 
Bertola and Drazen's (1993) model. 
Later Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Esteve (2006) take another sustainability condition 
within the 'statistical tests' strand of literature, the revenue-expenditure cointegration, 
and test it in a nonlinear analysis. Again using Spanish data, they seek for the possible 
presence of threshold cointegration between government revenues and expenditures. 
Bajo-Rubio et al. (2006) fit a vector error-correction model with one cointegrating 
vector and a threshold effect based on the value of the error-correction term: the model 
is split into two regimes depending on whether the error-correction term is below or 
above the threshold value. When using annual data, the error-correction terms are 
significant, hence there is cointegration and adjustment towards sustainability, only 
when the deficitJGDP ratio is above 5.30%. With quarterly data, Bajo-Rubio et al. 
(2006) find that the error-correction effects are significant only when the deficitlGDP 
ratio exceeds 7% in annual figures. Thus the successful fiscal consolidations in line with 
the intertemporal budget constraint occur in a nonlinear fashion, only when deficits 
become too high. 
Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) find that fiscal disequilibrium adjusts nonlinearly in four 
EMU member countries, however with different 'trigger points' and types of 
nonlinearity. They conduct several tests for nonlinear fiscal adjustment of the estimated 
fiscal disequilibrium term which accounts for structural breaks: the null of linear 
adjustment is generally tested against the alternative of nonlinear adjustment; the null of 
either linear or quadratic adjustment is tested against the alternative of non linear logistic 
adjustment; if rejecting the hypothesis of non linear logistic adjustment, the null of linear 
adjustment is tested against the alternative of nonlinear quadratic adjustment. Having 
rejected the linearity hypothesis for all four countries, Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) find 
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evidence of quadratic·type nonlinearity for Greece and Italy and logistic·type 
nonlinearity for Ireland and the Netherlands. These nonlinearities are modelled by the 
quadratic logistic smooth threshold error·correction model (QL·STECM) and the 
logistic smooth threshold error·correction model (L·STECM), respectively. Both 
models involve two regimes but those regimes are separated by one threshold in the L· 
STECM and two threshold values in the QL·STECM. The QL·STECM threshold values 
define an 'inner regime' band within which the adjustment to equilibrium is different 
. from the one outside the band. The estimates from the error·correction models suggest 
that the authorities in Greece and Italy 'allow deficits to take substantial values before 
taking corrective action' (ibid., p. 406), namely 16% and 14% of their total 
expenditures, respectively. For the other two countries, the single estimated regime 
threshold is below 10% in absolute value; and even though fiscal adjustment takes place 
both below and above this value, the deficits are corrected faster when they are higher. 
Recently Chortareas, Kapetanios and Uctum (2008) analyse the sustainability of 
government debt in selected Latin American countries applying various new unit root 
tests with nonlinear alternatives. The results, when 'compared to the gloomy picture of 
traditional unit root tests' (ibid., p. 655) are more favourable to the hypothesis of fiscal 
sustainability. Depending on the debt measure and the model specification, the authors 
uncover stationarity in up to three of five countries where standard tests fail to support 
any stationarity. Chortareas et al. (2008) strongly advocate the use of an array of tests 
which allow for nonlinear mean reversion in order not to underestimate the assessment 
of fiscal sustainability. 
2.4. Conclusion 
In summary, there are two main approaches to fiscal sustainability analysis although all 
rely to different degrees on the !BC. This chapter presents an original taxonomy where 
the literature is subdivided into 'constrained sustainability' and 'statistical tests' groups. 
The first strand is best exemplified through either additional rules/indicators 
'augmenting' the basic !BC or the measurements of deviations from some longer·term 
!BC·compatible projections. In both cases, the focus is on the specific changes to fiscal 
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policy needed to restore or achieve sustainability: rather than merely counting on the 
posterior realisation of the !BC with debt converging to zero only in the limit. 
Most fiscal rules and sustainability indicators are directly and explicitly derived from 
some representation of the !BC. Even if not expressly rooted in the !BC, the 
'constrained sustainability' approach acknowledges that an !BC will always hold ex 
post, if required through adjustments to the ex ante discrepancies, be they planned or 
envisaged. As in the entire fiscal sustainability area, the distinction between fiscal 
solvency and fiscal sustainability is often obscured. The various constraints may be 
derived from formal tests and econometric modelling of past fiscal performance. But 
generally the advantage of the 'constrained sustainability' approach is that it is suitable 
for a more normative and forward-looking policy analysis. 
The examples of fiscal constraints that are usually cited in the literature are not always 
intuitive and easy to interpret. Not all the rules and indicators proposed in practice are 
backed by sound economic theory. Furthermore, even if specific constraints are valid as 
theoretical constructions their practical implementation may be limited due to 
measurement errors arising from the uncertainty of long-term forward projections. 
Buiter's 'permanent' rules provide an example of the difficulty of obtaining empirically 
observable variables. Still, some constraints are conveniently translated into practical 
policy indicators and perhaps that explains the continued drive to explore theoretically 
designed sustainability indicators and the practice oflegislated fiscal rules. 
The 'statistical tests' literature forms the second strand in the theory of fiscal 
sustainability. That approach is backward-looking and sets itself the limited task of 
assessing only a realised past performance. This sharply differentiates it from the more 
normative endeavours to study current and forthcoming sustainability recommending 
specific policy adjustments. But whereas the forward-looking exercises are typical of 
the 'constrained sustainability' perspective, they are burdened with uncertainty in the 
sense that they may need to rely on forecasts about the fiscal stance. Unless a researcher 
is willing to take on such assumptions behind the seemingly more ambitious 
'constrained sustainability' approach, the 'statistical tests' may be regarded as robust 
enough for empirical purposes. 
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However, a far-sighted call for modelling uncertainty shadows the 'statistical tests'. 
Bohn's criticism of the deterministic tradition is well-founded theoretically and attempts 
to address it have been limited. It should be noted, however, that the models accounting 
for effects of uncertainty defined more generally, within both major strands of the 
literature, although gathering momentum in recent years have only partially resolved the 
issue. Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and more recently Leachman, Bester, Rosas and Lange 
(2005) study fiscal sustainability based on conditions under which cointegration tests 
remain valid even under uncertainty. Ucturn and Wickens (2000) claim to have avoided 
the problem raised by Bohn (1995) by using discounted values for debt and deficits. If 
the environment were stochastic the rates of return (yields on government debt) would 
have to incorporate risk premia associated with uncertainty, as seen from the 'discount' 
factors in (2.58). Taking discounted debt and discounted deficits, on the other hand, has 
the advantage that 'it avoids the need to take explicit account of the fact that ... [the rate 
ofreturnJ ... is stochastic' (Uctum and Wickens, 2000, p. 202). 
Bohn (1998) provides a conceptually different approach to account for uncertainty, 
arguing that traditional fiscal sustainability analyses based on the !BC and 
transversality conditions 'depend sensitively on the choice of discount rates' (ibid., p. 
961). As demonstrated by Bohn's (1991b, 1995) critique, the commonly-used empirical 
counterparts for those rates are inappropriate in a stochastic setting. That is why Bohn 
(1998) proposes his alternative model, where 'a strictly positive and at least linear 
response of the primary surplus to changes in the debt-income ratio turns out to be 
sufficient for sustainability' (ibid., pp. 960-961) for both 'good' and 'bad' states of 
nature. 
Bumside (2004) argues that Bohn's critique has only partially been overcome. 
Reviewing modem fiscal sustainability analyses, he states that 'we should not expect 
major improvements in the accuracy of estimated debt ceilings, forecasting power, 
contingent liability valuation, or policy analysis' (ibid., p. 2) because the old 
assumptions are relaxed at the cost of new problematic ones. Furthermore, Bumside 
contends that recent empirical studies tend to become quite specialised in terms of 
addressing varying aspects of sustainability. Thus on the horizon consensus is observed 
neither in modelling uncertainty nor in defining and testing fiscal sustainability. 
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As for the 'statistical tests' models, it may be concluded that even without explicitly 
addressing uncertainty they at least avoid any need for long-term projections into the 
future. 
In short, no single approach could be regarded as superior. Neither are the methods, nor 
the two literature strands, necessarily complementary in drawing a subtler picture of 
fiscal sustainability. As discussed, the very fiscal sustainability notions are not 
unambiguous. The theories and the empirical approaches vary widely in assumptions 
and in focus. The fiscal sustainability literature is so diverse that this chapter attempts to 
bring together the loose strands into some unifying classification rather than to put 
forward an exhaustive framework for studying sustainability. 
Then which among the multitude of approaches would best fit a study of fiscal 
sustainability in Europe? Is compliance with the fiscal rules under the Maastricht Treaty 
and the SGP synonymous with sustainability, or a more sophisticated statistical analysis 
of historical data would be required? The answer really depends on the research focus. 
The 'constrained sustainability' approach yields indicators to augment the !BC or to 
eliminate ex ante the gap between the forecast fiscal paths and what would be needed to 
comply with an !BC in the future. That approach corresponds exactly to the 
MaastrichtlSGP fiscal criteria, the association of which to the !BC was discussed above. 
So a fulfilment of the fiscal rules is enough if just a snapshot of some notion of fiscal 
sustainability is aimed. 
The 'statistical tests' approach is justified if the researcher is interested in the past fiscal 
performance of the European economies. The implicit assumption behind the statistical 
tests is that policies will not change so that the data series are representative for the 
'long run'. The advantage of that approach is the direct targeting of the !BC condition, 
whereas the durability of the various 'constrained sustainability' fiscal rules is more 
debatable. 
The statistical analysis can deliver relevant policy conclusions, to the extent to which 
the public is interested in long-run solutions. But it has important theoretical 
underpinnings too about the power of the European fiscal framework to induce 
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sustainability in line with the !BC. The latter is a central concern of this thesis, as it 
aims to analyse whether the European economies made a progress towards long-run 
fiscal sustainability and what, if any, were the effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
SGP in that respect. Providing the tools to assess the past fiscal performance therefore, 
the 'statistical tests' serve well the purposes of the research agenda of this thesis. 
Still, even if confined to the 'statistical tests' literature strand, the assessment of fiscal 
sustainability in Europe should choose among various approaches. There is no unique or 
universally accepted econometric method, and the path-breaking studies surveyed above 
have established a multitude of statistically testable conditions for fiscal sustainability. 
Stationarity of a fiscal data generating process may be sufficient to have sustainability. 
Or, cointegration between debt and primary deficit, or between total revenues and total 
expenditures, along with a unitary cointegrating parameter on the latter, may suffice 
(Table 2.1). Revenue-expenditure cointegration is the sufficient condition following 
certain seminal papers on fiscal sustainability (e.g. Hakkio and Rush, 1991a, and the 
'strong' sustainability condition defined by Quintos, 1995) as well as many empirical 
applications thereafter. Quintos (1995) has left the fiscal sustainability literature with an 
option to permit a more relaxed definition: the revenues and expenditures need not be 
cointegrated as long as the independent variable's parameter estimate in the bivariate 
regression lies between 0 and 1. Her 'weak' sustainability condition however may 
potentially put a strain on an economy with a rising debt; therefore it will be safer if the 
data support the 'stronger' sustainability case. The above requirements also nest a 
special case when the transversality condition in (2.11), hence sustainability, is 
satisfied: if the expenditures and revenues series are individually /(0). Otherwise, the 
cointegration with a vector (I, -I) is needed23. 
Clearly therefore, a range of possible methods can be applied to establish fiscal 
sustainability. In the subsequent empirical chapters, the range of preferred methods is 
narrowed down to that of revenue-expenditure cointegration. The cointegration 
approach is employed here for the following reasons. 
23 Recalling at this point the limitations, from an ec-onomics point of view as discussed, of Bohn (2007) 
who allows for higher orders of integration of the fiscal series. 
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First, this chapter has put forward a straightforward argument for resorting to 
cointegration analysis rather single-series stationarity. As Ahmed and Rogers (1995) 
show, under some very general conditions cointegration between total revenue and total 
expenditures is necessary and sufficient for sustainability even in a stochastic 
environment. Thus a major theoretical concern may be overcome. 
Second, the analysis of the cointegrating relationship between revenues and 
expenditures below takes advantage of Quintos' (1995) sustainability conditions. Thus 
the assessment of fiscal sustainability may distinguish between the 'weak' vs. the 
'strong' sustainability hypotheses, to bring forward evidence of varied degrees of 
compliance with the !BC. 
Third, the cointegration approach accommodates the convergence modelling in Chapter 
Three. The recursive estimation of the slope parameter in the cointegrating regression 
provides the means to identifY any gradual adjustments towards, or deviations from, 
long-run fiscal sustainability, as well as any effect from the Maastricht Treaty. Thus a 
verifiable merit of the cointegration technique is that it addresses prime research 
questions of the thesis. 
Certainly one may argue that recursive techniques in a univariate time series analysis 
can also expose hypothetical fiscal adjustments in Europe in the 1990s and beyond. For 
example, unit root tests on the series of debt or deficit may be performed recursively, 
plotting the relevant test statistics appropriately scaled. However, the cointegration 
approach is preferable because it may also be extended to study increasing fiscal 
sustainability convergence in a case with an increasing number of cointegrating vectors. 
This will become possible if data are available for three fiscal series: public revenues, 
non-interest expenditures and interest payments. This is a likely future extension to the 
current work: so a fourth reason to use the cointegration framework is making the 
provision for continuity and potential comparisons with future empirical results. 
Fifth, the revenue-expenditure cointegration is chosen as the favoured sustainability 
measure because, as Chapter Five will demonstrate, the econometric methods, including 
those dealing with gradual fiscal adjustments, may also be utilised for the open 
economy. That enables a comprehensive empirical analysis of fiscal sustainability in 
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Europe as the running theme of this thesis: across both 'old' and accession Europe, 
closed and open economies, and highlighting the reactions of both the government and 
the private sector. 
The first appendix to this chapter lists empirical literature on Europe in accordance with 
the econometric approaches to fiscal sustainability. The chapters to follow then aim to 
contribute in several dimensions to the evidence about the enlarged European Union, 
using various statistical tests related to the revenue-expenditure sustainability condition. 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
EUROPEAN FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY STUDIES 
The table here documents the emerging European fiscal sustainability literature. 
Whereas Chapter Two is focused exclusively on theory and thus provides the analytical 
.. background, the studies identified below summarise the empirical literature context. 
Table 2.A.l contains empirical works within the 'statistical tests' strand of literature. 
Research into fiscal sustainability in Europe began only after the North American 
studies and gained momentum since the 1 990s. The existing findings are based on 
diverse research strategies and are often contradictory across papers and samples. 
As long as this thesis aims to expand the eclectic empirical evidence for Europe, the 
selection follows the geographical criterion. As such, Table 2.A.l intends to represent 
the most comprehensive European fiscal sustainability catalogue so far, enriching 
similar attempts in Vieira (1999) and Afonso (2005b). 
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Table 2.A.I. Some existin em irical evidence about fiscal sustainabili 
Pa er 
Afonso (2005b) Annual 
Afonso and Rault (2007a) EU 15 (1970-2006) Annual 
Afonso and Rault (2007b) EUI5 (1970-2006) Annual 
Abmed and Rogers (1995) US (1792-1992) and UK Annual 
(1692-1992) 
Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) Greece (1970: 1-1998:3). Quarterly 
Italy (1962:2-1997:4). 
Ireland and Netherlands 
(1957: 1-1998:4) 
Artis and Marcellino (1998) EU15 without Greece and Annual 
Luxembourg (period 
varies across countries 
hetween 1963 and 1994) 
Baglioni and Cherubini (993) Italy ( 1979: 1-1991:5) Monthly 
Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Spain (1964-2001) Annual 
Esteve (2004) 
Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Spain Annual and 
Esteve (2006) (1964-2003.1982:1- quarterly 
2004:1) 
Bravo and Silvestre (2002) 11 EU countries (1960- Annual 
2000) 
Caporale (1995) 10 EU countries (period Annual and semi-
varies across countries annual (for the 
between 1960 and 1991) different countries) 
Cipollini (2001) UK (1963:1-1997:3) Quarterly 
Claeys (2007) EU 15 without Annual 
Luxembourg (1970-2001) 
Unit root tests for first difference of debt, 
unit roots with breaks for debt. 
cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
(including structural shift tests) 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures (with 
and without breaks) 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures, 
unit root tests for first difference of debt (with and 
without breaks) 
Cointegration for revenues, expenditures and debt 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures (with 
and without breaks) 
Unit root tests for (un)discounted debt (gross/net) 
Unit root tests for debt 
Threshold autoregressive model of the overall 
budget balance/GDP ratio 
Nonlinear threshold cointegration for revenues and 
expenditures 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Unit root tests for debt 
Unit root tests for overall balance. 
cointegration for revenues and expenditures (and a 
regime switch to adjust towards linear cointegrating 
relationshiP) 
Unit root tests for debt, 
unit root tests for overall balance, 
cointegration for revenues, expenditures and interest 
payments 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
YeslJ) 
Yes 
Yes: for the panel 
No: for some tests for the 
individual countries 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes: for discounted debt 
in Belgium, Spain and 
Italy (net) and in Austria, 
Belgium. Netherlands and 
UK (gross) 
No: all other 
countries/debt definitions 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No: Denmark, Germany, 
Greece and Italy 
Yes: the rest 
No (unless regime shift in 
the face oflarge 
imbalances) 
Yes: for the panel 
No: for some tests for the 
individual countries 
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Paper I Country (period) I Data frequency I Tests(1) I Panel analysis I SustainabiIity(2) 
Considine and Gallagber (2008) UK (1919-2001) Annual Exponential smooth transition autoregressive model No Yes 
of the debtlODP ratio 
Corsetti and Roubini (1991) 18 OEeD countries Annual Unit root tests for discounted debt, No No: Belgium, Greece, 
(1960-1989) unit root tests for uncounted debt, Ireland. Italy and 
unit root tests for overall balance Netherlands 
Yes: the rest 
De Haan. Stunn and De Groot Netherlands (1948-2003) Annual Unit root tests for deficit, No Yes 
(2004) cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Feve and Henin (2000) 07 (various, unspecified) Semi~annual Unit root tests for debt No Yes: UK 
No: the rest 
Getzner. Glatter and Neck Austria (1960-1999) Annual Unit root tests for discounted debt, No Yes: 1960-1974 
(2001) unit root tests for discounted primary and overall No: 1975-1999 
deficit 
Green. Holmes and Kowalski Poland (1991: 1-1998:3) Monthly Unit root tests for overall balance. No Yes 
(2001) cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Greiner and SemmIer (1999) Germany (1955-1994) Annual Unit root tests for discounted debt, No No 
unit root tests for discounted primary and overall 
deficit 
Hatemi-J (2oo2a) Sweden (1963:1-2000:1) Quarterly Cointegration for revenues, expenditures. debt and No Yes 
private consumption 
Hatemi-J (2002b) Sweden (1963:1-2000:1) Quarterly Cointegration for taxes and expenditures including No Ye' 
interest payments (time varying coefficient model) 
Kalyoncu (2005) Turkey (1970-200 I). Annual (Turkey) Cointegration for revenues and expenditures No No 
Mexico, South Africa, and quarterly (the 
South Korea and the rest) 
Philippines (period varies 
across countries between 
1970 and 2003) 
KirchgliSsner and Prohl (2006) Switzerland (1900-2002) Annual Unit root tests for debt and deficit (with and without No Yes: over entire period 
a break). No: before 1940 and after 
cointegration for revenues and e!!penditures 1945 
Konstantinou (2004) Greece (1970:1-1997:1) Quarterly Unit root tests for deficit, No No 
cointegration for revenues and e~ditures 
Leachman, Bester, Rosas and 15 industrialised countries Annual Cointegration (and multicointegration) for revenues No Yes: from 
Lange (2005) (1960-1998) and expenditures multicointegration tests, 
Norway and UK 
No: all other 
countries/tests 
Llorca and Redzepagic (2008) 8 EU accession countries Quarterly Unit root tests for debt. Yes- Ye' 
(1999: 1-2006:1) unit root tests for overall balance, 
unit root tests for revenues and expenditures, 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
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Balfoussias (1999) 
Marinheiro (2006) 
Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos 
(1999) 
Payne (1997) 
Prohl and Schneider (2006) 
Uctum, ThurstoR and Uctum 
(2006) 
Uctum and Wicken, (2000) 
Vanhorebeek and Van Rompuy 
(1995) 
Vieira (1999) 
WesterIund and Prohl (2008) 
Portugal (1852-2003) 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain (period 
varies across countries 
between 1961 and 1995) 
G7 countries (period 
varies across countries 
between 1949 and 1994) 
EUI5 (1970-2004) 
07 and selected Latin 
America and Asia 
countties(1970-2002) 
11 EU countries and US 
(period varies across 
countries between 1965 
and 1994) 
8 EU countries (1970-
1994). and Belgium 
separately (1870-1993) 
Belgium, Germany. 
France. Italy. Netherlands 
and UK (period varies 
across countries between 
1950 and 1996) 
8 OECD countries 
Annual 
Annual 
Annual 
Annual 
Annual 
Annual 
Annual 
Annual and 
quarterly 
Quarterly 
root tests a 
break) 
Unit root tests for first difference of debt, 
unit root tests for deficit, 
cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
(inc[uding structural shift tests) 
Unit root tests for deficit (with and without breaks), 
cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Unit root tests for discounted debt (with and without 
a break) 
Unit root tests for (discounted) debt 
Unit root tests for debt, 
unit root tests for overall deficit 
Unit root tests for deficit (with and without breaks), 
cointegration for revenues and expenditures 
Cointegration for revenues and expenditures (with 
breaks) 
Notes: (I) Further tests depending on the paper's research questions may have been performed. 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes: 1903-2003 
No: before 1903 
No: after 1975 
Yes: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain 
No: Belgium and Italy 
Yes: Gennany 
No or inconclusive: the 
rest 
No 
Yes: with a break, France, 
Italy. Turkey and UK 
No: all other European 
countries with or without 
testing for unit roots with 
a break 
Yes: Denmark. France, 
Ireland and Netherlands 
No: the rest 
Yes: Germany and France 
No or inconclusive: the 
rest 
Yes: Germany 
No: the rest 
Ye' 
(2) The conclusion regarding only European sustainability if the sample also comprises non-Europe countries. Where tested for, weak-form 
sust.in.bility following Quintos (1995) is here documented as a lack ofsust.inability. 
(3) Both panel nnd single time series tests. 
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APPENDIX 2.B 
THE 'PERMANENT BALANCE' RULE 
This appendix details the derivation of the 'pennanent' version of the intertemporal 
budget constraint (equation 2.20 above) and the 'permanent balance' rule for the non-
primary government deficit (equation 2.21 above), as per Buiter and Grafe (2004). The 
notation, modified from the original to keep consistency with the corresponding 
discussion in Chapter Two, is summarised in the following list: 
b 
d 
cl 
g"'gT+gC+g, 
gT 
gc 
" 
r=i-tr 
S '" fog 
f"'fo+\Vk 
fo 
\V 
k 
8 
il 
government debt, share ofGDP 
primary government deficit, share of GDP 
non-primary government deficit, share of GDP 
government expenditures, share of GDP 
government transfers and subsidies, share of GDP 
government consumption, share of GDP 
government capital fonnation, share of GDP 
nominal interest rate on government debt 
rate ofinflation 
real interest rate 
short-tenn real interest rate 
primary surplus, share of GDP 
total government taxes and other current government revenues, 
shareofGDP 
government tax revenues, share of GDP 
gross financial rate of return on the government capital stock 
government capital stock, share of GDP 
real GDP growth rate 
short-term real GDP growth rate 
Furthennore, a 'dot' over a variable denotes 'its instantaneous rate of change' (ibid., p. 
70) and a 'p' superscript denotes the 'pennanent' nature ofa variable. 
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Buiter and Grafe (2004) specifY their no-Ponzi solvency constraint in a non-discrete 
form: 
(2.B.I) 
QO -jrr(II)-B(If)]du 
b(t) ~ re ' [r(v)- g(v)]dv 
In other words, debt should not exceed the present value of all future primary surpluses. 
Decomposing the total government taxes and other current government revenues, as 
well as the government expenditures, as shown in the list of notation, (2.B.I) can be 
rewritten as: 
(2.B.2) 
QO -j[r(U)-8(U»)du 
b(t) ~ re ' s(v)dV 
QO -I[r(U}-8(u)]du 
" re ' [ro(v) + V'(v)k(v) - gr(v) - gc(v) - g](v)]dv 
I 
Then a 'permanent' primary surpluslGDP ratio is defined as 'that constant primary 
surplus-GDP ratio whose present discounted value is the same as the present discounted 
value of the actual (or anticipated) future sequence of primary surplus-GDP ratios' 
(ibid., p. 73). In the infinite time horizon, this means: 
(2.B.3) ( " )-'" GO -j[r(u)-8(u}]du QO -j[r(u)-8(u)]du sP" re' dv re' s(v)dv I I 
'Permanent' counterparts to all other government revenue and expenditure flows are 
defined analogously. The term: 
QO -jrr(u)-B(u)]du 
re' dv 
I 
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is interpreted as 'the value of a real (that is, index-linked) perpetuity whose (real) 
coupon grows at a proportional rate ... from an initial value of one unit of output' (ibid., 
p. 74). Then the 'permanent' real interest rate minus the 'permanent' real growth rate is 
defined as 'that constant value of the excess of the real interest rate over the real growth 
rate that generates the same value for this real perpetuity as is generated using the actual 
(or anticipated) future values' (ibid., p. 74) ofr - 8: 
(2.B.4) 
Tberefore (2.B.2), using (2.B.3) and (2.B.4), produces the 'permanent' version of the 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
(2.B.5) sP fP -gP b S -::=-""7::" 
rP -8P rP -8P 
that is equation (2.20) in Chapter Two. 
T: +'I'PkP - gf - g~ - g{ 
r P -8P 
As for the 'permanent balance' rule for the non-primary budget deficit, again as a share 
ofGDP, Buiter and Grafe (2004) first define that deficit as: 
(2.B.6) d' =g-T+ib 
Also the instantaneous rate of change of government debt, as a share of GDP, is defined 
as the sum of the primary deficit plus the short real interest on existing debt adjusted for 
the short real growth in GDP: 
. 
(2.B.7) b=g-T+(r'-8')b 
Because r '" i - 1T:, and using the expression for the non-primary deficit in (2.B.6), 
(2.B.7) results in: 
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. 
(2.B.8) b", g-r+ib-(7r+B')b 
",d' -(7r+B')b 
The next step involves the 'permanent' intertempora! constraint from (2.B.5). Buiter 
and Grafe (2004, p. 76) defme a 'prudent government borrowing rule' as keeping the 
government tax revenue as a share of GDP (To) at a constant value (denoted Tt) which 
should at least equal the sum of permanent government spending flows, as shares of 
GDP, plus the growth-adjusted interest cost of government debt, as a share of GDP, 
minus the 'permanent' income from the government capital stock, again as a share of 
GDP. That 'prudent borrowing rule' is actually a tax smoothing rule and it comes 
directly from (2.B.5), Le.: 
(2.B.9) 
The behaviour of the government debtlGDP ratio in (2.B.7), after decomposing the total 
expenditures and revenues into their flows as defined in the list of notation above, and 
using the tax smoothing rule of (2.B.9), can be manipulated as: 
(2.B.IO) 
. 
b '" gT + gc + gl -(To + \!fk) + (r' -B')b 
!(,gT + gc + gl- g: - gf - gj ':'b(rP -BP)+'I'PkP -\!fk+(r' -B')b 
'" IfPk' -\!fk+ gT - g: + gc - gf + gl - gj + [(r' -rP)-(B' -BP)]b 
Finally, from (2.B.8) and (2.B.lO) it follows that: 
(2.B.II) 
which is exactly equation (2.21) in Chapter Two, i.e. the 'permanent balance' rule for 
the general (non-primary) government deficit. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY CONVERGENCE 
IN'OLD'EUROPE 
Progress has not followed a straight ascending line, but a spiral with rhythms 
of progress and retrogression, of evolution and dissolution. 
- Joh.nn Wolfg.ng von Goethe (1749 -1832) 
The empirical studies summarised in Appendix 2.A disagree in their findings regarding 
the long-run fiscal sustainability in Europe. Neither does consensus exist on the power 
of E(M)U's fiscal rules in particular to bring such sustainability. There is more than the 
differing datasets or research techniques to explain the latter: the achievements of 
Maastricht and the SGP remain obscure because limited ways have so far been proposed 
to display the evolution in sustainability. This chapter proposes a way to assess fiscal 
sustainability convergence over time, in addition to the hypothetical Maastricht regime 
change. A comprehensive application on 'old' Europe's data illustrates the approach. 
At first sight the analysis of historical data should reveal whether or not EU members 
are in fact compliant with the !BC: and then MaastrichtlSGP might automatically be 
(dis)credited for the results. This seems to have been the research route followed so far 
in the European fiscal sustainability literature. Using this approach however, it could be 
argued that the exact contribution of the E(M)U to fiscal sustainability may never be 
extracted unless the stages in any convergence towards sustainability are identified. 
The rules of the E(M)U seek to impose fiscal discipline on the road to and then within 
the monetary union and, as the next section shows, the 1990s do point to significant 
fiscal adjustments in some countries. Whereas the 'backward-looking' statistical 
analysis is not directly compatible with those rules, it can nonetheless test the 
hypothesis if fiscal sustainability has been achieved; hence whether the Maastricht 
Treaty and SGP definitions correspond to the notion of long-run fiscal sustainability. 
Moreover, the statistical tests can reveal when historical sustainability of fiscal policies 
has been attained. 
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How sustainability is achieved or changes over time, are issues almost never discussed 
in the empirical literature. Some studies note that more complex dynamics with 
particular instances of structural breaks exist (Tanner and Liu, 1994, Liu and Tanner, 
1995, Quintos, 1995, Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007, or for all the EUI5 countries Afonso, 
2005b). De Bandt and Mongelli (2000) use 'convergence' in a different context to 
measure the correlation between key fiscal variables and also the existing pairwise 
cointegration among country and group (European) averages. Blot and Serranito (2006) 
analyse convergence in certain EMU fiscal policy indicators but not in sustainability of 
fiscal policy in the !BC sense. 
A notable recent contribution is Prazmowski's (2005) study of the Dominican Republic 
based on recursive cointegration but his approach differs in that it uses the Kalman filter 
and also does not validate the method and its results across more (or European) 
countries. Before that Hatemi-l (2002b) also applies the Kalman filter on Swedish 
quarterly data from 1963 till 2000 to estimate a time varying coefficient model. While 
my research agenda also involves the recursive estimation of a slope parameter, I draw 
on a simple and transparent dynamic OLS cointegration analysis and a dataset covering 
almost the entire 'old' Europe. That is complemented by an explicit treatment of the 
Maastricht shift, further highlighting the performance in the 1990s and beyond. 
In summary, this chapter addresses the two sequential research questions: have the 
EUl5 countries achieved long-run fiscal sustainability over the period in question, and 
if so have they become more sustainable due to Maastricht and the SGP? The empirical 
applications examine the hypothetical gradual convergence towards or away from fiscal 
sustainability, as well as the particular effect from the Maastricht Treaty. The narrative 
of the chapter goes as follows. The next section reviews the fiscal experience of 
Western Europe, based on the two Maastricht fiscal rules, in the run-up to the EMU and 
in the first years of its existence. The research methods and strategy are outlined then, 
followed by the section describing the data and presenting the empirical findings. The 
chapter concludes with a brief summary of results and policy implications. 
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3.1. Fiscal policy before and after the Euro 
This section presents the main fiscal aggregates from 1970 until 2006, the same time 
span as in the empirical tests below. The descriptive statistics here provide an intuitive 
view of the hypothesis for convergence towards sustainability since the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in 1992. They give a background for the more formal analysis later. 
General government fiscal balances 
Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty declares that EU member states should avoid 
excessive deficits. Article I of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) to 
the Treaty stipulates that the reference value is 3 percent for the ratio of planned or 
actual government deficit to GDP at market prices. The SGP in 1997 re-stated that limit, 
emphasising that within it 'dealing with normal cyclical fluctuations', hence also the 
operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers, is still possible. The enforcement mechanism is 
stronger for EMU members than for non-Euro member countries. When the latter have 
excessive deficits, recommendations are made by the Council. These recommendations 
according to Article 104(7) are not made public unless no effective measures are taken 
by the member country. However, the notices under Article 104(9) and the sanctions 
under Article 104(11) are not applied to non-Euro members (EC, 2006a, p. 40, Box 1.1). 
Figures 3.1 to 3.4 illustrate the dynamics of non-primary general government fiscal 
balances in the pre-2004-enlargement EU, as percent of GDP. Figure 3.1 shows the 
non-Euro countries, Figure 3.2 shows the five biggest and Figure 3.3 the six smaIlest 
Euro area economies (before the Eastern enlargements including Slovenia, Malta, 
Cyprus and Slovakia, but excluding Luxembourg24). 
Figure 3.4 plots three unweighted EUI4 averages over the same period: for the whole 
EU minus Luxembourg, abstracting from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, for the pre-
2007-enlargement Euro area, again without Luxembourg, and for the same Euro area 
but without Greece which adopted the Euro one year after the first eleven countries. 
24 Historical data on Luxembourg is very scarce so this country is not included. This would hardly alter 
the overall conclusions about fiscal sustainability in Europe, as in 2006 the country's GDP was only 0.4 
percent of the Euro area total (source: Eurostat). 
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Figure 3.1. General government fiscal balance: EUl5 non-Euro countries (percent of 
GDP)* 
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• Data unavailable for Denmark for 1970. 
Source: Own calculations based on DEeD and Eurostat data as described in the data subsection below. 
Figure 3.2. General government fiscal balance: five biggest Euro area countries (percent 
ofGDP) 
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Source: Own calculations based on OEeD and Eurostat data as described in the data subsection below. 
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Figure 3.3. General government fiscal balance: six smallest pre-2007 Euro area 
countries (percent of GDP)* 
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Figure 3.4. General government fiscal balance: unweighted 'old' Europe averages 
(percent of GDP)* 
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Source: Own calculations based on OEeD and Eurostat data as described in the data subsection below. 
The four figures above reveal the fiscal turbulences in those countries over the last three 
and a half decades. Individual country experiences differ substantially yet two common 
patterns are evident. First, a deterioration is observed in the overall budget stance since 
the mid-1970s, arguably due to the oil shocks in that decade (see Fatlls and Mihov, 
2003, p. 116). Second, since the early 1990s fiscal adjustments have taken place with 
the best fiscal positions achieved around the turn of the century in nearly all countries 
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over the whole period. Yet the only year since the early 1970s when the EU on average 
was in a fiscal surplus is 2000. 
It is also evident that the three non-EMU members performed rather similarly to the 
rest. One suggestion would be that all countries have been well integrated through 
common trade, cross-border investments and perhaps synchronisation of the business 
cycles. Hence national budgets have reflected that. Such a surmise deserves a separate 
study and may not be equally valid for each country, but the experiences of Denmark, 
Sweden and Great Britain indirectly challenge any straightforward explanation that it 
was just the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that set off the improvement in fiscal 
sustainability throughout the nineties. 
Yet the Maastricht convergence criteria must have mattered for countries eager to adopt 
the single currency. Indirect evidence for that is the widespread deterioration in fiscal 
balances after introducing the Euro in 1999. It may intuitively be implied that, having 
joined the EMU, countries found the SGP fiscal burdens less binding. For some such as 
Germany the time had come for deep structural reforms while for others such as 
Portugal the Euro exposed the lack of competitiveness of the economy. In many cas·es 
the result was higher deficits or at least looser fiscal policies. 
The analysis of the institutional quality of European public finances (see Afonso, Ebert, 
Schuknecht and Thllne, 2005) lies beyond the scope of the current analysis. Likewise 
the decomposition of expenditures and revenues is not needed to test for fiscal 
sustainability. Fatas and Mihov (2003, p. 121) assert that the deficit reductions after 
1992 were due first to tax increases and subsequently to later reductions in government 
spending. Finally, the coordination of fiscal policy in a monetary union and particularly 
in the EMU is a broad topic of its own. Such coordination especially against the 
background of the poor performance of some EMU countries has spurred a huge policy 
and academic discussion about reforming the SGP. A recent survey by Fischer, Jonung 
and Larch (2006) identifies and analyses 101 such reform proposals. The assessment of 
the Pact is at best a side effect of the current study: only inasmuch as it affects long-
term fiscal sustainability as earlier defmed. 
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General government debt 
The second fiscal provision stemming from Maastricht is that the gross general 
government consolidated debt at nominal value should not exceed 60 percent of ODP at 
market prices. That criterion is taken into account when reviewing the performance of 
candidates for full-EMU membership. In their 'convergence programmes' debt data and 
projected debt paths are reported, whereas the current EMU members report those in 
their 'stability programmes' (Council Regulation 1466/97). Thus compliance is 
monitored for all EU members under the surveillance based on the EDP, however in 
practice no binding disciplinary action can be taken if the debt limits are breached by 
existing EMU members or by the two EU members with the 'opt-out' clause. 
Even in the run-up to the third stage of the EMU, the Maastricht debt criterion was 
viewed more flexibly and considered with greater scope for discretion. Against the very 
high debt/ODP ratios for some European countries, the Treaty allowed for exceeding 
the reference value in cases when 'the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace' (Article 104). 
It should therefore not necessarily be expected for the debt/ODP ratios to have declined 
before 1999 or afterwards, although convergence towards the 60 percent value is likely. 
And that is indeed the overall message of Figures 3.5 to 3.8 which show debt defined 
according to the Maastricht defmition for the 'old' pre-2004-enlargement EU (data 
unavailable before 1990). 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the evolution of the Maastricht debt/ODP ratio of the three non-
Euro countries. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 respectively present the five biggest and the six 
smallest Euro area countries (before the EMU enlargement to include Slovenia in 2007 
and Malta and Cyprus in 2008; based on ODP at market prices). Although available 
since 1990, the Luxembourg data are not shown in Figure 3.7, like in Figure 3.3 
previously" . 
"The debt/GDP time path differs substantially from the rest of the EU\5: Luxembourg's debt is only 5.4 
percent ofGDP in 1990 and 6.8 percent ofGDP in 2006, according to Eurostat 
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Figure 3.5. Maastricht debt: EU15 non-Euro countries (percent ofGDP)* 
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Figure 3.6. Maastricht debt: five biggest Euro area countries (percent ofGDP)* 
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Figure 3.7. Maastricht debt: six smallest pre-2007 Euro area countries (percent of 
GDP)* 
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• Without Luxembourg. 
Source: Eurostat 
Finally, Figure 3.8 demonstrates the unweighted average Maastricht debtlGDP ratios for 
'old' Europe in several dimensions: for the whole EU15, for EU14 (that is EUIS 
without Luxembourg), for the whole Euro area before 2007, and for the same Euro area 
without Luxembourg or without Greece. 
Figure 3.8. Maastricht debt: unweighted 'old' Europe averages (percent ofGDP)' 
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It can be seen that indeed the years just before the Euro witnessed an overall decline in 
the general governmentlGDP ratio, although the Euro area was formed in 1999 with an 
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unweighted average still above the 60 percent reference value. In the EUI2, debtlGDP 
remained higher than the EUI5's. Certainly individual countries differ: Luxembourg as 
mentioned has very low indebtedness while some Euro area countries (notably Italy, 
Belgium and Greece) exhibit very high debtlGDP ratios. Ireland managed to reduce its 
debt from 94.2 percent ofGDP in 1990 to 53.8 percent ofGDP in 1998; after joining 
the EMU, debt reduction continued to reach as low as 24.9 percent ofGDP in 2006. 
Debt reduction in the late 1990s generally reflects the improvement in budget balances. 
That may be implied for most individual countries, though with exceptions such as 
Greece, with a continually high debt, and Austria, where budget deficits shrank while 
debt as a share of GDP did not change significantly in the years just before the Euro. 
Germany and France similarly did not succeed in reducing debt despite some budget 
consolidation right in the run-up to the single currency. Although high, the debtlGDP 
ratio of Belgium shows a declining trend. 
3.2. Between Maastricht and the long-run fiscal sustainability 
The overall budget balances and general government debt data so far present varied 
degrees of compliance with the fiscal criteria from Maastricht and the SGP, both before 
and after the countries adopted the Euro. A tentative suggestion is therefore that despite 
efforts by Brussels and individual countries to ensure the sustainable public finances 
required (in a Ricardian sense) in a monetary union, evidence has been mixed. 
Yet even for countries with seemingly successful short-term adjustments an open 
question remains: have fiscal outcomes, even within the Maastricht bounds, contributed 
to long-run fiscal sustainability? In other words, have fiscal policies in the 1990s and 
beyond been such that, looking back at the historical data, the mc is already satisfied 
without a need for future changes in policy? 
From that perspective, the analysis of fiscal sustainability in 'old' Europe should resort 
to the more formal econometric methods discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter 
will demonstrate that the longer annual fiscal series now available from the EUl4 
countries equip an econometric study of not merely the convergence of the fiscal 
variables, e.g. on some reference deficit and debt values, but of the fiscal sustainability 
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convergence per se along the road to the Euro. As the empirical methods below rely on 
the time series properties of past fiscal series, some basic econometrics background is 
presented first. 
Econometrics background 
Chapter Two concluded in favour of the cointegration between total revenues and total 
expenditures as the testable condition for fiscal sustainability in this thesis. 
Cointegration refers to a stationary linear combination of individually integrated 
variables. The orders of integration of the variables matter and should first be 
established. This thesis does not consider the bounds testing approach to the analysis of 
level relationships by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (200 I) where the order of integration of 
regressors is not preconditioned and it is not known with certainty if they are purely 
1(0), purely 1(1) or mutually cointegrated. The two major procedures for cointegration 
analysis are the two-step method following Engle and Granger (1987) and the system-
based one of Johru:'sen (1988,1991 and 1995). The standard specifications of these tests 
exploit the relationship between individually 1(1) variables. It is possible to adapt these 
and test for either 'multicointegration' (i.e. a stationary linear combination of variables 
with different orders of integration; Granger and Lee, 1990) or 'polynomial 
cointegration' (i.e. cointegration between the levels and the first differences in variables 
which are 1(2); Engsted and Haldrup, 1999, p. 237, fn. I). However this is not needed if 
the fiscal series are found to be 1(1). 
The tests for the order of integration, which must precede and justify the subsequent 
cointegration analysis, might conclude that the expenditures and revenues are in fact 
both stationary. This would mean that the overall deficit/surplus is also necessarily 
stationary, as it is a linear combination of the expenditures and revenues, and so a 
sustainable fiscal policy will be signalled (Trehan and Walsh, 1988, 1991). It follows 
that if the series are convincingly found to be 1(0) in the levels, cointegration tests may 
not be needed. 
The first unit root test to be applied below is the generalised least squares version of the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The ADF is a standard tool in the analysis of 
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single time series and, in its complete form with a constant and a linear trend, is based 
on the following regression: 
m 
(3.1) M'; = PI + p,t + &'-1 + a, L LlY,_, + &, 
;=\ 
where PI is the constant, P2 is the coefficient on the trend term t, and from the estimation 
of 0 the 'tau' statistic is obtained and compared to relevant critical values. The null 
hypothesis is that 0 is zero, i.e. there is a unit root. There are several methods for 
choosing the number oflags of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of (3.1), 
and more than one of them are applied in the empirical tests below for robustness. It is 
the added lags of LfY, that 'augment' the first test proposed by Dickey (1976) and 
Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
The Dickey-Fuller generalised least squares test (DFGLS) suggested by Blliott, 
Rothenberg and Stock (1996) performs a modified Dickey-Fuller type test. The null 
hypothesis is that the series is /(1) while the alternative is that it is stationary around a 
linear time trend or stationary without such trend. In the first case, the intercept and the 
trend in the original series are estimated by GLS, before transforming and detrending 
the series and performing an ADF test on it. In the second case, only the intercept in the 
original series is estimated by GLS before transforming the series and performing an 
ADF test on it. It has been shown that the power of the DFGLS is higher than of the 
former Dickey-Fuller tests, so it is nowadays preferred as a 'second-generation' unit 
root test (Baum, 2001, p. 9). 
The assumption for the validity of the non-augmented Dickey-Fuller test is that the 
residuals in the regression are not serially correlated. If they are, the aim of the ADF is 
to add the lagged terms as in (3.1) until the serial correlation is overcome. Another way 
to address a possible serial correlation in the residuals is contained in the test designed 
by Phillips and Perron (1988), hereafter PPERRON. They use the Newey-West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator for that 
purpose. The asymptotic distribution and the critical values for the PPERRON test 
statistic are the same as in the ADF test. The PPERRON test has a null hypothesis that 
the series is /(1) and is performed below in order to complement the results from the 
DFGLS test. 
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A third test, the one by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992, hereafter 
KPSS) is also applied to the fiscal series in order to achieve yet further robustness. 
Unlike the previous two tests, this test is based on the null that the series to be tested is 
1(0) and not 1(1). Doing DFGLS, PPERRON and KPSS tests guarantees robustness if 
the findings are not contradictory at a given level of significance. This approach to 
testing for unit roots/stationarity in the total revenue and total expenditures series is 
pursued below. 
These tests are fairly standard in applied research today but their sometimes low power 
and size properties are also admitted. The literature in that respect is vast. Haldrup and 
Jansson (2005) review some criticisms of unit root tests and the theoretical advances in 
increasing their power and size. More recently, Jonsson (2006) and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
and Sans6 (2006) have discussed the size and power properties of the KPSS stationarity 
test. Unit root tests with a null ofnonstationarity may lack the power to reject a wrong 
null when the root of the time series is 'close to' but less than unity. In addition, 
misspecification regarding a trend or the numbers oflags may distort the size of the test, 
in which case a true null may be rejected. This is a reason why various specifications 
and tests are compared below. 
The revenue-expenditure fiscal sustainability condition may be explored via a number 
of cointegration methods, once the individual series are found to be 1(1)26. The analysis 
of long-run relationships in accordance with the !BC requires an estimation of the 
cointegrating vector. Johansen (1988,1991 and 1995) and Ahn and Reinsel (1990) have 
considered efficient estimation based on cointegrated systems fitted in vector error-
correction models (VECM). An alternative model for cointegrated systems, the 
'triangular' representation, yields other efficient estimators such as in Saikkonen (1991) 
and Stock and Watson (1993). The empirical analysis below employs the dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) and the dynamic GLS (DGLS) estimators as proposed by Stock and Watson 
(1993i'. These estimators are simple to compute and, in the case when the individual 
26 Previewing the empirical results below, the prevailing evidence from 'old' Europe supports such an 
order of integration. 
27 Saikkonen's (1991) estimator for cointegrated 1(1) variables is generalised in Stock and Watson (1993) 
for cointegrating regressions among J(d) variables. 
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series are 1(1) and there is a single cointegrating vector, they are asymptotically 
equivalent to the JohansenlAhn-Reinsel estimator (ibid., p. 784). 
The preliminary triangular representation for a bivariate system (as in the current 
empirical setting) with 1(1) variables is: 
(3.2) 1'; = a+ f3X, +&, 
Mt=u, 
where E, and u, are stationary processes28• In order to control for any correlation between 
E, and u" Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) suggest augmenting (3.2) with 
differenced leads and lags of the regressor, i.e. the following DOLS regression is 
estimated: 
K 
(3.3) 1'; = a+ pX, + Ly.AX",_. +&, 
k=-K 
where k is the lead/lag order. K should be such that the correlation between E, and u, 
disappears for Ikl > K . There is no unique method for determining the leadl1ag order 
(Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007, p. 393) but the least-squares estimation of (3.3) is 'not 
feasible if K is too large compared with the sample size' (Saikkonen, 1991, p. 13). Stock 
and Watson (1993) choose K = 2 or K = 3 for their Monte Carlo samples with 100 or 
300 observations, respectively (ibid., p. 797), and both K = 2 and K = 3 for their 
empirical data with over 80 years of annual observations (ibid., p. 802). In view of the 
shorter series of annual data from the EUI4, below the lead/lag order is set to 1. 
If the residuals in (3.3) are autocorrelated, then the DGLS is the correct cointegrating 
regression estimator. The construction of the GLS estimator assumes that E, follows an 
AR(P) process. Stock and Watson (1993, p. 797 and p. 802) setp = K and that is also 
the general approach in the application here, i.e. p = I. In few cases where the first-
order autoregressive correction is not sufficient to capture the autocorrelation in the 
errors, the latter are modelled as an AR(2) for the GLS transformation. The estimation 
of the autocorrelation structure thus follows Campbell and Perron (1991, p. 51). 
" This follows equations (2.la) and (2.lb) in Stock and Watson (1993, p. 785): an analogous but more 
general system nesting (3.2) is presented in Saikkonen (1991, p. 3). 
/0/ 
In (3.3), ex and p are the cointegrating parameters; hence the estimated cointegrating 
vector, V, is given by V = Y, - a - fix, and 'its stationarity can be checked through 
any standard unit root test' (Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007, p. 393). 
The research strategy 
Using the econometric techniques just described, the assessment of fiscal sustainability 
in Europe involves the following stages. First, the orders of integration of the series of 
total revenues and total expenditures are examined. In the cointegrating equation then 
the total revenues are regressed on the total expenditures, applying either the DOLS or, 
if the residuals are serially correlated, the DGLS estimators. The null hypothesis of a 
unit root in the cointegrating equation is tested, and a number of diagnostic tests are also 
performed to check the model specification. 
Fiscal sustainability strictly requires a cointegrating vector of (I, -I), following Quintos 
(1995), so the convergence in fiscal sustainability over time can be inferred from the 
recursive estimation of the cointegrating (slope) parameter. That is why the recursive 
estimates of the coefficient of total expenditures along with the 95% confidence band 
are reported, treating 1985 as the start date for the recursion. If there were any 
MaastrichVSGP effects or other structural breaks in the cointegrating relationship, they 
should be visually detected. The recursive estimation of the cointegrating (slope) 
parameter delineates the current study from previous fiscal sustainability literature and 
forms an essential part of the research strategy29. 
Finally, the Maastricht effect can be tested by estimating the total multiplier of 
Maastricht effect through an overall slope dummy for the whole period following the 
treaty30. The analytical framework at this stage mirrors Arghyrou and Luintel (2007). 
Other things being equal, a positive coefficient of the slope dummy 'implies a move 
towards ... strong-form sustainability because the bubble term converges faster to zero 
29 Hatemi-l (2002b) takes a related yet distinctly different step: he provides time varying estimates of the 
slope coefficient but in a state-space model and where expenditures are regressed on revenues; his 
empirical analysis covers only one European economy. 
30 Thus the break date is exogenously selected. 
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when p == I rather than when p < I' (ibid., p. 400); the converse interpretation applies 
when the same coefficient is estimated negative. 
The strategy for research into the (convergence in) fiscal sustainability in 'old' Europe 
is summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3.9. 
Figure 3.9. The research strategy 
Unit rootIstationarity tests 
(total revenues and total expenditures) 
Cointcgration regression 
ofrcvenues on expenditures 
(DOLSIDGLS estimation) 
Unit root tests 
on the cointegrating vector 
Recursive estimation 
of the cointegrating (slope) parameter 
(total expenditures) 
A Maastricht regime shift: 
cointegration regressm. of revenues on 
expenditures (DOLSlDGLS estimation) 
3.3. Data and empirical results 
A Maastricht regime shift: 
unit root tests 
00 the cointegrating vector 
Stage I 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
This section demonstrates the empirical analysis of fiscal sustainability in the EUI4, the 
hypothesized convergence in sustainability over time and the Maastricht effect. The 
relevant fiscal data are discussed first. 
Data 
A key consideration about the data concerns the level of government. The fiscal 
sustainability theory reviewed in Chapter Two preferred the general government as the 
most comprehensive level of government, best revealing the fiscal stance of a country. 
The Maastricht and SOP deficit and debt criteria, which are a natural context for 'old' 
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Europe's fiscal sustainability assessment in a historical perspective, not coincidentally 
are also set in terms of general government data. 
Another consideration regards the frequency of the fiscal series. Alternative data 
sources were thoroughly reviewed, such as the quarterly version of the International 
Financial Statistics of the IMF, Eurostat's Quarterly Non-financial Accounts of the 
General Government, and the databases of the Economist Intelligence Unit. The choice 
of annual data was preferred and the key argument for that is an econometric one. Unit 
rootlstationarity and cointegration tests are of little value if the series are too short to 
allow for the reversion to a mean or trend equilibrium. The small-sample bias in 
traditional time series econometrics is well-documented but simulation studies (Hakkio 
and Rush, 1991b, and Otero and Smith, 2000) have shown that increasing the frequency 
of the sample does not significantly raise the test power and a false null hypothesis is 
still easily accepted. Neither are the size distortions of the tests alleviated by increasing 
the frequency while staying at a relatively short time span: a true null hypothesis is still 
easily rejected. With those limitations in mind, annual general government fiscal data 
are used here. 
Furthermore, working with a very large group of countries like those belonging to 'old' 
Europe requires special attention regarding consistency across the sample". In that 
respect, additional alternative annual general government finance data sources were 
reviewed: again the International Financial Statistics but also the Government Finance 
Statistics of the IMF, World Economic Outlook of the IMF, and the annual versions of 
databases of the Economist Intelligence Unit. None of those provided consistent and 
long enough fiscal data series at the EU 15 general government level. It must also be 
emphasised that platforms such as Datastream or ESDS International only give access 
to data collected and arranged by other organisations such as the previously listed. 
It was fmally Eurostat and the database of the OEeD (accessed through SourceOECD) 
which provided the longest and the most consistent, hence best comparable across 
countries and over time, series for the empirical analysis. Wherever available, primarily 
Eurostat data are used. Arguably this dataset is the most methodologically reliable for 
intra-European research and closest to the decision-making processes in Brussels and 
31 Even without Luxembourg where as discussed data are scarce. 
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Frankfurt. Eurostat data are mirrored in the AMECO macroeconomic database of the 
European Commission. As it also largely coincides with the more user-friendly (and in 
many cases longer) Economic Outloole database from the OECD however, technically 
the latter features as the most commonly used source in Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 presents the series of general government total expenditures and total 
revenues. The choice of these two series corresponds to revenue-expenditure 
cointegration being the preferred empirically testable condition. 
Table3.1. fiscal data overview 
NO. COUNTRY SOURCES AND ADJUSTMENTS 
Annual general government total revenues and total expenditures, as ratios to GDP. The original 
series are at current prices, in millions of national currency, not seasonally adjusted. Pre~1999 data for the 
Euro area countries are fixed to the Euro at the country's irrevocable Euro conversion rate. 
Initially, the opportunity to model increasing fiscal sustainability convergence through a 
rising number of cointegrating vectors in a Johansen framework was also explored. The 
latter requires separate interest payments data but such series are inconsistently 
available across the sample of all EU15 countries over the 37-year time span. An 
alternative could have been to construct interest payments series synthetically by 
multiplying stocks of debt with some interest rate. That poses further empirical 
difficulties. First, the choice of the interest rate is itself limited by data availability and 
is also contingent upon the theoretical assumptions for constant or varying rate. Wilcox 
(1989) circumvents those assumptions by empirically calculating ex post the rates of 
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return to see if discounted debt was stationary but data for this purpose are limited and 
the 'correct' rate may not be obtainedJ2• Second, the debt series wherever available are 
usually given in terms of debt outstanding, whereas the market value of the debt might 
better reflect the true fiscal burden. 
Before proceeding to the empirical tests, two remaining points about the data and the 
empirical counterparts to the theoretical models for fiscal sustainability convergence 
should be noted. As reviewed in Chapter Two, nominal rather than real values of the 
fiscal variables are preferable for three reasons. First, real values are not directly 
observed or observable, neither empirically or as policy targets. Second, any attempt to 
convert nominal values into real means more 'pre-test intervention' and hence a way of 
distorting the raw data. Third, the need to use some deflator would further blur the 
comparability between countries. Even if the European Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) is used, it has limitations and also some countries still do not report it. 
Another preference also justified previously is the practice of taking the nominal values 
as ratios to nominal GDP. That reflects the implicit limitation on the government's 
potential to meet its fiscal obligations. The context of economic growth in a country is 
central when assessing its fiscal and overall sustain ability . 
In summary, it is general government, annual and nominal total expenditures and total 
revenues that are presented in Table 3.1, all expressed as ratios to GDP at market prices. 
Unit rootlstationarily results 
The first results from the unit root and stationarity tests are presented in Table 3.2. A 
battery of specifications and tests were applied in order to achieve robustness. At the 
conventional confidence intervals the evidence suggests overwhelmingly that the series 
of total expenditures and total revenues in the levels are not stationary for the fourteen 
countries in this sample. Table 3.3 displays the evidence from the same tests but this 
time performed on the first-differenced series. The results suggest that the differenced 
series are 1(0) rather than 1(1). 
32 See Chapter Two. 
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Table 3.2. Unit rootlstationaritytests: total expenditures and total revenues !levels) 
Tests with trend(l) Tests withont trend(l) Serie Country 
s 
DFGLS (2,6) : DFGLS KPSS(4) PPERRO DFGLS DFGLS : KPSS(4) : PPERRO 
: 13.6) , , N I4.5) (2.6) , (3,6) : 
Austria le -0.495 (I) :-0.495 (I) i 0.424· : -1.969 -0.542 (I) : -0.542 (I) : 1.07' 
tr -0.426 (I) :-0426 (I) ! 0.421· i ~2.133 -0.352(1) :-0.352(1) : 1.39' 
Belgium le -1.580 (2) :-1.580 (2) : 0.254' : -4.190 -1.405 (2) : -1.405 (2) : 0.254 
Ir -1.410(1) :-1.410 (I) : 0.248' : -4.844 -0.008(1) :-0.008(1) : 1.23' 
Denmark le -1.474(1) : -1.474 (I) : 0.347' , -3.307 -1.186(1) :-1.186(1) ,0.902' 
tr -1.447 (I) : 0.893 (2) : 0.249- : -5.991 -0.654 (I) :-0.350 (2) , 1.06' 
Finland le -2.119(1) : -1.276 (2) : 0.204" : -4.675 -0.800 (2) : -0.800 (2) : 0.881' 
Ir -0.272 (I) :-0.272(1) ! 0.345- : -5.135 0.153 (I) :0.153(1) : 1.51· 
France le -1.574(1) :-0.823 (4) , 0.345' i -4.978 -0.203 (I) :-0.368 (9) i 1.61' 
tr -1.266(1) :-1.266 (I) : 0.333' : -5.025 0.685 (I) i 0.685 (I) : 1.64· 
Gennany le -1.777(1) ;-1.777 (I) : 0.125··· : -10.011 -0.877 (I) :-0.877 (I) : 0.576" 
tr -1.621 (I) :-1.621 (I) : 0.12S··· : -9.886 -0.706 (I) :-0.706(1) : 0.74' 
Greece le -0.611 (I) :-0.611(1): 0.41' : -0.979 -0.152 (I) :-0.152 (I) i 1.71-
Ir -2.284 (I) :-2.284 (I) : 0.118 : -9.677 -0.082 (I) :-0.082 (I) ! 1.79-
Ireland le -1.462 (I) :-1.462 (I) : 0.364' : -4.891 -0.947 (I) :-0.947 (I) ! 1.16· 
tr -1.536 (I) :-1.536(1) : 0.366' i -6.271 -1.045 (I) :-1.045 (I) : 0.763' 
Italy le -0.999 (I) :-0.999(1) : 0.444' : -2.750 -0.229(1) :-0.229(1) f 1.27· 
tr -1.330 (I) :-1.330(1) : 0.31- : -4.028 0.197 (I) :0.197(1) : 1.81· 
Netherlands le -0.867 (1) : -0.867 (I) : 0.429' : -3.853 -0.961 (I) :-0.961 (I) : 0.497" 
tr -1.258 (I) :-1.258 (I) : 0.4'" ! -5.383 -1.204(1) :-1.204(1) : 0.493" 
Portugal le -1.072 (I) :-1.072(1) : 0.365' : -5.007 0.340 (1) : 0.340 (I) ! 1.65-
Ir 3.087'" (I) :.1.867 (2) i 0.193" ! -16.249·" 0.482 (I) ,0.482(1) ! 1.8S-
Spain le -0.847 (I) :-0.847 (1) : 0.448- : ·1.161 -0.479(1) :-0.479(1) : 1.26' 
tr ·0.938 (I) :-0.938 (I) : 0.439· : -1.960 0.364 (I) :0.364 (I) : 1.64· 
Sweden le -0.806 (I) : -0.806 (I) : 0.376' : -4.025 -0.771 (I) :-0.771 (I) : 0.673" 
Ir -0.403 (I) : -0.403 (I) : 0.424- : -4.084 -0.543(1) :-0.543(1) i 0.881' 
United le -2.349 (I) : -2.349 (I) : 0.128'" : -10.629 -2.104 (I) :-2.104 (I) : 0.548" 
Kingdom tr -1021 (I) :-1.950(2) : 0.0987 ! -13.985 -1.207 (2) :.1.207 (2) : 0.544" 
Notes: le and tr stand for total expendItures and total revenues, respectively, as shares ofGDP. 
*, * * and * ** denote rejection of the null at 10/0, 5% and 10%. In DGFLS, the 5% and 10% 
critical values are from Cheung and Lai (1995), while the 1 % critical values are interpolated from the 
ones presented by Ellio!!, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). In KPSS, the critical values are taken from 
Kwiatkowski el al. (1992). In PPERRON, the critical values are linearly intelJlolated from the ones in 
Fuller (1976). 
(I) Both tests with and without a trend include a constant tenn. 
(2) Lag order selected according to the minimum Schwarz infonnation criterion 
(3) Lag order selected according to the minimum Ng-Perron (2001) modified Akaike infonnation 
criterion. 
(4) Same tag order used as determined by either the modified Akaike infonnation criterion if lag 
at most 3 there, or if otherwise: by the minimum Schwarz infonnation criterion from the DFGLS test. In 
PPERRON, that is set to correspond to Newey.West truncation lags window used in calculating the 
standard error (Le. correction for serial correlation orup to that lag order). 
(SI The rho statistic in the PPERRON test, Ho: rho = 1. 
(6) The brackets report the number of lags selected for each test statistic. 
: NI",!) 
: -4.345 
: -4.187 
: -5.266 
: -3.937 
! -4.722 
: -2.306 
: -4.077 
: -3.959 
i -2.496 
: -1.855 
: -10.116 
: -9.510 
, -2.088 
: -0.929 
: -1.446 
: -4.417 
: -3.331 
: -1.207 
! -3.489 
: -4.876 
: ·2.539 
: -0.912 
: -2.798 
·1.668 
-5.425 
-5.725 
-8.288 
-11.619·" 
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Table 3.3. Unit rootlstationarity tests: total expenditures and total revenues (first 
differences 
Tests with trend(l) Tests without trend(l) 
Country Series DFGLS i DFGLS (3,6, :KPSS(4) :PPERRO DFGLS :DFGLS ; KPSS (4) 
(1,6) 1 IN (4,s) (2,6) : (3,6) 
Austria LIte .3.740"(1): -3.740" (I) : 0.0348 : -37.359' -2.817' (I): -1.093 (6) :0.699·· 
Lltr -5.840' (I) : -5.840' (I) :0.0298 : -39.287' -3.648' (I): 0.087 (7) 10.606" 
Belgium LIte -2.347 (I) i -2.347 (I) 10.131". 1-37.363* -2.051 (I) : -2.051 (I) 10.531" 
Lltr 3.201"'(1): -2.079(2) :0.0926 :-39.520' -3.1%' (I): -2.019 (2) :0.276 
Denmark LIte -3.895' (I) : -3.895' (I) :0.0434 :-24.464· -3.908' (I): -3.908' (I) :0.349'" 
Lltr -4.093' (I) I -0.963 (8) :0.0805 1-38.255' -3.733' (I) I -0.862 (8) 10.15 
Finland LIte -3.391"(1~ -3.391"(1) :0.0677 ] -18.409··· -3.046' (I): -3.046' (I) iO.24 
Lltr -4.397' (I) : -4.397' (I) :Om57 : -33.346' -2.720' (I) i -0.055 (8) : 0.311 
France LIte -3.657" (3l! -2.731 (I) 10.0435 :-23.723·· 2.583" (l)i-2.583" (I)iO.199 
Lltr -3.608" (I): -2.544 (2) 10.0631 :-30.413' -3.136' (I) 1 -2.15'" (2)1 0.164 
Gennany LIte 3.259'" (I): -1.462 (5) to.091 1-29.115· 2.600" (I): -0.848 (5) :0.278 
Lltr 3.330'" (I): -1.445 (6) :0.0931 :-33.907· 2.362'''(li -0.464 (6) iO.29 
Greece LIte -4.056' (I) : -0.890 (8) :0.0924 !-43.209' -3.378' (I): -0.537 (8) :00401·" 
Lltr 3.279'" (I)i -2.343 (2) iO.0811 ~-30.431· -3.220' (I) i -1.067 (7) iO.0845 
Ireland LIte 3.346'" (I): -3.346"'(1) 10.0908 1-25.961' -2.934' (I) : -1.796 (4) :0.22 
Lltr -3.998' (I) 1 -2.683 (2) :0.081 :-37.935* -3.039' (I) 1 -1.053 (5) 10.095 
Italy LIte -2.809 (I) : -2.022 (2) :0.0893 :-34.205' -2.081 (I) : -1.443 (2) :0.446··· 
Lltr -3.407" (11. -1.626 (5) iO.0998 :-34.115· -3.303' (I) i -1.504 (5) :0.178 
Netherlands LIte -3.026 (I) -2.371 (2) : 0.115 :-35.242' 2.308'''(lj -0.781 (7) :0.533·· 
Lltr -2.981 (I) -0.896 (7) :0.154" :-29.746· 2.302"'(11 -0.726(5) 10.485 •• 
Portugal LIte -4.168' (I) -4.168'(1) 10.0405 1-30.670' -4.036' (I): -4.036' (I) :0.286 
Lltr -5.376' (I) -1.037 (8) :0.0446 :-33.810* -4.334' (I) : -0.723 (8) :0.0607 
Spain LIte -2.958 (I) -2.958 (I) :0.0909 :-24.790* -2.14'''(1): -0.578 (7) :0.6·· 
Lltr -2.925 (I) -1.944 (3) :0.1 :-32.%3' -2.864'(1): -1.908(3) :0.299 
Sweden LIte 3.246'''(1). -3.246"'(1) ,0.0442 ,-34.009' -2.506"(1), -2.051 (2) 10.354··· 
Lltr -3.651"(1): -3.651"(1) :0.0299 : -30.380' -1.747 (I) : 0.595 (8) 10.493·· 
United LIte -2.871 (I) : -2.871 (I) :0.0806 1-22.270" -2.871' (I): -2.871' (I) :0.0901 
Kingdom Lltr -3.932' (I) : -3.932' (I) :0.0453 : -26.336' -2.918' (I): -1.087 (6) :0.0768 
Notes: LIte and Lftr stand for the first differences of total expenditures and total revenues, respectively, 
as shares ofGDP. , 
•• .. and ... denote rejection of the null at 10/0, 5% and 10%. In DGFLS, the S% and 10% 
critical values are from Cheung and Lai (1995), while the 1% critical values are interpolated from the 
ones presented by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). In KPSS, the critical values are taken from 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). In PPERRON, the critical values are linearly interpolated from the ones in 
Fuller (1976). 
(I) Both tests with and without a trend include a constant term. 
(2) Lag order selected according to the minimum Schwan information criterion 
(3) Lag order selected according to the minimum Ng-Perron (2001) modified Akaike information 
criterion. 
(4) Same lag order used as detennined by either the modified Akaike information criterion if tag , 
at most 3 there, or if otherwise: by the minimum Schwarz information criterion from the DFGLS test. In 
PPERRON, that is set to correspond to Newey-West truncation lags window used in calculating the 
standard error (i.e. correction for serial correlation of up to that tag order). 
(5) The rho statistic in the PPERRON tes~ Ho: rho ~ I. 
(6) The brackets report the number oflags selected for each test statistic. 
J08 
rPERRO N I4,s) 
:-30m3' 
:-33.880' 
;-32.455* 
:-38.191' 
:-21.789' 
:-38.370* 
:-17.174·· 
:-30.813' 
:-22.341* 
i-30.S6S* 
:-26.838* 
:-31.169' 
:-40.932' 
:-30.828* 
1-25.232' 
: -38.117· 
:-30.847' 
i -33.275' 
:-30.602' 
:-25.735' 
:-28.605· 
:-33.806' 
i·20.500· 
:-32.165' 
:-31.132' 
:-26.608' 
: -22.093' 
:-26.115 
Cointegration results 
The cointegration analysis is to provide the main evidence for or against fiscal 
sustainability. Having established that the fiscal series are 1(1), the regression 
specification from (3.3) is applied to the EUI4 data, with total revenue the dependent 
variable and total expenditures the regressor. The results from the DOLS (DGLS) 
regression, the unit-root tests for the estimated cointegrating vector and the set of 
diagnostics are presented in Table 3.4, following the research strategy outlined in the 
previous section. 
In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain the 
cointegrating coefficient on the expenditures (fJ) is statistically significant but the unity 
null is strongly rejected. The slope parameter is estimated positive and less than I, and 
the unit root in the cointegrating vector is not rejected: hence, weak-form sustainability 
is confirmed for these countries. 
Non-stationarity of the cointegrating vector is rejected, at various significance levels, in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom but the cointegrating 
coefficients are statistically different from unity, positive and less than I. Thus, again 
evidence for only weak-form sustainability is provided there. 
For Portugal, even though the unity null of the slope coefficient carmot be rejected at 
the 5% level and its actual estimate is close to I, the cointegrating vector is not 
stationary. Portugal therefore satisfies another weak-form sustainability definition as per 
Quintos (1995). 
The DGLS transformations employ up to second-order autocorrelation corrections. The 
diagnostic tests rarely indicate specification problems at the conventional significance 
levels: the residuals are normal, serially uncorrelated, homoskedastic and without 
ARCH effects. 
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Table 3.4. Cointegration analysis witbout breaks 
COUNTRY : AT : BE.: DK : FI : FR·: DE .: GR : lE : IT : .NL . PT . ES : SE : GB 
: DGLS (I)': DGLS(2)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I)':DGLS-(I)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I)': riGLS (2)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (2)': riGLS (ii' 
_____ • ____ • _____ --'-'-" _ ••• , •••••••• _ ... , , ... , ...... ___ ..... ,,_._ •• __ ........ _'" .'"." ••• " .' •• '._.'.'.' ~._ •• ___ ._._._ •• _ ... , .... "."., __ • _____ ••• _._ .... __ •• '0 ..................... ,4 ••...••.•..••. , ..................... ____ ._,_-'-._. _______ ••• _ .•.. ___ . ___ .. , .•..... ''''_''' .. " ..... . 
Estimated equation: 
I~L=!l.2J}T~L"t-"L_-:O.l6ii--:ii:40C·····:iiJ8·6--··: 0.215 : 0.\35 ,·ii:217·······:o.0"8:\"-: 0.219 : 0.015 :·0.156·-··::0:02[---: 0.075 : 0.374 : ojiiii--·· 
_._. _____ .. _____ j_(Q,Q.2§)~_.~ (0:.021)'. iiQ~Q.!7r:_L(Q.'020)' : (0.017)' ~ (0,042)'_ i{O"mL: (O.~: (0.026) ~ (9.921)' _ ~{0.0172 : (0.013)' : (0 . .031)' ~ lO .. 03.6i*_ 
TE : 0.640 : 0.140 : 0.647 : 0.601 : 0.685 : 0.483 : 0.660 : 0.4.00 : .0.822 : 0.646 : 0.929 : 0.738 : 0.376 : 0.486 
~~~..,.,-_._~-,-_-=------::. _(Q,1?5Q)~_: (0,0~92'_ . : (0 . .085)' : (0.041)' : (0.034)' ~ (0~0212'_ .jO.037)' : (0.025)' : (0.053)' : (9.93..9)'_ j!!'oiO)-*_;_1I!,033)' : (0.051)' : lo .. ol!l)'_ 
F-Waldtest, Ho:ft-O : 163.03 : 12.71 : 57.41 : 211.74 : 410.91 : 28.36 : 321.37 : 245.92 : 237.87 : 267.54 : 529.61 : 486.52 : 55.30 : 35.84 
_~~?~ : [!LQ.OI'_~ [O,OQ)~_: [0.00]* : [0.00)' : [0.001' : [OcOQ)~ _L.l9·00)' : [O.OOLJQ,QQL lo.o.oJ~_ UO.OO:t. . ....J!!:.®L : [.0.00)' : 10.90J~ _ 
F-Waldtest,Ho:ft I : 51.54 : 477.45 : 17.13 ,93.06 ,87.07 : 32.44 : 85.61 ,555.00 : 11.11 : 80.51 :3.06 : 61.29 : 152.76 : 40.01 
_[P,:Y~Lu~L. __ . ___ : [Q,(m;_: .. [O,9Q)*' ...... ~IQ,QQr ___ :JQ,.Q9L...;_lQ:QQl~_: .. [O,oor ........ :JQ,OQl~._ .. :JQ,QOl' __ :lQ,QQr_ .. .:. [0 . .90J~ ...... :IQ:Q2e ...... J!!:.~..:.1Q,0_QI~.....: [O.OOJ*. • 
t-ADFon E, : -2.716 : -1.915 : -2.337 ,-2.593 : -2.698 : -3.861·· ,-1.154 : ·2.544 : -\.035 : -4.566' : ·2.806 : ·0.504 :-3.181"': -3.656" 
{Iagorder) : (O) : (O) : (I) , (.o) : (I) : (0) : (0) : (0) , (0) : (3) : (0) : (0) :(2) : (I) 
[5% critical valu!1 : [.3.5\OJ :.I:.U1..~L.: [-3.521) : [-3.510J : [-3.516) :.I:~:~.I~LiJ-3.510J : [-3.510J : [-3.5\OJ : [:.3.:g?LiJ-3.510) : [·3.510J :[-3.521] :J:~:5!~L 
Misspecification tests 
_(J,1-vaJI!~l ______ .•. ____ ........... _ .. _ ..... _. ___ . _______ .. " ...................... _. __ ._ ... ~ ______ ._ ......•..... _ ... ~_ .. __ ... ,.--__ -:-__ --:_ ..... __ .. _ .. . 
Breusch·Godfrey LM F-test; 0 94 : 0 25' . . . : : . . . . . , for I" order autocorrelation: . : . : 0.62 : 0.67 : 0.85 : 0.76 : 0.39 : .0.92 : 0.26 : 0.07 : 0.68 : 0.69 : 0.25 : 0.22 
- ............ -- ...... --, ..... -_ ..... -.. -..... -.. -......... - ~.---.:------'---..; -. - . - .-~---:-..--~ -. - - - i----;----;..-----'-
_}~~~;:;!i~~~-te-st_J..<'.:.~-.J ~.13_ .;.: _0._2_1 _...;.,_0_.4_5_.....;:~0_.5_8_-.;: ~.~3 ___ .;.: _0_.9_5_.....;:_0_.8_9_.....;,;..0_._90 __ .;.: ~.~9 ___ ;..' 0_._49 __ .;.' _0_.0_0_...;.:_0_.7_7_~: 0.81 
Engle's LM Chi test :009 :094 :.0.36' ·008 :.0.42 ·051 . 2 ·075 :.0.03 ·0 ·087· . for ARCH ..: . : 0.69 :. : . : 0.5 :. : .52 :. : 0.46 : .0.85 
White's Chi' test •. - .. -.--.- . .:---...;.---..:----.. -._.-... _ ... _ .. ;...---. ..;----..:---......:. '.-' -- .-----...;..---.:---.....:. - - - -. 
~~!~~.k~.~~tj~jty : 0.58 : ... ~.3~ .. _ .... :_0_.9._3. __ . .:.., _0_.3_8 _-=-' _0._60_---" .. ~:3_~ ...... _ ... L 'O.I_~_ •••••. ,_0_.2_3 ___ :_0_.~~ ___ . __ ].~:2~ ... __ .. L~:.~.I .............. _: 0_. ~.:.. __ .1.~:!.._ .. __ .j.0.:3_1 .. _ ... . 
Sustainability inference :Weak-form:Weak-form:weak-form:Weak-form:Weak-fonn:Weak-fonn:Weak-form:Weak-form:Weak-form:W~~k:f~~:Weak-form:Weak-form:Weak-form:W~;k:f~~ 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Annual data from 1970 (1971 in Denmark) to 2006. 
IDOLS order of the autocorrelation correction. 
Ill, '" III and ••• denote significance at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respective1y. 
TR and TE stand for total revenue and total expenditures, respectively, as shares of GDP. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Jag order selected using the minimum Schwarz information criterion; cointegration test critical values from MacKinnon, 
1991, Table I). 
llO 
In summary, 'old' Europe appears to be no more than weak-form fiscally sustainable. 
This evidence broadly confirms Arghyrou and Luintel's (2007) results from a previous 
European study exploring Quintos's (1995) fiscal sustainability conditions. In view of 
such results, however, it is important to remember that 'weak' fiscal sustainability may 
in practice place an undue fiscal burden on the public finances of a country and lead to 
fiscal unsustainability eventually33. All in all therefore, the full samples from the last 
four decades from 'old' Europe hardly offer any evidence in favour of the hypothesis 
that fiscal sustainability, in a historical perspective, has been achieved as of today. 
The recursive estimation of the cointegrating (slope) coefficient (jJ) in the DOLS 
(DGLS) regression of total revenue on total expenditures can uncover evidence for 
fiscal pressures and adjustment towards sustainability. In this way, the cointegration 
analysis incorporates an assessment of possible gradual convergence in fiscal 
sustainability in Western Europe. Figures 3.10 - 3.23 display the recursive estimation of 
the slope coefficients, including the 95% confidence bands. The recursions start from 
1985, so as to disentangle any positive influence of MaastrichtlSGP on fiscal 
sustainability: if sustainability has emerged only after 1992, then such effects can 
plausibly be confirmed. 
The recursive cointegration evidence indicates weak-form sustainability across most of 
the countries, with the estimated 95% confidence bands for the coefficients varying 
between 0 and I. As long as the upper end of the confidence range for the cointegrating 
parameter suffices for such a conclusion, the results suggest possible strong-form 
sustainability in Finland in the mid-1980s (Figure 3.13), France shortly after the start of 
the recursions «Figure 3.14), and Portugal after 1994 (Figure 3.20). If minding that the 
95% confidence band partly lies outside the (0, I) interval, however, the charts imply 
absence of fiscal sustainability in Portugal during the first half of the recursive period 
and in the United Kingdom (Figure 3.23) before 1991. . 
The estimates of the slope coefficient show that the fiscal stance in Germany generally 
improved, despite a slight deterioration after the launch of the Euro (Figure 3.15). 
Greece likewise displays steady improvement throughout the 1990s (Figure 3.16). 
Again just within Quintos's (1995) weak-form definition, there is a marked 
33 The weak-fonD results in the empirical papers in Table 2.A.1 are documented as a lack of 
sustainability . 
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improvement in fiscal sustainability in Spain after the country joined the EU in 1986 
(Figure 3.21). For the rest of 'old' Europe, the results demonstrate little or no signs of 
convergence in fiscal sustainability since 1985. 
As for a particular 1992 regime change, only Austria (Figure 3.10), Gennany, Greece 
and Portugal display any more visible jumps in the estimated coefficient of the 
expenditures, suggesting that Maastricht at least initially spurred a convergence in fiscal 
sustainability. No clear positive effect can be seen in Denmark (Figure 3.12), Ireland 
(although Figure 3.17 hints that the Maastricht Treaty may have stopped the deviation 
from fiscal sustainability), Italy (Figure 3.18), the Netherlands (Figure 3.19), Spain, 
Sweden (Figure 3.22), and the United Kingdom. Conversely, a negative Maastricht 
effect is rather observed in the cases of Belgium (Figure 3.11), Finland and France. 
Figure 3.10. Austria: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.11. Belgium: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.12. Denmark: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.13. Finland: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.14. France: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.15. Germany: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.16. Greece: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.17. Ireland: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.18. Italy: convergence in fiscal sustainabil ity 
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Figure 3.19. Netherlands: convergence in fiscal sus tainability 
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ability Figure 3.20. Portugal: convergence in fiscal sustain 
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Figure 3.21. Spain: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
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Figure 3.22. Sweden: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
0.7 -r-----------------------------
0.6 t-._o_._._._.-"o-".:..:.'-'-'.'-'.:..;.'-' • .........,..-:-__________________ _ 
... 
. . 
. . 
0.5 t--------------'--''---~~~~ ......... -:-. -;-.-::-• ..,. ••• ~ ..... -;.-;.-;;.-;.c-;.c:.-
0.3 f-------------------------------
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
0.2 .......... .. ........ 
.. -_ .......... . 
............ 
.. .. .. .. 
0.1 f--------------------------------------
--Cointegrating parameter 
(total expenditures/GDP) 
...... ·95% confidence band 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Figure 3.23. United Kingdom: convergence in fiscal sustainability 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
0.5 
o 
-0.5 
-1 
-1.5 
. . 
---Cointegrating parameter 
• 
(total expenditures/GDP) 
. 
.. .... ·95% confidence band 
. 
• 
. 
\. . 
"\. . . ' . 
.. ...... . . . . 
• . 
. . . . . . 
.. .. .. .. .. ........ .. ........ 
........... ........ ........ 
. ---_ .......... _- ..... --_ ........ _ . 
. . . 
.. 
. 
. 
. . 
. 
" 
19851986 198719881989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 }995 1996 1997 19981999 2000 2001 200220032004 2005 2006 
To sum up, no country belonging to 'old' Europe satisfies the !BC in the 'strong' sense 
defined by Quintos (1995) because either the revenue and expenditures are not 
cointegrated, or the estimated cointegrating vector is not (1, -1), or both. Such is the 
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evidence from the cointegration analysis over the full sample periods; the recursive 
estimation of the coefficient on the expenditures signifies no convergence in 
sustainability either. 
The recursions also showed little empirical support for a Maastricht Treaty effect. The 
hypothesis of a regime change can be addressed explicitly with the estimation of the 
total multiplier of Maastricht effect through an overall slope dummy for the whole 
period after the (exogenously selected) break in 1992. As in Arghyrou and Luintel 
(2007), a significantly positive slope coefficient will then suggest that Maastricht has 
induced fiscal adjustment towards the strong-form sustainability. This further view on 
the EUI4 is illustrated by the empirical results in Table 3.5, where the specification 
from (3.3) is augmented by the structural shift dummies. 
The total multiplier associated with Maastricht turns out to be significantly positive, but 
its estimated value suggests only a modest regime change to improve the fiscal outlook 
after 1992, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The 
same Maastricht effect seems only slightly stronger in the cases of Greece and Italy. 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden (a non-EMU country) show a statistically 
insignificant total multiplier, thus indicating no fiscal sustainability effect from the 
Maastricht Treaty. The estimated Maastricht slope dummy appears significantly 
negative in the United Kingdom, confirming the move away from strong-form 
sustainability after 1992. The UK did not have to conform to the European convergence 
criteria in order to adopt the Euro; hence the Maastricht Treaty may have not been the 
cause for the negative post-1992 effect on the country's government finances. 
In all countries except the UK, the overall slope (jJ + rp) is statistically different from 
zero and positive but less than I, thus implying weak-form fiscal sustainability 
regardless of whether the cointegrating vector residuals appear stationary (Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands) or not. 
The UK evidence stands out with an estimated coefficient of the overall slope which is 
statistically insignificant. Hence, despite rejecting the unit root null in the residuals from 
the cointegrating vector, the evidence from this country poses a challenge even to the 
weak-form fiscal sustainability definition of Quintos (1995). 
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Table 3 5 Cointegration analysis with a break 
COUNTRY : AT : BE : DK FI FR: DE GR: lE IT: NL PT ES SE GB 
1-="7"-,---;-_-:;-__ -'-:-=D"'G"'L"'S-'(!L(~GLfilj': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I)': DGLS (I(~g_';fil{DGLS(fiSJGis (I)': DGLS (I)' D.QI,~.t2)': DGLS (2)' DGLS (1)': DGLS (2)': D..C;:~§ (Il' 
Estimated equation: 
Tt?, ~ a + PTE, + rp(D,TEJ +1' , 
a : 0.183 : 0.286 ',0.251 : 0.208 : o.lzf-··' 0.277 : 0.172 :o.iiis-:·o·.079--··'·o.lM·' 0.033 :-0.097--' 0:368''',0.322 
1_= ______ .:.(9,9J1)~ .. L(0,0~9)'. i(Q,045)* : (0.029)* : (0.024)* ;(O,O~ll*. L{Q,Q?Q)~.jQ,cg~~0.023)* :.lO.,o2,s)*_: (O.O~Q,QJ.~~_L(Q,.Q~?)~ .. i (0.95.5)*_ 
TE : 0.586 : 0.326 : 0.504 : 0.619 : 0.711 : 0.347 : 0.376 : 0.457 : 0.628 : 0.590 : 0.740 : 0.656 : 0.391 : 0.229 
-;:c==--:-:-;-;::c;:-=,-;:-(Q,Q41)~_i(0,O?2)*_J.0,Q.~5)* ~ (0.067)* ~ (0.049)* ; (OJ!OJ*.!.(Q,Q~?L.jQ,043)* : (0.050)* :.lO.9~0)*_ ;"(0.063)* :JQ&m~j.@.,Q.m~ ... : (O.1I~)~*_* 
D*TE(D-I in 1992-2006,: 0.020 : 0.069 : 0.049 : -0.007 : -0.005 : 0.016 : 0.132 :0.031 : 0.105 : -0.018 : 0.087 : 0.044 : -0.014 : -0.045 
..Jl.!'t.~el"'~e)L(Q·Q.Q§)~ ... : (0,9Q9)*. ;"(Q,I!lliL*_.:,-,· {~0,:,.02,:,1'f)......;.:.;:(0~.0",0:'.:7),-,: {O,QQ6J*" L(Q·Q!~Q,Q!8)*": (O.OI1r.....~ @.,oI.1) _ L@,!l!.!it:..jJQ,Q!!)~....JO.OIQL; (O·,oP)*_ 
F-Waldtes~Ho:p+rp-O 179.64 : 47.98 : 47.19 : 135.00 : 252.37 : 11.69 : 144.07 : 69.75 : 257.95 : 97.63 : 239.55 548.66 52.01 2.07 
_ ... ll':yalueJ [0.00]* ; [0,00]~.:JQ:QQ1~_: {O.OO]* . [0.00]* : (0,00]:_ ~IOcQQ!~_ .. ~JO.OOLlO.OOr....i [!l . .o<l]~ .. )0.00]* [0.00]* [O.OOl*_~ [O.16J._ 
F-Waldtest,Ho:P+rp-1 : 76.00 : 113.34 : 30.82 : 53.99 : 43.94 35.79 135.44: 76.44 : 34.19 : 54.77 : 10.44 101.41 141.48 40.63 
... Il':Y~!~"L. ' [O.OOL (o,o0l~ .... ~JQ:.Q.QI~ .. _L[O.OO]* [0.00]* , [O,OO]~ _J!l,00]* [0.00]* _J.Il.:Il.Ql~ [0.00]: .. ~ [0.00]* [0.00]* ,[O.OOJ~ 10,.00r 
t-ADF on &, :-3.988*** : -2.283 : -2.637 : -2.557 : -2.665 :-3.960'**: -2.545 : -2.832 : -2.515 : -5.037* : -3.187 : ·0.888 : -3.008 : -3.767*** 
{Iag order} : (I) : (O) : (I) : (O) : (I) : (O) : (O) . {O} : (O) . (3) : (O) : {O} : (2) : {I} 
[5% crit[C~!..~!~~1 ___ 1-3.~~?:L_:.[:3:9~.~L : [-4.000] : [-3.985J : [-3.992LI:.3,?~51 ... :J:.~.:2~.5J [-3.985]: [·3.985] [:1:.1l.Q~L':J~,2.~?L: (-3·2.ill_: ~.OOOL{:~:2?JL 
Misspecification tests 
.{P.:y~!~~.s2~_;;;--;-:c;-;:cc-::----~"··"···"··"""··"·"-""---"~-----~- .... · .. · .. ············~ .... -.-...... r .. _· __ ~ ....... ___ ~ ...... --- .. ~--~--.-
Breusch-Godfrey LM F-test 0 83 :. 0.34 . 048 . 067 .. 088 . 63 : 068 . 9 . 069 : 0 for 151 order autocorrelation: . : . : . : . ; O. : . O. 5 . : .07 
- ... -.. -----.--.,. ... .---~--.-----.... ....... --_.!----''----'. _. - .. ,-----.,--. .. ... 
J~~~!Lty~h~ test .L0~~ ~.~O. .... : ._0 ... _0_0_.-;:_0_.4_8_~:,-0_.5_5_-, ~.~4 ___ ~: _0._40 __ : 0.72 : 0.03 : ~.~4 _ .•• 
Engle's LM Chi test .. . for ARCH 0.26: 0.64 : 0.45 : 0.66 0.08 0.70 0.79 0.88 0.36 0.76 
. ,.----=------' .. _._."._---!----!-----' ... -.--- ~---.,---:.....--: _.--Wfift~s-Chi2 test r. h k d .. : 0.38 : 0.20 : 0.27 : 0.23 : 0.39 : 0.27 : 0.27 : 0.20 : 0.21 0.42 
-'-' ...... _-_ .•. ,-_._-_ ........ .. .. 
--"-'''.-
0.78 0.57 0.19 0.46 , 
. ... .. 
· 
.. 
0.53 0.06 0.80 0.98 
.. .-
- · 
•. 
0.23 0.97 0.32 0.34 
- -
- · -
0.42 0.25 0.42 0.45 
__ ~~.,~!~ros ~~~"tlc""ty"'_ _ _'_ __ __' ...... _, .. " .. ".""'''~, .. ________ '_ __ '''''' ___ '''. __ .. _ ,._, __ ,,_. ___ . ___ ... ~. ___ .....:. ___ ,,_. _______ '_ __ """ ___ "'-_ 
-------"" "" .. , •..... '" .. ". __ . 
Notes. Standard errors m parentheses. Annual data from 1970 (1971 III Denmark) to 2006. 
I DOLS order of the autocorreJation correction . 
• , ** and ••• denote significance at the 1%,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
TR and TE stand for tota1 revenue and total expenditures, respectively, as shares of GDP. 
ADF is the Augmented Djckey~Fuller test (Iag order selected using the minimum Schwarz information criterion; cointegration test critical values from MacKinnon, 
1991, Table I). 
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All in all, the combined results from Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 provide evidence against 
fiscal sustainability which is fairly uniform across the fourteen countries and robust in 
terms of whether the Maastricht effect is explicitly considered or not. In most cases in 
'old' Europe, the Treaty of 1992 has encouraged only negligible adjustments to satisfy 
the strong-form definition of long-run fiscal sustainability; sometimes the Mastricht 
effect is absent or even significantly negative. 
3.4. Conclusion 
A comprehensive statistical assessment of the fiscal performance of 'old' Europe during 
the last almost four decades hardly offers any evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
fiscal sustainability, in a historical perspective, has been achieved. This verdict 
conforms to the majority of previous European-based studies documented in Appendix 
2.A. However, the recursive cointegration methodology in this chapter makes it possible 
to examine if there was any convergence in fiscal sustainability over time. It may now 
be acknowledged that the fiscal rules imposed to ensure the successful launching and 
functioning of the monetary union have not in fact induced national policies compliant 
with the !BC. This conclusion is all the more robust since the analysis here is one of the 
first really pan-European fiscal sustainability studies. 
There has always been keen academic interest in the fiscal side of the EMU, the 
literature both spurring and shadowing the policies in the run-up to the Euro in the 
1990s and the SGP reform debate in the current decade. As the E(M)U enlarges further 
and new economies experience some old compliance challenges, public finances in 
Europe will remain an area where theory and policy intersect. What are the policy 
implications then, if neither Maastricht, nor the Pact, nor the actual advent of the Euro 
seem to have mattered in streamlining any efforts to run public finances in keeping with 
the intertemporal constraint? 
The first implication to note is that since the countries over most of the period reviewed 
have failed the !BC condition, policy changes are to be expected if authorities are keen 
to restore long-run sustainability. Unfortunately this suggestion may be alerting but is 
not straightforwardly translatable into concrete budgetary policies. Policymakers may 
intuitively expect that reducing the government debt is required, implying an increase in 
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revenue or cut in expenditures. But hardly anything is clear about the size and sign of 
adjustments needed to achieve a stationary linear combination between revenues and 
total expenditures. 
Whereas the evidence here may be judged more narrowly as just an empirical 
application of the proposed sustainability convergence model, it nonetheless sheds new 
light on the rationale behind the European fiscal rules. Opponents of the current fiscal 
regime in Europe might be tempted to arm themselves with the findings from this 
chapter. A possible neutral argument, however, could be that the results above do not 
immediately relate to the efficacy of the fiscal rules: but rather bear on a claim that the 
Maastricht and SGP fiscal arrangements differ from some definitions of long-run 
sustainability . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN EU ACCESSION 
COUNTRIES: A PANEL (CO)INTEGRATION 
PERSPECTIVE 
=================================== 
But the only way of discovering the limits o/the possible is to venture a litlle 
way past them into the impossible. 
- Arthur C. Clarke, 'Profiles of the Future' (1962) 
During the period from 2004 to 2007 the European Union enlarged further to include a 
total of twenty-seven members. The accession of the new members from Central and 
Eastern Europe marked an end to the transition process that followed their political 
transformation and the start of economic reforms after 1989. In most cases the transition 
began with severe recessions and then deep structural" reforms followed, which 
necessarily meant a complete makeover of the fiscal environment in an economic, 
legislative and policymaking horizon. The accession countries have also undergone 
remarkable fiscal adjustments with debt and deficits often below those in the 'old' 
European Union (the EUI5). Following EU accession, all new members must comply 
with the fiscal requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Many of them already 
joined the ERM 2 and made efforts to adopt the single currency rapidly. Slovenia in 
2007 became the thirteenth member of the currency union; Cyprus and Malta followed 
suit in 2008; Slovakia joined the Euro area in 2009. Despite the apparent overall 
progress in fiscal consolidation, the whole evidence points to both fiscal slippages and 
successes in the past, as well as ongoing pressures to abide by prudent fiscal policies. 
Now that the accession countries all joined the EU and the SGP should be guiding their 
policies, delving into their fiscal performance so far could be revealing. An imminent 
research question is whether, based on their historical record, fiscal policies in the 
region as a whole can be categorised as 'sustainable'. 
Having stated that, relatively little work has been done to study fiscal sustainability in 
the accession countries using the formal methods of fiscal sustainability assessment, 
discussed in the previous two chapters. Therefore this chapter aims to fill a gap in the 
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empirical literature and extend the fiscal sustainability analysis to the twelve EU 
accession countries. 
Undoubtedly an obstacle to the analysis of Central and Eastern Europe is the very short 
time series of available data. Thus for purely econometric reasons it has until recently 
been argued that studying long-run sustainability there will remain impossible for years 
to come. Appendix 2.A confirms that the region has received minimal research attention 
so far in this particular literature strand. 
In a related literature, Krejdl (2006) analyzes the sustainability of Czech public finances 
but from the 'constrained sustainability' perspective, as defmed previously. Radulescu 
(2003) practically relies on descriptive indicators to assess sustainability. The study by 
Mackiewicz and Krajewski (2007) strictly belongs to the fiscal reaction literature 
following Bohn (1998). 
Instead, accession countries' fiscal sustainability has been addressed as a broader 
concept and/or analysis has focused on concrete aspects of fiscal policy. Thus recent 
research includes Coricelli (2004) and Schwartz, Corbacho, Cui, Ganelli and Manasse 
(2007) who dealt with the public investments side of fiscal policies aimed at catching-
up with the more advanced European economies; Afonso, Nickel and Rother (2006) 
highlighted the fiscal consolidation experience; Wagner (2006) surveyed the fiscal 
challenges related to EU accession; Lewis (2007) analysed country-specific fiscal 
dynamics in the run-up to the EU; and Staehr (2008) studied the cyclicality of fiscal 
policies. 
Green, Holmes and Kowalski (2001) are a notable exception in that they empirically 
prove an IBC-rooted fiscal sustainability for one accession country, Poland. Their 
analysis is based on high-frequency (monthly) data from January 1991 through March 
1998, i.e. long before the EU entry. Recently Llorca and Redzepagic (2008) assessed 
fiscal sustainability in a panel of eight accession countries, using quarterly data from 
1999 until the first quarter of 2006, in accordance with the revenue-expenditure 
cointegration criterion. Their statistical methods are akin to the ones utilised in this 
thesis and represent a major extension of the empirical fiscal sustainability literature to 
the region of Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter, however, tackles some of the 
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issues overlooked in Llorca and Redzepagic (2008) and offers important advances along 
the following lines. 
The analysis here will cover for the first time all the twelve EU accession countries and 
the fiscal time series from them are longer. As Chapter Three discusses, the 
cointegration study of macroeconomic data requires long data spans and increasing the 
frequency in order to provide more observations does not alleviate the power and size 
distortions with series of relatively short length. 
Furthermore, this chapter is based on an original dataset constructed for the purposes of 
the empirical agenda. To study the hypothesized fiscal adjustment 'puzzle' for the 
region, I propose adopting some novel applications from panel econometrics. The 
variety of panel time series methods applied below exceeds any of the panel 
sustainability studies so far documented in Table 2.A.! and certainly Llorca and 
Redzepagic (2008). 
Not least, this chapter relaxes the strong assumption of cross-sectional independence in 
the panel data. This assumption has been a limitation of the tests which have so far 
dominated the panel cointegration literature. The analysis below follows some very 
recent theoretical breakthroughs and is the first to assess the historical fiscal 
sustainability of accession Europe, in keeping with the !BC, without confining the data 
to a cross-sectional independence assumption. 
In summary, from a theoretical perspective the chapter is among the first contributions 
in a recent literature importing the advances in the econometrics of unit roots and 
cointegration in panels into the domain of fiscal sustainability. Taking advantage of a 
new dataset covering more countries with longer time series of relevant fiscal data than 
ever before, this chapter conducts the most comprehensive so far fiscal sustainability 
analysis for accession Europe. Furthermore, the variety of econometric methods and 
specifications aim for maximal robustness of the empirical results, hence - plausibility 
of the policy implications. 
Applying the tools of fiscal sustainability analysis in the !BC sense to accession Europe 
provides continuity and a common framework for comparing the results from other 
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chapters and discussing cross-country and cross-region evidence. However, the data 
limitations are necessarily reflected in the scope of the research now. Macroeconomic 
series from Central and Eastern Europe before the start of transition are, if available at 
all, incompatible with what those countries began to report in the 1990s. The complete 
makeover of institutions, legislation and accounting conventions means that annual 
series substantially longer than a decade are not feasible. What is more, some of the 
countries in the sample did not emerge as independent political entities until the early 
1990s. That precludes an analysis of the evolution over time (or essentially, 
convergence) in fiscal sustainability in the spirit of Chapter Three. 
In view of the above, before studying how the accession countries held up to the !BC, it 
is worth noting the major dissimilarities between them and 'old' Europe. Briefly 
presenting their distinct fiscal background in the next section will highlight the research 
. focus, justify the choice of empirical strategy and ease the interpretation of results. After 
that the chapter proceeds with motivating the panel fiscal sustainability analysis and a 
background for the panel time series techniques. The data and the empirical results 
come next, before the final section which briefly concludes. 
4.1. The fiscal experience of accession countries 
The section below presents some background descriptive statistics and a summary of 
key developments that affected the fiscal stance of the twelve countries which have 
joined the EU since 2004. 
The transition and EU accession context 
The fiscal paths of CEE countries since the early 1990s were marked by periods of 
imbalances and volatility, as illustrated by Table 4.1 and Table 4.234• The fiscal 
turbulence reflected the dual pressure of transition reforms and progress towards EU 
accession. It may be argued that whereas some countries were delaying politically 
unpopular structural reforms, that seems to have resulted in slower growth (Table 4.3) 
rather than in a distinct pattern of the aggregate fiscal indicators. 
34 The narrative here and in Chapter Five also relates to Malta and Cyprus, the two nominally non-
transition countries which acceded to the EU in May 2004. 
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Table 4.1. General government fiscal balance, percent of GDP 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Bulgaria nla nla nla 1.7 0.4 ·0.5 1.9 0.1 ·0.9 2.2 1.9 3.3 
Cyprus nla nla ·6.3 ·2.3 ·1.5 -4.1 nla -4.2 -4.4 ·2.4 ·2.3 -4.4 
Czech Republic ·13.4 ·3.3 ·3.8 ·5.0 ·3.5 ·2.9 ·3.7 ·3.7 ·5.7 ·6.8 ·6.6 ·2.9 
Estonia nla nJa nla nla nI. -0.2 ·0.3 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 
Hungary nfa nla ·5.9 ·8 ·5.5 ·2.9 ·3.4 ·8.2 ·7.2 ·6.5 ·7.8 ·9.2 
Latvia -2 -0.5 1.5 -0.6 ·5.3 ·2.8 ·2.1 ·2.3 ·1.6 ·1 ·0.2 0.4 
Lithuania -1.6 -3.3 ·11.9 ·3.1 ·2.8 ·3.2 ·2.1 ·1.5 .1.3 ·1.5 ·0.5 ·0.3 
Malta nla nla nla ·9.7 ·7.6 ·6.1 ·6.4 ·5.5 ·10 ·5 ·3.1 ·2.6 
Poland ·4.4 ·4.9 ·4.6 .4.3 ·1.8 ·1.5 ·3.7 ·3.2 ·6.3 ·5.7 -4.3 ·3.9 
Romania nla nla nla -3.2 -4.5 -4.6 ·3.3 ·2 ·1.5 .1.5 ·1.4 ·1.9 
Slovakia -1.8 -8.6 ·6.7 .4.8 ·6.4 ·11.8 ·6.5 ·7.7 ·2.7 ·2.4 ·2.8 ·3.4 
Slovenia nla nia nla nla nI. ·3.8 ·4.1 ·2.5 .2.8 ·2.3 .1.5 .1.4 
EUl5 ·5.3 ·4.1 ·2.5 ·1.7 ·0.8 0.5 .1.1 ·2.2 ·2.9 ·2.7 ·2.3 ·1.6 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: 'nJa~ means data unavailable 
Table 4.2. General government consolidated gross debt, percent of GDP 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200 I 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Bulgaria nI. 105.1 79.6 79.3 73.6 66.2 54 45.9 37.9 29.2 22.8 
Cyprus nI. nI. 61.6 62 61.6 61.9 64.7 69.1 70.3 69.2 65.3 
Czech Republic nI. 12.2 12.9 13.4 18.2 26.3 28.5 30.1 30.7 30.4 30.4 
Estonia 4.4 4.1 
Hungary nI. 64.2 61.9 61.2 55.4 52.2 54 58 59.4 61.7 66 
Latvia ~ ~ U IH I~ 15 I~ IU IU 12 10 
Lithuania nla 15.2 16.5 23 23.8 22.9 22.2 21.2 19.4 18.6 18.2 
Malt. nla 51.5 64.9 56.8 56.4 63.5 60.1 70.4 73.9 72.4 66.5 
Poland nI. 44 39.1 40.3 36.8 36.7 39.8 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.8 
Romania nI. 16.5 17.8 24.2 22.7 nI. 23.8 21.5 18.8 15.8 12.4 
Slovakia 30.6 33.1 34 47.2 49.9 49.2 43.3 42.4 41.5 34.5 30.7 
Slovenia nI. nI. 23.6 24.9 27.4 28.4 29.1 28.6 28.9 28.4 27.8 
EUl5 72.6 71 68.9 67.9 64.1 63.1 61.5 63.1 63.3 64.4 63.3 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: 'nJa' means data unavailable 
Table 4.3. Gross domestic product, constant prices, annual percent change 
Average 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000-
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Poland 
·9.1 ·10.8 
7.3 0.3 
·1.2 ·11.5 
nla nla 
·3.5 ·11.9 
nla nla 
nla nla 
4.7 5.9 
·7.2 ·7 
·8.4 ·11.6 ·3.7 ·1.6 
8.4 1.5 4.8 8.2 
·3.3 0.6 3.2 6.4 
nla nla -1.6 4.5 
·3.1 ·0.6 2.9 3.5 
nla ·11.4 2.2 ·0.9 
nI. ·16.2 ·9.8 1.2 
8.1 3.9 4.6 6.9 
2 4.3 5.2 6.8 
2006 
·8 ·5.6 4 2.3 5.2 
1.8 2.3 5 4.8 3.5 
4.2 ·0.7 -0.8 1.3 4 
4.4 11.1 4.4 0.3 9.1 
1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 4.4 
3.8 8.3 4.7 4.7 8.5 
5.1 8.5 7.5 ·1.5 7.2 
4 4.8 3.4 3.8 0.4 
6.2 7.1 5 4.5 3.6 
Romania ·5.6 ·12.9 ·8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 ·6.1 -4.8 ·1.2 5.5 
Slovaki. nI. nI. nI. nI. 6.3 5.8 8 5.7 3.7 0.3 4.5 
Slovenia nla nla nia 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.7 4.8 3.9 5.4 3.8 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007, and own 
calculations. 
Note: 'nJa' means data unavailable 
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The initial instances of GDP decline, hence shrinking of the tax base, exacerbated the 
fiscal burden and were considered an important cause for the large primary deficits 
(Budina and van Wijnbergen, 1997). That is a first feature of the transition experience 
which differentiates those countries from the EUI5 group. Unemployment then rose 
sharply, further aggravated by large-scale privatisation and pro-market structural 
reforms, and the social security systems were strained. 
The collapse of the centrally planned economies revealed a heritage of outdated and 
malfunctioning infrastructures (EBRD, 2004). Schwartz et al. (2007) state that roads 
had been lacking investment and maintenance as the use of private cars had been 
limited compared to Western standards. The railways were mostly suited for the 
transport of industrial production. Telecommunication technology was not up to date 
and not widely accessible. Water supply was often insufficient and water waste disposal 
not environmentally friendly. 
That necessitated significant public sector outlays, even after newly-emerged private 
sector institutions allowed for public-private investment partnerships and after access to 
the EU pre-accession funds was opened up. In order to pursue international 
competitiveness and attract much needed foreign investors, the accession countries also 
embarked on more, radical tax reforms. Nowadays they exhibit lower corporate and 
income tax rates than EUI5. Most countries in the region gradually adopted flat-tax 
regimes. Whereas in the medium term that strategy indeed spurred growth and led to 
increase of tax revenues, initially the fiscal consolidation may have been jeopardised. 
The budgetary process has been adversely affected by a greater share of the shadow 
economy and hence tax evasion. Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) estimate that the 
average size of the shadow economy by the end of the last century was 38 percent of 
official GDP in the transition countries, compared to only 17 percent in the OECD. 
Not surprisingly then, most countries in the 1990s experienced budget deficits higher 
than the EU IS average. On the other hand however, their fiscal adjustment paths 
benefited from the generally lower (except for Bulgaria) initial government debt ratios. 
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In addition to their transition specifics, those countries also differ from the EUI5 group 
in the fiscal challenges related to EU accession advancement taking place 
simultaneously. Wagner (2006) presents a comprehensive survey of fiscal costs and 
benefits resulting from EU membership, on both the expenditures and revenues side. 
Thus compliance with EU regulations required more public expenditures. According to 
Kopits and Szekely (2004) the reform of public administration alone could cost up to 
1.5 percent ofGDP. Following accession, the new members also had to contribute to the 
EU budget. Although the accession treaties initially provided for some temporary 
compensation against the possibility that the new members incurred negative budget 
balances against the EU, the 2004 enlargement group are no longer eligible for those. In 
the financial programming period for 2007-2013 only the two most recent entrants, 
Bulgaria and Romania, were entitled to such compensations (fixed at EUR 0.4 billion). 
Moreover, the co-financing required for taking advantage of EU funds may have a 
negative impact on the accession countries' budgets: although private sources might 
also be drawn on for such projects. The European Commission estimated that in 2004, 
the first even if incomplete year of membership, co-financing amounted to about 0.3 
percent of GDP on average for the new EU members (Schwartz et al., 2007). 
Fiscal gains would be expected too. State subsidies should gradually be eliminated, 
taking off some pressure on the budgets. Reduced interest risk premia following EU 
accession should also benefit some countries, although as illustrated in Table 4.2 the 
debt and hence debt-service burden have generally declined or at least stayed low. 
Government revenues might be affected in both directions, again in the shorter or longer 
term. The new members benefit from transfers from the EU budget. The ten 2004 EU 
entrants were allocated expenditures ofEUR 9.1 billion in 2005 (9.5 percent of the EU 
total). Poland then became the 8th largest recipient of all European expenditure. But the 
emphasis was increasingly being put on the absorption capacity: in 2007 for the first 
time, funds committed but not spent by the accession countries were to be cancelled 
under the 'n+2 rule', i.e. after two years ifstill unspent (EC, 2006b). 
EU membership also further stimulates investment and economic growth in the new 
members, and thus contributes to higher tax proceeds. Conversely, exposure to 
competitive pressures from the cornmon market may deteriorate the financial positions 
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of domestic companies and spur intra- or cross-border mobility of production factors 
including labour: hence, undermine tax sources. 
All in all, the net fiscal impact of EU accession is hard to assess, even though all new 
members are net receivers of EU transfers. First post-accession estimates based on 
actual data indicated that EU-related transfers may have led to a fiscal drag of 0.5 to I 
percent of GDP and an additional aggregate demand stimulus of up to I percent of GDP 
(Rosenberg and Sierhej, 2007). 
Neither is the precise factor of EU accession easy to assess when looking at the 
aggregate numbers in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. Compared to the EUI5, whereas in some 
cases significant fiscal adjustments took place throughout the 1990s via reduction of 
gross debtlGDP ratios, about the turn of the century the accession countries fared worse 
in their fiscal balances (Buiter and Grafe, 2004). Some countries improved on their 
balances subsequently but causal links to EU accession are ambiguous: it is worth 
reminding that in the run-up to accession no macroeconomic criteria were conditioned. 
Still, after joining the EU the new members became automatically subject to the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Although before entering the ERM 2 and before full 
membership of the EMU the non-Euro countries may not, technically, be sanctioned 
against for violating the fiscal criteria of the Pact, their performance is subject to close 
scrutiny as discussed in section 3.1 above. Therefore it could be surmised that overall 
the drive for EU accession and then the obligations arising from it may partly explain 
the more recent fiscal consolidations in most accession countries. Schwartz et al. (2007, 
p. 7) have identified 38 episodes of fiscal consolidations, defined as annual positive 
changes in the overall budget balance, between 1999 and 2005. 
While the role of EU accession for the fiscal adjustments in CEE so far may be 
debatable, a separate strand of literature dwells on the ongoing policy discussions about 
reforms of the SGP. The Pact has attracted criticism concerning its relevance to the 
accession economies. Convergence and catch-up growth there are often argued to 
require high public investment outlays that may break the budget deficit limits 
(Coricelli,2004). 
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In essence, despite controversies and limited research into the fiscal background for the 
road towards EU membership, it is the specifics stemming from the transition and EU 
accession experiences which justify an analysis of the CEE countries as a group of their 
own. Their historical fiscal sustainability should be analysed separately, 
notwithstanding the fact that there are also many factors affecting the fiscal stance 
shared by any European country. Thus liberalisation of markets, globalisation and 
international competition are common challenges with oftentimes direct fiscal 
implications at national levels. Ageing populations, pension and public sector reforms 
may likewise provoke fiscal costs across otherwise varying countries. Although not 
subject to the disciplinary measures envisaged for existing EMU members, accession 
into the EU already requires some compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact for 
all. As the accession countries are not allowed the 'opt-out' clause, they would 
eventually have to adopt the Euro and must thus gradually bring their public finances 
under the Maastricht debt and deficit criteria. 
The long-run fiscal sustain ability criterion revisited 
The issue about whether fiscal policies of the accession countries have been sustainable, 
as defined under the 'backward-looking' statistical tests approach adopted empirically 
in this thesis, requires tools and data beyond the intuitive discussion and descriptive 
statistics. Observed high debt and deficit levels alone may not contradict the notion of 
sustainability if growing at rates lower than economic growth rates. Or the government 
may run fiscal surpluses in the future to compensate for accumulated debt, again 
requiring a statistical analysis beyond the mere debt/GDP ratios. 
Chapter Two discussed the rationale behind the 'statistical tests' approach to fiscal 
sustainability: assessment is done under the assumption that past policies are kept 
unchanged and the fiscal sequences are continued into the future. Considering the short 
data series typical of accession countries, that assumption seems necessary in the 
empirical work here. 
The pioneering contribution of Hamilton and Flavin (\ 986) reflects that interpretation of 
'testing' the !BC, although for them a violation of the !BC in historical data would just 
mean that the government has chosen the alternative fiscal path requiring perpetual debt 
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financing. Hamilton and Flavin's (1986) stationarity conditions for the presence of 
fiscal sustainabiJity were in subsequent literature complemented by econometrically 
testable cointegration conditions, as emphasized in the previous chapters. Today it is 
standard research practice to assess historical fiscal sustainability by testing for 
cointegration between revenues and total expenditures and estimating the parameters in 
the cointegrating vector. 
This chapter extends the European fiscal sustainability literature to cover all EU 
accession countries. The same revenue-expenditure cointegration conditions as in 
Chapter Three are tested in order to keep the research methodology uniform across 
Europe and ease the comparison of evidence and the interpretation of policy 
implications. Historical fiscal sustainabiJity will be confirmed provided that the series of 
total revenues and total expenditures are either both stationary in their levels, or are 
integrated of order I and cointegrated with a vector (I, -I). 
The assessment of fiscal sustainability is thwarted by the short series of accession 
countries' data. Long-run macroeconomic relationships cannot easily be tested since the 
structural transition from centrally-planned to market economy makes any fiscal data 
before the mid-1990s either impossible to obtain or irrelevant. It is not surprising that 
this area is less often studied for less developed countries as a whole". Green et al. 
(2001) and Llorca and Redzepagic (2008) represent the first attempts until now, to the 
best of my knowledge, to apply to some accession countries the methods of fiscal 
sustainability assessment of past data in the IBC sense. 
As long as data permit, such type oflong-run sustainabiJity analysis has been confined 
to other EU countries. Afonso (2005b) finds little evidence in favour of sustainability 
for the majority of EUJ 5 countries between 1970 and 2003, similarly to Bravo and 
Silvestre (2002) before that. Some of the countries assessed by Papadopoulos and 
Sidiropoulos (J 999) turn out to be fiscally sustainable, as are the countries from the 
study by Arghyrou and Luintel (2007). 
Prohl and Schneider (2006) applied panel cointegration techniques to render the 
opposite evidence that the EUl5 countries are fiscally sustainable: but only in the 
3S Certainly. data availability or adaptations of the seminal methods have pennitted research such as 
Gh.talc and Slinchez-Fung (2006). 
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weaker form following Quintos's (1995) definition. Claeys (2007) in another recent 
attempt to import panel methods concluded that the EU15's fiscal policy has been 
sustainable overall. At least at a panel level, the positive conclusion is not reversed if 
allowing for breaks and using a slightly longer dataset (Afonso and Raul!, 2007a and 
2007b). 
The panel approach can also provide the means to study consistency with the !BC of the 
fiscal policies of accession countries. It is the limited existence of formal fiscal 
sustainability assessment of these countries that inspired the search for new methods in 
the sections to follow. 
4.2. A panel fiscal snstainability analysis 
The revenue-expenditure cointegration framework for the analysis of fiscal 
sustainability, this time adapted in a panel setting, is motivated next. This section also 
contains a background for the relevant panel time series techniques. 
The implications of panel tests on the issue of sustain ability 
The panel perspective is an appealing alternative because of the low power and hence 
low value of unit root and cointegration tests if the individual time series are too short. 
According to Hakkio and Rush (199Ib) and Otero and Smith (2000), it is not 
worthwhile to increase the frequency of the sample in otherwise short time spans. The 
new advances in panel econometrics, however, make it possible now to seek the 
application of traditional fiscal sustainability assessment methods for the countries that 
recently joined the EU. 
In the context of the fiscal sustainability literature, the panel cointegration framework 
essentially involves a pooling of the data from individual countries in order to test for 
sustainability. Traditionally, fiscal sustainability is usually assessed on a country by 
country basis; what then is the economic rationale for applying the panel cointegration 
framework to the EU accession countries as a whole? The following reasons have 
justified this approach. First, the countries in the region have much in common to allow 
for a group-wise analysis. They have shared the common goal of acceding to the EU 
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and, as noted above, their policies have been conducted within the related fiscal context 
of both EU enlargement and transition to a market economy. Thus the panel approach is 
a reasonable first step in approximating the evidence for or against fiscal sustainability 
based on accession countries' data available at present. 
Second, as Afonso and Rault (2007b, p. 8) assert, 'even ifthere is no single fiscal policy 
in the EU, a panel sustainability analysis of public finances has to be seen as relevant in 
a context of EU countries seeking to pursue common and sound fiscal policy behaviour 
within the SGP framework'. This argument is not less applicable to the recent accession 
countries. 
Not least, as the results in Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) suggest, there is 
interdependence between the planned fiscal stances of the EU members. Potential 
reasons for the relationship between national fiscal policies in the EU are the common 
interest rates in the integrated capital market, yardstick and tax competition between the 
countries, their contesting to attract foreign investment through domestic infrastructure 
enhancements, and the peer pressure exerted by 'fiscally virtuous' countries (ibid., p. 
222). These reasons may be expected to imply co-dependent fiscal policies in the 
accession countries as well. 
Furthermore, from an econometric point of view Prohl and Schneider (2006) emphasise 
the higher power of the panel approach, in comparison with the shorter individual 
series, to examine the sustainability hypothesis. Panel data models provide more 
observations and hence more degrees of freedom while deriving the appropriate panel 
test statistics. Recently Westerlund and Prohl (2008) study a panel of the rich OEeD 
countries and also put forward the argument for the higher power of panel cointegration 
tests permitting better the analysis of breaks, the latter always being costly in terms of 
power loss. 
In other areas, the rising interest in panel (co )integration has also primarily been 
motivated by a desire to gain more statistical power over the single time series 
counterparts. Because the short time series are typical of transition and less developed 
economies, the panel versions of unit root and cointegration tests are increasingly 
attractive for cross-country research. Numerous applications are found in areas like the 
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purchasing power parity, equilibrium exchange rates and exchange rate pass-throughs, 
among others (Osbat, 2004)36. 
The revenue-expenditures cointegration condition in a panel setting might prove 
difficultto interpret because panel cointegration may hold for the whole of the panel but 
not f?r some individual members. While this argument applies to all panel cointegration 
studies, to mitigate it the first extension in the cointegration analysis below involves 
country sub-samples, thus extracting the maximal individual country inference possible 
using short series that preclude any univariate analysis. Such strategy further delineates 
this study from the existing ground-breaking panel sustainability literature. 
The panel unit root and stationarity tests 
The panel unit root tests performed in the next section follow Breitung (2000). The 
choice is motivated by the documented superior small-sample behaviour of this test. 
With the early panel unit root tests 'it is hard to detectnonstationarity in short time 
series', as Hlouskova and Wagner (2006, p. 25) put it; but their large-scale simulation 
study shows that Breitung's (2000) test is among the best performing37. Hadri's (2000) 
test is then also applied for robustness as it has the altemative null of panel stationarity. 
Both tests belong to the class of 'first generation' panel tests in that they assume cross-
sectional independence. This 'simplifies the derivation of the asymptotic distributions of 
panel unit root and stationarity tests considerably' (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006, p. 86) 
but is an arguably strong assumption, often violated in practice. Cross-sectional 
dependence in the errors is due to 'omitted observed common factors, spatial spill over 
effects, unobserved common factors, or general residual interdependence' (Breitung and 
Pesaran, 2005, p. 18). A country's macroeconomic performance may be affected by 
policies and outcomes in trade partners or related foreign economies. Another 
complication is the possible cross-section cointegration (Banerjee, Marcellino and 
Osbat, 2004). Breitung and Pesaran (2005) point out that cross-cointegration should be 
"Extensive literature surveys are contained in BaneJjee (1999), Baltagi and Kao (2000), Choi (2006) and 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2006 and 2007). 
" Initially the panel unit root tests developed by Maddala and Wu (1999), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), and 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) were also applied here. Indeed, their empirical results were inconsistent and 
contradictory. These results are available upon request. 
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distinguished from the case when the errors are cross-correlated without any 
cointegration of the units. 
In recent times a variety of 'second generation' panel unit root tests have been proposed 
to deal with different forms of cross-section dependence. Those include the 
contributions by Chang (2002), Choi (2002), Phillips and Sui (2003), Bai and Ng 
(2004), Moon and Perron (2004) and Pesaran (2007). Those tests, however, are not 
widely implemented yet, and to-date their finite-sample properties have not been 
examined as fully as those of the former panel unit root tests (Hlouskova and Wagner, 
2006). That is why the empirical approach below parallels the panel time series 
literature in other areas using the now standard 'frrst generation' tests. 
A further reason to keep the cross-sectional independence assumption and carry it 
forward to the subsequent panel cointegration analysis is the research strategy. The 
fiscal sustainability analysis of accession Europe aims to provide continuity with 
Chapter Three in favouring the revenue-expenditure cointegration condition. It is in the 
panel cointegration stage below that the assumption of cross-sectional independence is 
relaxed eventually. Thus the thesis becomes the first analysis of long-run fiscal 
sustainability in Central and Eastern Europe where the time series are not restricted to 
be independent across the countries in the panees. 
Panel cointegration tests 
Panel cointegration is in its infancy compared to the upsurge in the panel unit roots 
literature. Yet a multitude of tests have recently been proposed to deal with issues 
beyond the traditional univariate time series models: heterogeneity of the cointegrating 
parameters and of the trends and intercepts across units, cross-section dependence and 
cointegration between variables from different units. As in the single time series 
dimension, panel cointegration techniques belong to two classes: residual based and 
system based. The popular tests ofKao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004) belong to the 
first class. The tests proposed by Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001) and Breitung 
(2005) exemplilY the latter and represent panel extensions of the Johansen (1995) 
38 The issue of whether the empirical country series are cross~sectionally independent is discussed again 
in the data section. 
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procedure to identify multiple cointegrating vectors. A 'hybrid' alternative is the meta-
analytic derivation oftest statistics from individual series tests' p values. 
Banerjee et al. (2004) conduct Monte Carlo experiments for the size and power of some 
panel cointegration tests and find that the short series necessitate a particularly cautious 
application of panel cointegration methods. Similar warnings come from the large scale 
simulation study carried out by Hlouskova and Wagner (2007) who investigate the 
properties of panel cointegration tests as well as estimators. So although the panel 
perspective may be the only feasible way to conduct a wide-ranging analysis of fiscal 
sustainability in Central and Eastern Europe, the empirical results here should be 
interpreted against the small-sample robustness of the different tests. 
Again in view of facilitating comparisons with well-established other applications of 
panel cointegration, and so to have a simple first-step extension of traditional fiscal 
sustainability analysis into the panel dimension, the popular panel cointegration tests by 
Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004) are applied first below. 
The short time dimension of the panel dataset from the accession countries precludes 
attempting to also address possible structural breaks in the panel following a separate 
growing strand of the panel cointegration literature (Carrion-i-Silvestre, Lluis and 
Sans6, 2006; Westeriund, 2006a and 2006b). The policy assumption to justify a lesser 
need to model breaks in the current sample is that in most CEE countries the deep 
structural reforms were already implemented, or at least started, before 1995. 
Panel cointegration estimation 
Estimation of the cointegrating vector( s) is required finally in order to test the 
hypothesis of 'strong' vs. 'weak' fiscal sustainability following Quintos (1995). If both 
cointegration and unit cointegrating parameters were found, the data sample will give 
unambiguous evidence in favour of sustainabiIity. The evidence will be less vigorous if 
panel cointegration estimators cannot confirm the null hypothesis of unitary 
coefficient(s) on the right-hand side variable in the cointegration regression. 
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Recently growing literature has emerged to propose various methods of estimating the 
panel cointegrating relationship. Maeso-Fernandez, Osbat and Schnatz (2006) and 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2007) review some of them. Among others, such estimators 
comprise the fully-modified OLS (FMOLS) by Pedroni (2000) and Phillips and Hansen 
(1999), the dynamic OLS (DOLS) following Saikkonen (1991) and Mark and Sui 
(2003), the mean-group and pooled mean-group estimators proposed by Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1999) or more recent system estimators such as Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran 
(2005) or Breitung (2005). 
The FMOLS and DOLS estimators are recommended in the univariate time series cases 
for handling non-exogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation of the errors (Osbat, 
2004). The same considerations should be addressed in panel data too. That is why, 
after the panel cointegration tests, the panel cointegration estimators proposed by 
Pedroni (2000, 2001) are applied here. The following reasons have broadly justified that 
choice. 
First, the group-mean panel FMOLS estimator 'allows for a more flexible alternative 
hypothesis' (Pedroni, 2000, p. 96) in that the estimated coefficient(s) need not be 
identical across units. In group-mean estimators data are pooled along the 'between' 
dimension of the panel so that the null hypothesis of a common value of the 
cointegrating parameter across all units is tested against the alternative that the 
parameter has a value different from the null and is not required to be identical in all 
units. Conversely, pooled estimators are based on pooling the data along the 'within' 
dimension of the panel so that the null hypothesis of a common value of the 
cointegrating parameter across all units is tested against the alternative that the 
parameter has a value different from the null but is still identical in all units. Second, 
comparing the asymptotic properties of the pooled (along the 'within' dimension) 
'adjusted' FMOLS and 'residual' FMOLS, and the group-mean (along the 'between' 
dimension) FMOLS, Pedroni shows that the latter exhibits least small-sample 
distortions. Third, because Pedroni's result is based on T being larger than N, but that is 
not always so in the sample below, DOLS estimation is also applied to ensure 
robustuess of the empirical findings. Pedroni (2001) claims that the between-dimension 
group-mean panel DOLS reveals less size distortions compared to the within~dimension 
panel DOLS estimators and it is the group-mean estimator proposed by him (ibid.) 
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which is adopted here. Like the group-mean FMOLS estimator, the group-mean panel 
DOLS estimator has the further advantage to allow for a heterogeneous alternative 
hypothesis: the cointegrating vectors may differ across units. 
Finally, the recommended estimators although fairly recent today enjoy popularity 
among practitioners. Therefore applying them here for a first time in the fiscal 
sustainability context could again, much like with the tests, ease comparisons and 
bridge with existing panel analyses elsewhere. 
Further details about the panel cointegration methods are given in the following section. 
4.3. Data, methods and empirical results 
The empirical analysis of panel fiscal sustainability in the EU accession countries is 
performed on an original set of data, presented next. 
Data 
The data series are compiled from mainly Eurostat sources. The tests for unit roots and 
cointegration as well as the estimations use data from Central and Eastern Europe 
between 1995 and 2006. To stay in line with the fiscal sustainability theory and the 
approach in Chapter Three, all fiscal variables are general government level unless 
otherwise noted, annual, nominal and expressed as ratios to GDP. Data sources and 
adjustments are described in detail in Table 4.4 . 
. The countries' total current expenditures and revenues are calculated from the AMECO 
data, except for some countries/years as explained in the table below. AMECO is the 
annual macro-economic database of the European Commission's Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). The database used was updated as of 21 
May 2007 (7 May 2007 for the GDP data). The relevant series and AMECO codes are: 
• Total expenditure at current prices, mrd. Code UUTG, ESA 1995 
convention. Including one-off proceeds (treated as negative expenditure) 
related to the allocation of mobile phone licences (UMTS). 
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• Total revenue at current prices, mrd. Code URTG, ESA 1995 
convention. 
• GDP at current market prices, mrd. Code UVGDH. The EDP reference 
level. 
Table 4.4. Country fiscal data'overview (accession countries) 
NO. COUNTRY DATA SPAN SOURCES AND ADJUSTMENTS 
I Bulgaria 1995-2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above), except for 1995-2001 (taken from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit database: the 'budget expenditure' and 'budget revenue' 
lines there). 
2 Cyprus 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above), except for 1995-1997 (taken from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit database: the 'budget expenditure' and 'budget revenue' 
lines there), 
3 Czech 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
reoublic described above). 
4 Estonia 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above). 
5 Hungary 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above). except for 1995 {taken from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit database: the 'budR:et exoenditure' and 'budlZet revenue'lines therel 
6 Latvia 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described abovel 
7 Lithuania 1995·2006 Annual fISCal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above). 
8 Malta 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above) from 1998 onwards. Before that, the ratios are calculated 
on the basis of GDP data from Eurostat and fiscal data from the Nationa1 
Statistics Office of Malta (the "government consolidated fund" annual 
figures~ total revenues are adjusted from the 'total recurrent revenue" item 
minus the revenue from public corporations and from the central bank of 
Malta). 
9 Poland 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above). 
IO Romania 1995·2006 Government expenditures and revenue as ratios to GDP are directly from 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (forecast for 2006). The same data (until 
2004) are available from IMF's Romania: Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix, 9 May 2006, Table 16. The generaJ government data is 
consolidated and in that the Romanian data differ from other countries. 
The compromise was needed in order to get consistent data series (the 
otherwise standard general government data from Eurostat and the 
European Commission are available from 1998 only). As both series are 
given on a consolidated basis, any cointegrating relationship among them 
should stay (although possibly the cointegrating process is affected by the 
consolidation). 
II Slovakia 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above). 
12 Slovenia 1995·2006 Annual fiscal data from Eurostat (through the AMECO database as 
described above) from 2000 onwards. Before that, the ratios are directly 
from Eurostat's website . 
. . Note: The nommat revenue and expendtture senes are diVided by GDP at market pnces. Not seasonaJly 
adjusted. Slovenian data are fixed to the Euro at the country's irrevocable rate for the 2007 Euro 
conversion. 
The previous section underlined that the panel unit root and stationarity tests applied in 
this thesis are 'first generation' tests, i.e. they assume cross-sectional independence. The 
same assumption is behind the popular panel cointegration tests of Kao (1999) and 
138 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) which are also applied here. The empirical evidence therefore is 
contingent upon the validity of this assumption: but is it supported by the data from 
accession Europe? 
A rationale to keep the assumption of cross-section independence for now can be the 
expectation that government expenditures are more a function of national political and 
economic priorities and little correlated to total outlays abroad. The latter reasoning may 
be arguably less legitimate for government revenues, if they are viewed as more directly 
reflecting the business cycle, itself possibly linked to foreign developments. As the 
independence assumption is key and macroeconomic series are often correlated across 
countries, simple descriptive statistics from my data sample are provided in Tables 4.Sa 
and 4.5b to check the extent of co-movement among national fiscal policies". 
Table 4.5a. Are country fiscal policies mutually independent? Correlation coefficients 
(total expenditures as % ofGDP) 
SuI aria C s Czech re . Estonia Hunl!arv Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia 
Sui aria . 
ru, -0.35 . 
Czech re . 0,30 ·0.24 . 
Estonia 0.47 ·0.87 0.29 -
Hu" -0.55 0,16 -O.IS -0.09 -
Latvia 0.20 -0.50 ·0.06 0.69 0.05 -
Lithuania -0.39 -0.56 -0.29 0.44 0.07 0.33 -
Malta -0.45 0.86 -0.17 ·0.67 0.24 -0.55 -0.29 
-
Poland 0.22 ·0.56 0.33 0.58 0.37 -0.01 0,19 -0.22 . 
Romania 0,37 ·0.80 -0.04 0.78 -0.36 0.77 0.57 -0,80 0.08 . 
Slovakia 0.39 -0.85 -0.09 0.75 -0.24 0.40 0.63 -0.74 0.42 0.80 . 
Slovenia 0.47 -0.37 0.88 0.36 -0.48 0.14 -0.24 -0.45 0.06 0.27 0.07 
Table 4.Sb. Are country fiscal policies mutually independent? Correlation coefficients 
(total revenues as % ofGDP\ 
Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Estonia Hun a Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Romania Slovakia 
Sui aria 
-ru, 0.67 . 
Czech re . 0,05 0.34 . 
Estonia -0.61 -0.68 0.22 . 
Hunga -0.57 -0.65 0.12 0,87 . 
Latvia ·0.34 -0.39 -0.25 0.57 0.40 . 
Lithuania -0.38 ·0.66 -0.66 0.37 0.21 0.70 . 
Malta 0.55 0.94 0.53 -0.56 -0,56 -0.37 -0.67 . 
Poland -0.80 ·0.70 -0.08 0.73 0.79 0.45 0,31 -0.63 . 
Romania 0.71 0.39 0.13 -0.10 -0,0] -0.04 -0,16 0.40 -0.36 . 
Slovakia -0.63 -0.92 -0.19 0.83 0.80 0.46 0.59 -0.88 0.78 -0.22 . 
Slovenia 0.53 0.54 0.63 ·0.19 -0.12 -0.46 -0.80 0.57 -0.27 0.38 ·0.44 
The correlation coefficients from the tables hardly point to any cross-country 
dependence in the fiscal processes: not even between countries which are usually 
39 Claeys (2007) supports his assumption of cross-sectional independence by conducting cointegration 
analysis on pairs of countries. The series of the accession countries however are too short to engage in 
such bilateral country cointegration assessment. 
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grouped together and assumed to share most in terms of transition background, common 
economic policies or even geography. Whereas the above provides some justification 
for the cross-section independence assumption to be carried forward, remaining 
correlation in the errors, both within country observations and between countries, is of 
course still possible. Hence, the assumption of cross-section independence is relaxed 
below in the fmal panel cointegration test: the new sieve bootstrap test suggested by 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
Panel unit rootlstationarily results 
The tests by Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000) were computed. The first test has the 
hypothesis for the presence of unit root as the null, whereas the second one is a panel 
stationarity test. The tests assume a common autoregressive structure across the panel 
units. 
The nature of the unit root process can be illustrated through the following general first-
order autoregressive panel setting: 
(4.1) 
where i and t denote the cross-section and time dimensions of the panel, respectively, XII 
are the exogenous variables including any fixed effects or individual trends, PI are the 
autoregressive coefficients and the errors 811 are by assumption mutually independent 
idiosynchratic disturbances. Stationarity requires Ipll < I, whereas if IPil = I then YII 
contains a unit root. In the Breitung (B) and Hadri (H) tests, PI = P for all i (Le. there is a 
common unit root process). 
The B test considers the following ADF variant of(4.1): 
(4.2) I1YII = t:o/'H + I,fJijI1YII-J + Xii 0, +&" 
j=1 
where the unit root is common across the series, Le. a = P - 1, but the lag orders Pi for 
the differenced regressors may be unit-specific. The null hypothesis is that a equals zero 
whereas the alternative hypothesis is that a is less than zero. 
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In order to estimate ex, Breitung (2000) runs two auxiliary regressions, for a given set of 
lag orders. He regresses both Ay" and y"./ on Ay".] (ibid., p. 170). Denoting the 
respective estimated coefficients from these two regressions /J and /J, the following 
proxies for Ay" and y"./ are derived: 
(4.3) 
where S, are the estimated standard errors from each regression in (4.2). Then Breitung 
(ibid., p. 171) transforms and detrends the proxies in (4.3) as follows: 
(4.4) /I,. *= (T-t) (/1,.- _ /l,.y,,+, + ... +/I,.YIT) y" (T-I+I) y" T-I 
* _ _ I-I (_ _) 
y" = y" - Yll - T _I Y,T - YIl 
Finally, a is estimated from the pooled regression: 
(4.5) 
Breitung (2000) shows that the estimator for a is asymptotically normally distributed. 
The test of Hadri (2000) also assumes a common unit root process but has a null 
hypothesis of no unit root in any of the series. Initially, the residuals are obtained from 
the individual OLS regressions ofy" on an intercept or on an intercept and a time trend; 
i.e. in the latter case the residuals are obtained from40: 
(4.6) y" =0, +1'/,1+&" 
40 Equation (4.6) corresponds to Hadri's (2000, p. 150) equation 3. 
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Let Bu be the estimated residuals in (4.6). Hadri (2000, p. 151) then constructs the 
following LM statistic: 
(4.7) 
, I ""N 1 ",," S' 
N ~, rz £...':1 11 
LM= _, 
<TE 
1 
where Su is the partial sum of the residuals, S" = L By , and 0-; is the consistent 
)=1 
estimator of <T; under the null hypothesis. The expression in (4.7) may also allow 
heteroskedasticity in E" across the units, i.e. in this case (4.7) takes the form: 
(4.8) 
[
_1 ",," s,] I LN T2 ~t=1 ;1 LM=-
N 1 0-" E.I 
Hadri then constructs the following test statistics which is asymptotically normally 
distributed: 
(4.9) 
where ~ = 116 and'; = 1145 if the model contains an intercept only, i.e. rh in (4.6) 
equals zero for all i, and ~= 1115 and .; = 1116300 if the model contains an intercept 
and a trend. The heteroskedastic consistent statistic in (4.9) is reported throughout this 
thesis wherever the Hadri tests are performed. 
The results from the application of the B and H tests here are given in Table 4.6 through 
to Table 4.9. Exploiting the second right-hand side term in (4.1), the test specifications 
allow for heterogeneity across the countries as well as the possibility of a linear trend in 
the series. Two versions of each test are performed to check the robustness: having as 
exogenous variables either individual intercepts (fixed effects) or both individual 
intercepts and individual trends. 
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The evidence from the levels data suggests that the series are not 1(0). both with and 
without a linear trend. 
Table 46 Panel unit rootlstationarity results' total expenditures (levels) 
Test Exogenous variab1es Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual interceots -\.134 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept 0.022 
Hadri (H) individual intercepts 5.534* 
Ho: Stationarity (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept 5.448'" 
Notes: • denotes rejection of the null at 1%. The modified Akatke mfonnatlon cntenon IS used for 
automatically selecting the lag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short sample). 
The tests assume asymptotic nonnality. In the H test, the heteroskedastic consistent Z-statistic is used. 
Table 4 7 Panel unit rootlstationarity results' total revenues (levels) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual intercepts 0.512 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept \.lOO 
Hadri (H) individual intercents 6.264* 
Ho: Stationaritv (common unit root orocess) individual trend & intercept 5.928* 
Notes: • denotes rejection of the null at 1 %. The modified Akruke mfonnatlon cntenon is used for 
automatically selecting the tag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short sample). 
The tests assume asymptotic normality. In the H test. the heteroskedastic consistent Z-statistic is used. 
Before proceeding to the cointegration analysis about whether the accession countries 
have been fiscally sustainable or not, the same panel tests are applied to the first-
differenced data. 
Table 4 8 Panel unit rootlstationarity results· total expenditures (first differences) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual intercents ·2.551'" 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root orocess) individual trend & intercept -2.729'" 
Hadri (H) individuaJ intercents 1.770"'''' 
Ho: Stationarity (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept 9.547* 
Notes: '" and "'. denote rejection of the null at 1% and 5%. The modified Akalke mformatton cntenon IS 
used for automatically selecting the lag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short 
sample). The tests assume asymptotic normality. In the H test. the heteroskedastic consistent Z-statistic is 
used. 
Table 4 9 Panel unit rootlstationarity results' total revenues (first differences) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individuaJ intercents ·2.109""" 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root process) individuaJ trend & intercept -1.658""" 
Hadri (H) individual intercepts 2.993* 
Ho: Stationarity (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept 11.895* 
Notes: '" and """ denote rejectIOn of the null at 1% and 5%. The modified Akalke mformation cntenon IS 
used for automatically selecting the lag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short 
sample). The tests assume asymptotic nonnality. In the H test, the heteroskedastic consistent Z-statistic is 
used. 
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Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show that in their first differences total expenditures and revenues as 
a ratio to GDP are stationary for the panel of the twelve accession countries, except for 
the H test. However, Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) have detected the high tendency of 
the Hadri (2000) test to commit Type I errors. As noted above, the interpreration of the 
results should take into account the performance of the tests in short samples: and the 
cited extensive simulation study shows that Breitung's (2000) test exhibits superior 
power and size behaviour. 
Panel cointegration tests results 
The conclusion is that total expenditures and revenues are not stationary in their levels 
(which would have implied fiscal sustainability) but are rather /(1) instead, so I proceed 
to the panel cointegration tests. Due to the short and narrow panel dimension, no 
Johansen-related system-based tests are done as they are likely to be the most distorted 
here. 
The Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests below are residual-based and are now 
standard in panel cointegration research. Both model unit-specific intercepts but differ 
in that Kao assumes homogeneous slope coefficients while Pedroni does not. Pedroni's 
tests may also allow for heterogeneous trend terms. 
Kao (1999, p. 3) specifies the following bivariate panel regression: 
(4.10) 
where ell is the residual on which he bases the panel cointegration tests. The Dickey-
Fuller test or its augmented version is applied to the estimated residuals from (4.10) 
using: 
(4.11) 
or 
(4.12) 
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Let tADF be the t-statistic to test if p = 1 in (4.12). Then Kao constructs the following 
panel cointegration test statistic, derived from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the 
residuals: 
(4.13) ADF= tADF +J6iio-u l(20-,.) Jo-;u 1(20-;)+30-; 1(100-;.) 
Ab th t· t d . . -, -, -, --, d th I d" I ove, e es Ima e varIance IS U u = a u - (J'u£(J's an e ong-run con Ittona 
variance is u;u = a-;., - a-;U8a-~:. To obtain these, the regressors and regressands in 
(4.1 0) are specified as: 
. (4.14) YIt = YiI-l +u/t 
and the covariance of OJit = [U it ] is estimated as: 
8j( 
(4.15) 
while the long-run covariance is estimated as: 
(4.16) 
In (4.16), K could be any kernel function; the tests applied throughout this thesis use the 
Newey-West (1987) estimator. 
Pedroni's (1999, 2004) regression specification differs from (4.10) in that it permits 
greater heterogeneity in the panel: individual heterogeneous fixed effects, time trends 
and slope coefficients. The coefficients on the short-run parameters in (4.12) and on the 
lagged residuals in (4.11) and (4.12) can also vary with i. Pedroni (2004) argues in 
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favour of heterogeneous panels along the following lines. Firstly, if the true slope 
coefficients are heterogeneous and we impose homogeneity, 'then the estimated 
residuals for any ... [such] ..• member of the panel ... will be nonstationary, even ifin 
truth they are cointegrated' (p. 600). As in reality the slope coefficients may be 
expected to vary across the countries, 'the implications for constraining the coefficients 
to be common are unlikely to be acceptable for tests of the null of no cointegration' 
(ibid.). Pedroni concludes that 'one can think of the test as effectively pooling only the 
information regarding the possible existence of the cointegrating relationship as 
indicated by the stationarity properties of the estimated residuals' (ibid.). Cointegration 
tests in heterogeneous panel settings are currently the norm in the empirical literature. 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposes seven panel cointegration test statistics, grouped in two 
depending on whether the alternative hypothesis is one of common autoregressive 
coefficients (p, = p < I, the panel 'within' dimension; four tests) or one of individual 
autoregressive coefficients (Pi < I, the group 'between' dimension; three tests). These 
test statistics are as follows: 
(4.17) Panel v statistic: 
(4.18) Panel p statistic: 
(4.20) Panel t statistic (parametric): 
(4.21) Group p statistic: 
N ( T )-"2 T (4.22) Group t statistic (non-parametric): N-1I2 ~ <7,2 ~ e;_1 ~ (e"_IL'.e" - i, ) 
(4.23) Group t statistic (parametric): 
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In (4.17) - (4.23), £;11 is the long-run variance of the residuals from the differenced 
regression in (4.1 0) where the slope coefficients are allowed to be unit-specific; e" and 
el; are the regressands in (4.11) and (4.12), respectively, but where again all slope 
coefficients are allowed to vary with i; ul' and 8; are the long-run and the simple 
(contemporaneous) variances of the residuals from (4.11), respectively; 8;' is the simple 
variance of the residuals from (4.12); and 21 = ~(UI' -8;). Further details are provided 
2 
in Pedroni (1999, pp. 659-662). Wherever the Pedroni panel cointegration tests are 
performed in this thesis, the seven test statistics are reported in the same order as in 
(4.17) - (4.23). 
So the following general panel regression model is considered in the empirical 
assessment of fiscal sustainability in accession Europe: 
(4.24) TRII = a, + P,TEII + Ell 
where TR and TE stand for total revenues and total expenditures as ratios to GDP, 
respectively, al are the individual intercepts, PI are individual slopes <PI = P in the Kao 
tests), i denotes the unit (country) and t denotes the time dimension in the panel. 
. The results from the Kao and Pedroni tests performed on the series of accession 
Europe's total revenues and total expenditures as shares of GDP are presented in Table 
4.10. 
Table 4.1 0 provides unambiguous evidence in favour of cointegration. A note may 
again be taken of possible size and power distortions in the short panel. Banerjee et al. 
(2004) show that Pedroni's tests are less reliable for sample sizes below lOO periods of 
observations and that in such samples the parametric panel and group ADF-statistic 
tests perform best. Hlouskova and Wagner's (2007) simulations confirm that and even 
point out that the non-ADF tests have virtually no power for TS 25. Thus any instances 
of Pedroni's statistics' non-rejection of the no-cointegration null might indeed just 
illustrate Type II errors. The Monte-Carlo simulations by Gutierrez (2003) show that for 
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homogeneous panels (if the accession countries may be assumed to be so) and short 
time series Kao's tests perform better than Pedroni's. 
Table 4 10 Panel cointegration (all twelve countries) Kao and Pedroni tests , 
Test Test type Test statistic 
Kao residual cointegration, 
homogeneous coefficients Augmented Dickey-Fuller test -2.907' (fJ, ~ P across sections); 
Ho: No cointegration 
Pedroni residual cointegration; Panel v-statistic test 1.705" 
Ho: No cointegration 
Panel rho-statistic test HI: Cointegration, homogeneous alternative of common -2.747' 
autoregressive coefficients (the 'within' dimension) Panel PP-statistic test -5.046' 
Panel ADF-statistic test -3.017' 
Pedroni residual cointegration; Group rho-statistic test -0.223 
Ho: No cointegration 
Group PP-statistic test HI: Cointegration, heterogeneous alternative of individual -3.526' 
autoregressive coefficients (the 'between' dimension) Group ADF-statistic test -2.189" 
" 
0 0 Notes. • and denote rejectIOn of the null at 1 % and 5 Ye, respectively. One lag of the change ID 
residuals is used in the second-stage augmented regressions, in view of the short sample. The long-run 
variances are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) kernel estimator with a lag truncation equal to 
{ )'" L as suggested in Pedroni (1995). lOO 
The cointegration between total revenues and total expenditures in accession Europe 
does not suffice to imply fiscal sustainability: the second necessary condition is that the 
cointegrating vector must be (I, -I). But before proceeding to the panel cointegration 
estimation, two further extensions are considered to shed more light on the cointegration 
hypothesis. First, although inevitably biurred in a panel analysis, at least some degree of 
individual country inference is attempted through the following strategy. The same 
panel cointegration tests are applied to sub-samples of countries consisting of the full 
sample minus one country at a time. That is proposed as an optimal compromise 
between not losing too many observations and being able to focus attention on each 
country's contribution to the full panel results. 
The Kao and Pedroni results from the sub-samples are given in Table 4.1 1. 
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Table 4.11. Panel cointegration (eleven countries), Kao and Pedroni tests 
Test statistic, full panel without: 
• . . 
· 
, 
• . . 
, 
• • Test Test type : BO CY : CZ EE : HU LV LT MT PL RO SK SI 
Ko. : : : : : 
residual cointegration. Augmented : : : : : : 
homogeneous coefficients Dickey-Fuller -2.090" : -2.470· : ·2.591· : -3.023* : -2.746· : -2.631· : -3,064* : -3.059· : -2.597· : -3.074* : -3.313· : -2.810· 
<PI = P across sections); test 
Ho: No cointegration : 
Pedroni Panel v-statistic 1.704·· : 1.540·" : 1.690" : 1.813" : 1.463··· : 1.664" : 1.432·" : 1.478·" : 1.620··· : L7SS" : 1.796" : 1.656·· 
residual cointegration; test 
Ho: No cointegration Panel rho-statistic: 
-2.763· : -2.670· : -2.36)* : -2.744* : -2.685· : -2.713* : -2.636* : -2.609* : -2.680· : -2.811*; -2.403* : -2.423-HI: Cointegration, test : 
homogeneous alternative of Panel PP-statistic 
-4.94* : -4.898* : -4.140'" : ~5.l82'" : ~5.IOI'" : ~5.002'" : ~4.824'" : -4.812'" : -4.932'" : -5.056'" : -4.629'" : -4.376'" common autoregressive test 
coefficients (the 'within' Panel ADF-
-1.991" : -2.663'" : -3.134'" : -3.446'" : -2.889'" : -2.729'" : ·2.448'" : -2.764'" : -2.878'" : -3.128'" : ·3.558'" : -3.086'" dimension) statistic test : 
Pedroni Group rho- : 
-0.250 : -0.228 : -0.045 : -0.291 : -0.239 : -0.280 : -0.167 : .(}.136 : -0.332 : -0.560 : -0.080 : 0.045 
residual cointegration; statistic test 
Ho: No cointegration Group pp-
-3.368'" : -3.415'" : -2.812'" : ~3.683'" : -3.628'" : -3.569'" : -3.265'" : ·3.243'" : -3.682'" : -4.064'" : -3.184'" : ·2.603'" H.: Cointegration. statistic test 
heterogeneous alternative of 
. . 
· 
. 
. . 
. 
· 
· individual autoregressive GroupADF-
· 
. 
-1852"'''' ! -1727"'''' 1 . 
, 
-Z.371"'j -1328"''''''' ! -1 453·"'· : -2352'" : -2.600'" : 
-2.081 ''''1 -1.9J3" l -2.032'''' ! -2.600"'1 -2.846· coefficients (the 'between' statistic test . ! . ! ! . ! . ,dimension) 
0 0 0 Notes: *, ** and .** denote rejectIon 0 the null at 1 Ye, 5Yo and IOVa, respectIvely. One lag of the change ID res.duals IS used 10 the second-stage augmented 
regressions, in view of the short sample. The long-run variances are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) kernel estimator with a Jag truncation equal to 
4..I.... assuggestedin Pedroni (\995). ( )'" \00 
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The first aggregate result to note when comparing Table 4.11 to Table 4.10 is that there 
is no evidence that anyone country is substantially different from the rest. Hence there 
is no reason to believe that individual countries have played a role in tilting the panel 
results from Table 4.1 O. This provides a strong empirical argument in favour of 
applying the panel approach to fiscal sustainability for Central and Eastern Europe. So 
the overall conclusion is that the accession countries combined in the panel exhibit 
common cointegration evidence: whether fiscal sustainability is present or not. More 
individual country evidence may be sought in the cointegration vector estimation below. 
Another important extension to the panel cointegration tests presented so far is to relax 
the arguably strong assumption of cross-section independence. As previously discussed 
the tests by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004), although benchmarking the panel 
cointegration literature, are only 'first generation' tests based on the assumption of 
cross-section independence. To address that, while at the same time providing evidence 
that is econometrically justified against the small-sample dimensions, the recent sieve 
bootstrap panel cointegration test in Westerlund and Edgerton (2007, hereafter W-E) is 
applied. 
Unlike the other panel cointegration tests above, this test has a null of cointegration. As 
argued in the panel unit root and panel cointegration literature, such null is convenient 
for hypothesis testing because, if not rejected, an interpretation is possible that at least 
one unit in the panel shows stationarity/cointegration. Such interpretation, although 
again limited in what it can be inferred about any particular country, is attractive as one 
step towards bringing the panel analysis down to the country level. 
The W-E test allows dependence in the errors both within and between the cross-section 
dimensions. Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) demonstrate that it also has good small-
sample behaviour. Therefore inference based on this test critically complements the rest 
of the analysis in this chapter. More generally, it also makes inroads into the panel 
cointegration empirical literature, and certainly in the fiscal sustainability area. With 
this empirical application the thesis becomes the first analysis of historical fiscal 
sustainability of accession Europe where the assumption of cross-country independence 
is relaxed. 
150 
The test is based on a regression specification analogous to (4.24), again allowing for 
the flexibility of heterogeneous intercepts and slopes. Collecting the predicted residuals 
from this regression is the first step before arriving at the bootstrap stage itself where 
the bootstrapped samples of total revenues and total expenditures are generated. Finally, 
the bootstrap test statistic is constructed corresponding to the sample counterpart: 
(4.25) 
I N T 
LM+ =-"" '-'S' N 2 £...J£...()); It NT ;=1/=) 
where SIt is the partial sum process of the fully-modified estimates of the residuals from 
(4.24) and &,' is the long-run variance of u" conditional on ATE,,; u" is defined by 
I 
decomposing the residuals from (4.24) as 8", = U" +v", with v" = L 1'/" and 1'/" 
j=1 
independent and identically distributed with zero mean and variance var(1'/,,) = a} 
(Westerlund and Edgerton, 2007, p. 186). 
These steps are repeated 2,000 times and the one-tailed bootstrap distribution is 
obtained. The bootstrapped critical values at the conventional levels are presented in 
Table 4.12. Figure 4.1 displays the kernel density estimate of the bootstrap distribution 
of the test statistic. 
Table 4.12. Accession countries fiscal sustainability bootstrapped critical values, WoE 
test 
Test Exogenous 99% 95% 90% 
variables 
Westerlund and individual intercepts, 0.191 0.237 0.269 Edgerton (2007) no detenninistic trend 
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Figure 4.1. Accession countries fiscal sustainability bootstrap distribution, W-E test 
statistic 
·f· 
.1 .2 .3 W·E2007 .... __ 
Then the test statistic from the original sample is obtained and compared with the 
critical values from the bootstrap distribution. This time, the null of cointegration is not 
rejected even at the 10% critical value (Table 4.13)41. 
Table 4.13. Panel cointegration, W-E test 
Test Exo enous variables Test t e Test statistic 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007); individual intercepts, 
: Cointe tion no deterministic trend Sieve bootstrap 0.294 
Notes: The group-mean FMOLS proposed by Pedroni (2000, 2001) used for estimating regression 
coefficients. The long-run varlances are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) kerneJ estimator with a 
lag truncation equal to i L)219 as suggested in Pedroni (1995). 
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So the support for panel cointegration, hence group-wide fiscal sustainability, suggested 
by the Kao and Pedroni tests, seems more robust now after the Westerlund and 
Edgerton test: a 'second generation' test having the opposite null and relaxing the cross-
section independence assumption. Any conclusion that the EU accession couritries have 
achieved fiscal sustainability will, however, be impetuous before the cointegrating 
parameters are estimated. 
Panel cointegration vector estimates 
Moving forward to the estimation of the cointegrating vector, the bivariate panel 
regression of (4.24) above is considered. Total expenditures stand as the regressor in 
compliance with the theoretical requirement for unitary coefficients there in order to 
have strong-form fiscal sustainability. Let (11 = (S/I. t>.TE,J' be a stationary vector with a 
long-run covariance matrix 0, = L,L/, where L, is a lower triangular decomposition of 
41 The 0.294 test statistic is rejected at the one-tailed 16% bootstrapped critical value. 
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D,. D, is estimated using the Newey-West (1987) kernel estimator with a lag truncation 
equal to 4.I...- as suggested in Pedroni (1995). The specification in (4.24) allows for ( )'" lOO 
cointegrating vector heterogeneity. The covariance matrix is also decomposable as 
0, = O~ + 1, + 1/, with O~ being a contemporaneous (simple) covariance and 1, a 
weighted sum of autocovariances. 
The panel FMOLS estimator for p, is given by: 
(4.26) p:rr =N-'t(t(TE" -TE,)' f(t(TEu -TE,)TR,: -Tf, ) 
From (4.26) it follows that the estimator has an alternative 
construction: p:rr = N-' I:, p; , where P; is the FMOLS estimator applied to the ith 
rnember of the panel (pedroni, 2001, p. 729). 
The I-statistic for this group-mean panel FMOLS estimator follows the standard normal 
distribution and is given by: 
(4.27) 
where Po is the true coefficient under the null hypothesis (i.e. 1 here). The results are 
displayed in Table 4. I 4. The individual FMOLS estimates and associated statistics are 
reported alongside the panel group-mean ones. The hypothesis of unitary coefficient(s) 
on total expenditures in the cointegrating regression(s) cannot be rejected at 
conventional significance levels. 
Alternatively, the between dimension, group-mean panel DOLS estimator introduced by 
Pedroni (2001) is constructed by an augmentation of the cointegrating regression with 
differenced leads and lags of the regressor: 
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(4.28) 
K 
TR" = a, + PiTE" + I,r'kl1TE,,_. +&,; 
k=-Kj 
Considering the short length of the panel here and so potential dramatic loss of degrees 
of freedom, up to two leads and lags are used, but in separate applications to check the 
robustness of the results. The group-mean panel DOLS estimator is given by: 
(4.29) 
where Zft is a 2(K+I)xl vector of regressors Z" = (TE" -TEI,l1TE"_K, .. ·,l1TE"+K) , 
-
TRI/ = TR" - TR" and the subscript I outside the brackets in (4.29) indicates that only 
the fIrst element of the vector is taken to estimate the pooled slope coeffIcient. As with 
the panel FMOLS estimator above, an alternative construction for the panel DOLS 
estimator is P~D = N-'l::, P;J where P;., is the DOLS estimator applied to the ith 
unit of the panel. 
Then if (J'i' is the long-run variance of the residuals from the DOLS regression in (4.28), 
the I-statistic for this group-mean panel DOLS estimator is: 
(4.30) 
where as in (4.27) Po is the true coeffIcient value under the null hypothesis (i.e. I in this 
case). The results are displayed in Table 4.14. The individual DOLS estimates and 
associated statistics are reported alongside the panel group-mean ones. Unlike with the 
FMOLS estimates, the hypothesis of unitary parameter in the cointegrating vector can 
be rejected for most countries and so the evidence is more mixed than in the FMOLS. In 
the one lead/one lag specifIcation, the panel result is still in favour of the strong-form 
fIscal sustainability hypothesis. 
The group-mean DOLS estimate of the true parameter in the cointegration vector when 
two leads/two lags are specifIed is not statistically different from 1. As in the fIrst 
DOLS application, the unitary null was often rejected for the country coeffIcients. The 
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DOLS coefficient estimates, when the unit null is rejected, sometimes suggest that 
either revenues grew slower than expenditures with respect to GDP (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia) or sometimes decreased as expenditures rose 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania). The first scenario suggests that in those countries 
potentially debt could explode even though past fiscal policies have satisfied the !BC 
(this is exactly the 'weak' sustainability). As described by Quintos (1995, p. 410) 'the 
deficit will still be sustainable as long as the growth rate of debt does not exceed the 
growth rate of the economy ... [but] ... it has serious policy implications because the 
government will have difficulty in marketing its debt in the long run'. The second 
scenario (plus the results from Malta, and perhaps Poland where although the null is 
rejected the estimated parameter approaches 1) does not support the sustainability 
hypothesis even in the 'weaker' sense. 
Table 4.14. Panel cointegration estimation results 
Country FMOLS Test statistic DOLS Test statistic DOLS Test statistic (K~l) (K~2) 
I Panel 0.408 -1.548 0.440 -0.527 0.443 -0.750 
I Bulgaria -0. 119 ·0; :.216' _0.770 ''0' 
Cvnrus 1.986 '.619 
-I' 'JI9' . .26 -2 J26' 
I Estonia -3 .513' 1.615 -I '.79 I' 
Hungary -0415 .203 -2.609' -0.495 1.41 
Latvia -0.316 0.880 -1.036 1.939 .3/ 
-0.949 0.546 -11.030' 1.533 -\. :.3: ). 
Malta 0.078 655 IM' 
'oland .019 5' 
:omania '.330 -I l' IS' 
1.5:t5 '.644 r' I" 
lov.nia IS '.06S -2 4' li' 
Notes: • and •• , I of the null at 1 % and 5%. Ho: p, = 1. K is the number , 
The individual country estimation results unfortunately cannot be verified by individual 
tests for cointegrationper se because of the very short data series. Hence as with the rest' 
of the chapter the focus is more on the panel as a whole. Overall, considering both the 
results from the panel cointegration tests, which support cointegration, and the panel 
cointegration estimators (mixed results on individual country level but still not rejecting 
the 'strong' sustainability hypothesis for the group), the conclusion is that at least some 
accession countries have rather achieved fiscal adjustment in keeping with the !BC 
definition. 
Yet such conclusion should be based only on the panel as a whole, where more 
observations make the econometric analysis more reliable. But even then, caution is still 
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advisable due to small-sample size and power distortions. And the evidence is not 
robust enough to claim sustainability for each country individually. 
4.4. Conclusion 
As historical sustainabiIity assessment requires long series which are still unavailable 
for the EU accession countries, this chapter proposes a novel application of panel 
methods for the region. The panel approach is currently making its way into the fiscal 
sustainabiIity field and, with the most recent advances in panel unit roots and 
cointegration, the panel studies are likely to form a new body within the .'backward-
looking' statistical tests literature. 
The findings, although presented with a degree of caution, bring new insights into the 
macroeconomic performance of Central and Eastern Europe since the onset of transition 
and during the EU accession process. The formal econometric analysis broadly 
confirms the hypothesis of successful fiscal adjustment intuitively suggested by the 
descriptive data from the accession countries since the mid- I 990s. The panel tests show 
that revenues and expenditures are cointegrated with a vector (I, -I). Overall therefore, 
the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the accession countries as a whole 
exhibit fiscal sustainability within the estimation period. 
But this conclusion is only valid for the group of accession countries as a whole. After 
employing recently introduced methods for the estimation of long-run relationships in 
panels, the empirical evidence is less optimistic for each country individually. Delving 
into a country-level analysis, a recommended future extension when much longer series 
exist, would prove illuminating. Even so, the results for the panel and the implied 
results for individual countries (omitted one-by-one) suggest that it would be reasonable 
to conclude that at least some accession countries may have achieved fiscal 
sustainabiIity . 
The results of this chapter therefore, intriguing as they are against the background of 
deep structural changes and often painful economic reforms in the two decades of 
transition, do no! confirm that all the countries have achieved fiscal sustainability. From 
a policy perspective, the economies in the region still need to alter their fiscal policies in 
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order to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint, especially now that after the EU 
accession further fiscal challenges are expected. All in all, there is no justification for 
any complacency for the accession countries' fiscal authorities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OPEN-ECONOMY SUSTAINABILITY IN EUROPE 
The whole truth is generally the ally o/virtue; a half-truth is always the ally of 
some vice. 
- Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874 -1936) 
The previous two chapters analysed various perspectives on the long-run fiscal 
sustainability ofpre-2004 'old' Europe and the accession countries. But the analysis still 
leaves the door open for an unsolicited question: is the government budget the only area 
where a country's stability could be jeopardised? Fiscal sustainability researchers are 
usually content to make increasingly specialised inroads into the area while abstracting 
from the bigger picture. Yet the economy does not consist of a government sector only 
and nor does fiscal sustainability guarantee that other imbalances do not occur. In the 
macro economy, external imbalances are the first likely candidate. It would not be 
surprising if the different imbalances were related to one another (as Ley, 2003, and 
Corsetti and Miiller, 2006, suggest). 
Ideally, both fiscal and external sustainability should be analysed, and be analysed 
together in a unified framework. From that angle, traditional analyses focusing either on 
fiscal or current account sustainability reveal only part of the 'whole truth'. The existing 
literature, however, is surprisingly deficient in bridging the conditions for budget and 
external intertemporal solvency. This chapter aims to fill that gap: essentially by 
providing a distinct approach to model open-economy sustainability based on an 
examination of the relationship between private savings and private investment. I 
explain the rationale for this in detail in section 5.1. 
A country may accumulate external debt which will match the existing current account 
deficit in much the same way as the dynamics of government debt matches the budget 
deficit through the 'flow' budget constraint in Chapter Two. If persistent, the current 
account deficits may pose a threat to external solvency and the long-run external 
sustainability is thus questionable. Under certain scenarios the negative balance in the 
current account may be a result of looser fiscal policies having encouraged net imports 
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as a component of aggregate demand. Conversely, policymakers may wish to resort to 
fiscal tightening to reduce the current account deficit: but the ensuing short-term fiscal 
consolidation can possibly imply slowed economic growth, hence in the long term 
diminishing budget revenues and weakened fiscal sustainability. The European Central 
Bank acknowledges the presence of the additional source of fiscal risk stemming from 
'external imbalances, the correction of which can ... undermine fiscal sustainability' 
(ECB, 2007, p. 63) 
Leaving aside these two-way spillovers between the government budget and the 
external position, it is worth noting that external sustainability analysis alone partly 
deals with the fiscal stance, in the proportion of government debt which is not issued 
domestically. But that strictly speaking belongs to the domain of fiscal sustainability 
assessment as presented so far. Therefore a thorough research into whether a country's 
macroeconomic policies follow a long-run path compatible with an IBC would require 
distinguishing between the different sectors of the economy and between the internal 
and external positions, including possible overlaps. Unfortunately, such categories in 
accounting for the debt and the sectors of the economy are not available for many 
. countries or over long periods of observation. 
Data limitations may explain the so far limited efforts to assess overall sustainability. 
However, the model proposed in this chapter will demonstrate how such sustainability 
can be studied even without disaggregated data for the different types of debt. Instead, 
the variables of interest turn out to be private sector savings and investment: the link in 
the 'twin deficits' macro identity. This chapter therefore provides an extension to the 
fiscal and current account sustainability literature with roots in the IBC, by deriving a 
simple testable condition for the overall sustainability ofan open economy. 
The open-economy sustainability model forms the theoretical contribution here. And the 
derived sustainability condition is empirically applied in two economic and historical 
contexts: of 'old' Europe and accession Europe. The research methods mirror those in 
the previous two chapters, respectively, while the research questions may be regarded 
both on their own and as complementing the evidence from before. The first question is 
whether 'old' Europe's national policies have achieved sustainability in the open-
economy framework, and about any MaastrichtlSGP effect in that. The Central and 
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Eastern Europe panel is checked for the hypothesis if the forces of transition and E(M)U 
accession have led to a sustainable overall macroeconomy stance. Because the policy 
implications differ substantially from the narrower fiscal sustainability perspective, 
discussing them might represent a contribution as a first illustration of the concept. This 
chapter also provides room for certain re-interpretation of the results from the previous 
two chapters. 
In order to set the material below in a clear literature context and to enable a faster 
delivery of the chapter messages, it is instructive to state what it does not do. Above all, 
the open-economy sustainability model is not about external sustainability: it rather 
upgrades the fiscal sustainability assessment which is the running theme of the thesis. 
External sustainability analysis, even in the trend related to the !BC arithmetic, belongs 
to a strand of its own. Moreover, for the reasons outlined, studying the external position 
separately is of little value if we are in fact interested in the overall sustainability of the 
economy. 
Neither does the chapter deal with short-term external sustainability issues: the growing 
literature embodied in the works on the 'sudden stops' stemming from Calvo (1998) and 
the current account reversals as reviewed by Algieri and Bracke (2007) who assess a 
multitude of past adjustment episodes. The chapter models long-run sustainability 
conditions but is not concerned with the determinants, even if fiscal policy variables are 
among them, of the current account; key recent empirical contributions worth knowing 
there are Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Chinn and Ito (2007). 
Therefore, deterministic or causal relationships between the internal and external 
balances also lie beyond the scope of the current research, although the external 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy is central to another body of bordering 
literature: the one on twin deficits. While not expressly studying the twin deficit 
hypothesis, according to which adverse fiscal shocks deteriorate the current account 
balance while it benefits from fiscal consolidations (Corsetti and MUller, 2006), the 
results below may provide empirical arguments to twin deficit researchers about the 
private sector behaviour. 
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Private sector savings and investment are in the empirical focus now but any systematic 
co-movements between them should not be judged against the 'Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle' (the high historical correlation between national savings and investment 
observed by Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). The cointegration between the two series 
bridges the Feldstein-Horioka evidence with the domain of external sustainability 
analysis (Coakley, Kulasi and Smith, 1996) but it is rather the international capital 
immobility which has popularly been the focus and the proposed solution to the 
'puzzle'. The ensuing huge empirical research has found decreasing positive 
associations between national savings and investment, and that has naturally been 
interpreted as a sign of more efficient international capital markets and 'an end of the 
Feldstein Horioka puzzle' (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). 
It is important to realise that, although private savings and investment are major 
components of national savings and investment, respectively, they are by no means 
identical concepts. The existence (or otherwise) of any relationship between private 
savings and private investment carries no immediate implications for the relationship 
between national savings and investment. The model presented in this chapter has two 
distinct features: first, it involves only the private rather than total national savings and 
investment, and second, it does not need to assume either fiscal or current account 
sustainability. The sustainability criterion proposed here has no direct implications for 
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, because private and national savings (and investment) are 
fundamentally different. Moreover, even with fiscal sustainability in place, the 
economy-wide sustainability definition does not attest that cointegration between 
private investment and private savings can imply international capital immobility; for 
the latter, it is the national investment and savings relationship that matters42• 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the model but before that 
presents some descriptive statistics for an intuition why the open-economy approach to 
sustainability matters. External sustainability as defined by the intertemporal budget 
constraint is integral to the overall sustainability arithmetic, and is therefore also 
sketched out. The first empirical application on 'old' Europe's data is contained in the 
second section, while the third section provides another empirical application for 
42 My model is therefore irrelevant to the external sustainabi1ity condition and further research is needed 
before supporting a proposition that the concurrent satisfaction of both the fiscal and the economy-wide 
intertemporal solvency constraints will also imply external sustainability. 
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accession Europe. The chapter then summarises the main findings and proposes ways to 
interpret them with a view to drawing the policy implications. 
5.1. An open-economy sustainability model 
Monitoring external sustainability is important even if only for fiscal policymakers. 
Inappropriate fiscal policies after all may be detrimental not only to the fiscal stance but 
may lead to external imbalances. If the private sector savings-investment balance stays 
unchanged, an increase in the budget deficit or a reduction of the surplus will induce a 
corresponding increase in the current account deficit or a reduction of the current 
account surplus. Expansionary fiscal policy may increase domestic interest rates, thus 
attracting foreign investment and appreciating the local currency, under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, reducing net exports and deteriorating the current account 
balance. On the other hand, the higher debt that results from looser fiscal policy could 
also make households increase their savings in the proportion in which they expect 
future tax increases in accordance with the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. This will 
imply less domestic investment, in the proportion in which it cannot be funded by 
foreign capital. The latter will offset the increase in the current account deficit 
envisaged with the former scenario. 
The transmission channels between the two balances are diverse and their effects and 
directions may depend, among other things, on the degree of openness of the economy, 
the exchange rate regime, and capital mobility. It should at least intuitively be clear at 
this stage that fiscal and current account sustainability are related. 
That is why the descriptive statistics in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 may intrigue those who 
previously have limited their focus to fiscal sustainability as analysed in Chapters Three 
and Four. Many European countries have experienced deficits on both fronts or 
sometimes large current account deficits even when fiscal balances stayed in surplus. 
But generally 'old' Europe' does not reveal any pattern in the recent links between the 
fiscal and external balances. Neither does the advent of the Euro seem to have marked a 
clear shift in the current account dynamics (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1. General government fiscal and current account balances, percent ofGDP 
(EUl4) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
"":4:0 "',.1.8 '~2.4 -2:3', ' .1.6Y;' 
-2.2 -3.1 -2.4 -3.2' -2.5' 
Belgium -3.8 -2.1 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 Gen, gOY. fiscal -4.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 Current account nla nla nla nla nla nla nla 2.9 2 3.5 2.6 2.7 
? D" -k""':::!? Gen. gOY. fiscal " .--.-2.9 "' -·-·1.9 . -. --0.5 '" -0.0· 1.4.' 2.3·" 1.2 ',' 0.2 'i -0.1--" -~- 1.9 ,,4.6, 3.4 :1 
1/",,~~2f,., ::r;i:iiih,Currentaccount >,d;,,,O,7 ,!iLL, 1.4 : ',,::.0.5 ~ ""-1:1 ,"', ,,<1:9 ';1',. 1.4 >;);,_ 3.1 ,;;;r" 2.5·,; jt 3.4,;/'i';" 3::' /;:;4.4 i y 2,6"! 
Gen. gov. fiscal -6.2 -3.5 -1.2 1.7 1.6 6.9 5.0 4.1 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.5 
Current account 4 3.9 5.4 5.7 5.9 7.5 6.9 10.1 6.4 7.7 4.9 5.2 Finland 
tF"';'dRi2l;;f;/!;)~i~LjGen .. goy~ fiscal 'hi; ,,.S:5'!;r40.4~-1 ,,,;;;;~3.0' '·:2:6'~ ,;, ,·1':7 ·,',·1.'5:J+ -1;6)::~;'-3.2';:;1;:-4.2 i,L, -3.7 Tl,'!.,2.9·, "";;2,7 if 
T,." ~~,P,;::I:J:Bjd;,Current aCcount:l};J ,'0.7 ·'::;-''''1 ;3', '1]);:2.7 ';;'''1:2.'8' ",:'2'.'6'~ .' 1.2"'{;":' I :744!(/;':I:"10niL:;' 0.4 ,_",i~j!iO.5 .1'1/:;0.9 :;;~,n':1'.'3 :j 
Gen. gov. fiscal -3.2 -3.3 -2.6 -2.2 -1.5 1.3 -2.8 -3.6 -4.0 -3.7 -3.2 -2.3 
Current account -1.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -1,3 -1.7 0 2 1.9 4.3 4.6 5 Germany 
L,,· "H"",'''''''' "'<:,~i:i':Gen,'gov.- fisca1 :;i)!(!':..9.9 :>i0L~7.3 ~,;~"--6.S',, ,;4::2" ,:..3'.4: ·~4A;;;:': :>4.90[,;'1 _5.3:;;b;, ::"6.2:i';;ii)-r_7.7JiikJiilS:'J -' "':;..2.6:; 
.'Greece· Currentaccount "-2.2, -3.3 . -3.5 -2.7 -3.6 -7.7 '-7.2' -6.5 '-6.4'.' -5.6' ~7.1· ··'nI.' 
Gen. gOY. fiscal -2.0 0.0 1.6 2.2 2.6 4.6 0.8 -0.4 0.4 1.5 1.1 1.0 
Current account 2.6 2.8 2.4 0.9 0.6 0 -0.6 -1.2 0 -0,6 -3.5 -4.2 Ireland 
!' Ital):~.:':.,. Gen. gov. fiscal '. '-7.4 ' -7.0 "-2.7' '3.1' -1.8 -0.9" -3.1" -3.0 ' . -3.5 '. '-3.5 <4.3, .. 4,&·, ;, . ,,".)2:f:>I:,:1; i;:;:n,Current account%V'y 2.3 '10",1, 3.2 ;,;;;:,2.8 -, , !4~6" <0.7 :.," -05:, .. -0.1-:!''''' -0.8 """, .. 1.3, :.," -0.9 ";'-',;.1.6 '/' "'2.6 ~ 
Netherlands Gen. gov. fiscal -4.3 -2.0 -1.3 -0.9 0.4 2.0 -0.3 -2.0 -3,1 -1.8 -0.3 -0.4 
Current account 5.9 5 6.5 3.2 3.8 1.9 2.4 2.5 5.5 7.5 7.2 8,3 
Spain Gen. gOY. fiscal -6.3 -4.6 -2.9 -3.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 0,0 -0.2 l.l 1.4 Current account -0,3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.2 -2.9 -4 -3.9 ·3.3 -3.5 -5.3 -7.4 -8.6 
rSwed~>:; +Gen. 'gov'. fiscal 'S<: ,~6.9";' ;::'2.8 :c,;";1:D ,'1, 0'r:9 "" :2:3'" ",'5.0:ht:: 2.6'4i";,-.(t5'/H' :·0.2',:b0<>L6 'i(! ;:2.8" J:"2:9"r 
i .', Currentacoount ··1.9· . 3.5 ,··4.1 '2.7, 4.2 4 4.3·' 5" 7.2 ,,·6.7 ,6.9 ,'72' 
United Gen. gOY. fiscal -5.8 -4.1 -2.1 D.l 1.2 4.0 0.9 -1.7 -3.4 -3.3 -3.4 -3.0 
Kingdom Current account -1.2 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 -2.4 -2.6 ·2.2 -1.6 ·1,3 -1.6 -2.5 -3.2 
Source: General government fiscal data as described in Table 3.1 of Chapter Three and illustrated in 
Figures 3.1-3.4 there. Current account data are from Eurostat. 
Note: 'nJa' means data unavailable. 
Accession Europe over the same period at first sight provides stronger arguments 
against overall sustainability, based on the descriptive data from Table 5.2. What is 
noteworthy is that the sharpest increases in the external imbalances were coupled with 
nearly balanced or surplus budgets in Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia. Those three are 
currency board or exchange-rate targeting countries: it is tempting to suggest that under 
fixed exchange rates and absence of national monetary policy, fiscal policy is the only 
tool to restore sustainability. But what do the ratios in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 really tell 
us about the open .. economy (overall) sustainability? 
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Table 5.2. General government fiscal and current account balances, percent ofGDP 
( accession countries) 
Balance 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
i H_ ,-" Gen.gov.fiscal ";, n/a 'nla~j; nla> ],7:· 0.4 -0.5' "1;9:,. 0.-1,,'':0.9 ";2.2 ,:':1.9 <'3.3'~ t'-~~!~_~~_; !-~'- Current account ilih<~O.2; 1",,' 0.2.1i",;' S,2'r- ~O.4 >;', ~S:IJA -5.S>': -~7.3 ~5:6' -S.5' -6.6 ;-0~-12 ,', -15.71 
Gen. gov. fiscal n/a nla nla -4.2 -4.4 -2.4 -2.3 -4.4 -6.3 ~4.l -2.3 -1.5 
Current account -1.7 -4.9 -3.8 -6.3 -2.2 -4.9 ·3.2 -3.7 -2.3 -S -5.6 -5.9 Cyprus 
:: Czech ,'j::iffi!*- ; Gen/gov-.- fiscal ';'Fii.q3.4>ib';i,,,'3.3>0!1"~3;8'd.i~"f,.5.0:v}f;-(.3J17;~ ;" .... 3.!7:;;<",~5;7, 'r';:-~6:-8 -. ;':;~;6 ·<>;;i2-;9 '>0",.3.5 ><1:;~2.9j1 
L RepubHc \" '" Current account'" ~2.s !f,' -6.7::i]> -6.3 'b:" -2.l",'; '.:.2.4;: . -4.'8 - , .;5.3 . i<:-1.8 '::';~;;;'3.3:~ 
-5.6 <,"6:2 ,'<,'5.4 
Gen. gOY. fiscal "la n/a nla nla n/a ·0.2 -0.3 2.3 3.S 
Current account -4.2 -S.6 -11.4 -S.7 -4.4 ·5.3 ·5.4 -ID -15.5 Estonia 
0.4 2.0 2.3 
·9,8 -11.3 ·12.3 
·8.2 -7.2 . -6.5 
Latvia 
Malta Gen. SOY. fiscal n/a nla nla -9.7 -7.6 -6.1 ·6.4 -5.5 -10 -5 -3.1 -2.6 Current account -10.1 -11.1 ·5.4 -5.7 -3.2 -12.4 -3.S 2.4 -3.1 -6 -S.7 -6.7 
W ·.'.H>.:';' ''''in; Gen;; gov.':fiscaH ;;1;,,:..4.4 ii),i~; .. 4.9"1: ;>:'4.6sjM~ :..4,.3:;;::; ·~LS·q; .... 1:5·;:, " .. 3;·7 ;;,,,-3:2' <.;·6.3 "'<~5,7' ·~.3· ,·,,':,·3.9'( 
i Poland <'l:'? Current account" 0.6 " '2.1 'v· -3:7,,<;4> -7.4<,' '5.8' ,-2:8'. '2.6 '< ''2,1 <,-4.2 "'1.6:"3.21 
Romania Gen. goy. fiscal n/a nla nla -3.2 -4.5 -4.6 -3.3 -2 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -1.9 
Current account nla nla nla -6.9 -4 -3.7 -5.5 -3.3 -5.5 -S.4 -S.6 -10.4 
•••• "cc Gen, gov.fisc.1 <, -1.8' -8,6; -6.7 -4.8' ·6.4 -11,8, -6.5 -7.7-2.7-2.4 . '2.8-3.4, !;:~J~~ki,~li~ii;- Current aooounn ferri,;; .2;iihL· .. 9.9iik;~, .9.24,;:' .'-9.1,w:· -S:~;:-'i :',,,3.:5:;0, .;S;3,·.· ;';;7 .. 9 "·;-;·,,,0.8,\; .;";3.4', 1;0'·S.4 'i·';i'~8.2;f 
Slovenia Gen. gOY. fiscal nla nla nla nla nla -3.S -4.1 -2.5 -2.8 -2.3 -1.5 -1.4 
Current account -0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.6 -3.3 -2.7 0.2 1 -0.8 -2.7 -2 -2.S 
Source: Eurostat. General government fiscal balances reproduced from Table 4.1 in Chapter Four. 
Note: on/a' means data unavailable. 
The external sustain ability dimension 
The arithmetic of external (current account) sustainability assessment is analogous to 
the one of fiscal sustainability presented in detail in Chapter Two. The statistically 
testable conditions are derived from the external budget constraint, as 'similarly to the 
government accumulating public debt because its revenues fall short of its expenditures, 
a country accumulates external debt when it has a current account deficit' (Ley, 2003, p. 
9). 
The external sustainability assessment follows exactly the !BC arithmetic of Chapter 
Two. The initial step is analogous to (2.3): 
(5.\) F, = (1 + i, )F,-l + CA, 
Here F is foreign debt; CA is current account deficit. In this specification CA does not 
include foreign debt interest and thus corresponds to the primary deficit in the budget. 
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In empirical applications the current account is usually defined more narrowly in 
another respect: instead of what would be required under conventional balance of 
payments accounting, the standard research approach is to use the empirically 
observable net exports instead of a current account balance. The trade balance 
constitutes almost the whole of the current account and the near perfect positive 
correlation between net exports and the current account balance is put forward as an 
explanation why the former is always used as a proxy for the latter (Corsetti and MUller, 
2006, p. 604). In the empirical or even the early theoretical models (e.g. Husted, 1992, 
p. 160) that distinction is rarely noted: sustainability of the trade balance is regarded as 
external sustainability. The model below circumvents the above confusion. 
In (5.1) too, for simplicity a common 'world' nominal interest rate is assumed. Then the 
procedure is as for fiscal sustainability: through a 'flow' external constraint, scaling to 
GDP, introducing a discount factor incorporating the real interest and the economy's 
growth rates, to end up with: 
(5.2) !. _ -(j+l)!. _..,j., -(1+1)( ) t - P I+j+l LP cal+l+1 
;=0 
which corresponds exactly to (2.10). Current foreign debt equals the discounted future 
sequence of current account surpluses plus the discounted value of terminal foreign 
debt, all expressed as ratios of GDP. Following the arguments from Chapter Two, 
external sustainability requires the transversality condition that the first right-hand-side 
term in (5.2) be zero in the limit. Analogously to the !BC, an intertemporal external 
constraint is imposed. In other words, all foreign debt outstanding today should be paid 
off by future current account surpluses because otherwise rational foreign lenders will 
stop lending to a country running a Ponzi scheme against them, i.e. remaining with a 
non-zero terminal foreign debt. 
A 'statistical tests' strand of the current account sustainability literature then deals with 
empirically testable sustainability conditions which mirror those in the fiscal (budget) 
sustainability counterparts: stationarity of foreign debt or of its first differences, or 
cointegration between imports and foreign debt interest payments, on the one hand, and 
exports, on the other hand. The sustainability criteria reviewed in Chapter Two, as well 
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as their critiques, are directly transposable into the current account sustainability 
domain. 
The model 
It is important to recall at this stage that F comprises all foreign debt, which is both 
private and public (Figure 5.1). Hence, one may think of F as consisting partly of B, the 
general goverrunent debt defined in Chapter Two. This is an important issue for 
empirical work, because testing for the overall solvency constraint may require data for 
foreign and government debt and interest payments, as well as for the overlap between 
them. 
Figure 5.1. Foreign vs. goverrunent debt 
Foreign 
private-sector 
debt 
Foreign debt Government debt 
Government debt issued 
abroad (held by non-
residents) 
Domestically 
issued government 
debt (held by 
residents) 
Certainly data limitations play a role in choosing what type of sustainability to test for. 
When there are government or foreign debt data, whether the country respects 
separately the intertemporal and the external budget constraints may be duly assessed. 
Analyses traditionally dealing with fiscal sustainability need not consider that part of 
public debt goes to foreigners and is by virtue of that relevant to external sustainabiIity. 
This was the approach here so far too. Similarly, if the current account is the focus of 
research when an open economy accumulates foreign debt, the fact that part of that debt 
may be used to finance domestic public expenditures seems immaterial as to whether 
the country observes the external budget constraint or not. What matters is the ability of 
the country to sustain its policies in the long run without infringing upon either fiscal or 
external solvency. But although the existing literature on fiscal sustainability does not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign borrowing, it would be reasonable to suppose 
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that there could be different implications for fiscal sustainability in practice, depending 
on the respective proportions of debt held by residents and non-residents. 
Missing data may hinder an attempt to model overall sustainability, unless the overlap 
in Figure 5.1 is accounted for. As claimed above, the fiscal and current account 
imbalances may be related and it is important to examine how they influence the 
macroeconomic sustainability. Budget deficits can lead to rising foreign debt: but also 
current account adjustments, if needed to restore long-run external sustainability, could 
deteriorate the fiscal stance and break a fiscal path observing the !BC thus far. With 
respect to that, Ahmed and Roger's (1995) analysis of 'economy-wide' sustainability is 
rather an empirical exception in that they are able to distinguish between government 
and foreign debt. 
Whereas it is therefore advisable to extend the scope of analysis in an open-economy 
and encompass both sustainability conditions, practically no models exist for the 
intertemporal constraining of both the government budget and the current account 
balances 43. It is intriguing to embark on this and provide a theoretical model that is less 
demanding in terms of the empirically observable variables. Thus a more complete 
European sustainability picture will be obtained. 
This section outlines a model illustrating why a country may be running continuous 
fiscal surpluses but if foreign debt is persistently drifting away and above government 
debt, overall sustainability will be at risk. The starting point is a version of the national 
accounts macro identity: 
(5.3) Y=C+I-CA 
where Y is national income, C is consumption, I is investment and CA is the current 
account deficit as above 44. Rearranging, we get: 
(5.4) -CA = Y -(C+J) = S-I 
The right-hand side in (5.4) is total savings minus total investment. It may be 
decomposed between the private and public sectors, as: 
43 Except for the limited efforts in a related, yet distinctly different, Jiterature noted below. 
44 The national income identity may show government expenditures separately, i.e. out of I, but the 
relevant end result is the same. 
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(5.5) 
where the subscripts p and g denote the private and the government sector variables, 
respectively. But (Sg - 19) equals (T - G), which is the primary budget surplus (a 
negative budget deficit). So (5.5) becomes: 
(5.6) 
The latter is the 'twin deficit' identity linking the government primary deficit to the 
current account deficit and the private sector savings-investment balance. To keep 
consistency with the analysis so far, (5.6) should be expressed in GDP ratios, in nominal 
terms and to highlight the argument and avoid exchange rate complications, in domestic 
prices. 
The discussion so far is illustrated further by Table 5.3. As Chalk and Hemming (2000, 
p. 21) sum it up, although 'there is not necessarily a direct correspondence between the 
"twin deficits" ... fiscal and external sustainability are not entirely independent'. The 
link between the two sustainability notions is derived next. 
Table 5 3 The schematic flow of funds .. 
Domestic Economy Rest of the 
Government Private Sector World 
Gross National Domestic Income Y Yg Yp 
+ Final Consumption 
-c -Cg -Cp 
+ Gross Investment 
+ Exports of Goods & Nonfactor Services -1 -1g -1p -X 
.. Imports of Goods & Nonfactor SelVices M 
+ Net Factor Income -If 
+ Net Transfers -r; 
Non-financial balances (S-J) (S -I.) (S -I:) CA balance 
Source: Adapted from Ley (2003, p. 10). 
Using previous notation with the discount factor p assuming constant and equal interest 
rates, for the two classes of debt, and constant output growth rates, the twin deficit 
identity may be summed over all future periods and re-expressed in net present value 
terms: 
(5.7) E.,L,p-(I+I)(d ) = E.,L,p-(l+l)(sav-inv) +E.,L,p-(l+l)(ca ) L t+I+J L /+1+1 L /+1+1 
jzO ;=0 1=0 
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Above, (5.7) closely follows Chalk and Hemming's (2000, p. 22) equation 39, 
expectation operators added for the creditors' expectations about the country's overall 
balance. The first right-hand side term in (5.7) is private savings minus private 
investment. 
Now substituting from (2.10) but without seigniorage, to simplify and save space, and 
from (5.2), (5.7) turns into: 
(5 8) I· -(J+')b b - EJ.. -(1+1) ( .) + I' -(J+!)/, /, . Imp 1+)+1 -,- LP sav-lnV 1+;+1 Imp I+j+l - t' 
/::0 
or: 
(5.9) /, b - EJ.. -(1+1) ( .) + I' -(J+I) (/, b) t - t- LP sav-mv 1+i+1 Imp 1+}+1 - 1+)+1 
;",0 
The twin deficit identity (5.6) is now re-expressed in terms of GDP ratios, using the 
previous notation and the primary deficit expression, without seigniorage, from (2.9). 
The current account deficit is analogously expressed to derive: 
(5.10) b, - Plb,_1 = say - inv + !, - P,!,_I , 
or with the lag operator L: 
(5.11) b,(I- p,Ll = sav- inv + /,(1- p,Ll, 
and therefore expressing the private sector savings-investment balance as: 
(5.12) (!, -bl)(p,L-I)=sav-inv 
It is useful now to redefine (5.9) in the following way: 
(5.13) !, -b, = Efp-(i+I)(sav-inv)I+I+1 + p' (f. -b.) , 
;=0 
because limp-(J+')(!,+j+, - bl+j+
'
) = p' (I. - b.) wherefo and bo can be viewed as some 
initial values with p' 'bringing' them to the current period. The second right-hand side 
term in (5.13) plays the same role in deriving the empirically testable open-economy 
sustainability condition as the 'bubble terms' discussed in the seminal fiscal 
sustainability papers by Hamilton and Flavin (1986, p. 813, equation 9) and Haug 
(1991, p. 98, equation 5). 
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Overall, encompassing both the fiscal and current account dimensions, sustainability 
would be in place if the limit term in (5.9) above is zero: otherwise some terminal debt 
will remain. More precisely, the terminal debt would be the residual difference between 
foreign and government debt. That will imply, in analogy to the discussion in Chapter 
Two, that the country is engaged in an open-economy Ponzi game against its creditors. 
Then (5.13) is expressed in the form ofa testable regression as: 
(5.14) j, -b,= fp-(l+I)(sav-inv)l+i+1 + p'(fo -bo) +c, 
;=0 
The null hypothesis is that the 'bubble term' in (5.14) is zero. This will hold whenever 
(sav - inv) is stationary, because of (5.12) and under an assumption for a stationary 
disturbance term c,. This points to the sufficiency of this stationarity condition. To 
illustrate the concept further, it is instructive to recall the empirically testable conditions 
from equation 10 in Hamilton and Flavin (1986, p. 815) where they also had to assume 
stationarity of their disturbance term. To compare more, Haug (1991) based his model 
on deterministic identities: equation 6 there (ibid., p. 98) is used to derive the 
sufficiency of his (co )integration condition. That roughly corresponds to only working 
with (5.13) here. Finally, the construction of the testable null here parallels Hakkio and 
Rush's . logic about their equation 7 (1991a, p. 432). In my model therefore, a 
stationarity of (sav - inv) will suffice for ruling out a violation of the overall 
intertemporal constraint. The 'bubble term' will not approach zero in a dynamically 
efficient economy, where real interest exceeds real growth rate, unless the other terms in 
(5.14) are set to be stationary: hence stationarity of(sav - inv) is a necessary condition 
too. 
Furthemore, although trend stationarity is in this case mathematically possible, it would 
imply an undue economic burden on a country having to service, or at least to market, a 
constantly rising excess of foreign over government debt. Or if the trend is negative, 
fiscal sustainability could potentially be undermined with government debt constantly 
exceeding foreign debt. Hence, additionally imposing those economics constraints, (sav 
- inv) should be stationary around a mean. As with the expenditures and revenues in 
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Chapter Three, however, the individual savings and investment series may be modelled 
with linear time trends. 
To sum up, the condition to have the economy-wide sustainability is for private savings 
and private investment to be ef(I,I) with a cointegrating vector (I, -I): unless they are 
both individually f(O) which also implies overall sustainability as seen from (5.12)-
(5.14). An advantage of the model developed in this chapter is that it does not assume 
fiscal or balance-of-payments sustainability individually. Previewing the empirical 
results below, it wiIJ be shown that a country may fail the fiscal sustainability definition 
but satisfY the open-economy macroeconomic long-run solvency constraint. It is that 
overall constraint that is revealed via (5.12)-(5.14), rather than the intertemporal budget 
constraint (fiscal sustainability). or the external constraint (current account 
sustainability). While fiscal sustainability requires the cointegration between the public 
sector revenue and expenditures so that the country wiIJ finally be without any 
government debt, external sustainability means eliminating any terminal foreign debt 
through the cointegration between the national (public plus private) savings and 
investment (Le. literally the Feldstein-Horioka 'puzzle'). In contrast, the savings-
investment interternporal balance of the private economy turns out to be both necessary 
and sufficient for satisfYing the overall sustainability condition. The data from the next 
two sections wiIJ be checked for compliance with the new condition". 
The intuition behind this argument is straightforward: if private savings and investment 
do not move together in the long run, there wiIJ also be an increasing mismatch in the 
long-run sequences of foreign and government debt. Hence creditors should be wary 
about the country ending up with outstanding debt: a terminal excess of foreign over 
government debt, or vice versa. Thus a central role of the private sector looms up and 
any sustainability-related government stabilisation policies should take into account the 
45 An important extension for future research is the 'weak' open-economy sustainabiIity, drawing on 
Quintos (1995). Thus, private savings and investment may not need to be cointegrated as long as the 
coefficient on investment in a cointegrating regression where savings is the dependent variable lies 
between 0 and t. That would however pose potential sustainability problems in the real world (the 
country will have to service a growing foreign debt) in much the same fashion as admitted by Quintos 
about her 'weak-fonn' condition. A related caveat is Bohn's (2007) critique: but as discussed previously 
in an analogous setting, it will be economically unrealistic to allow for higher orders of integration for the 
difference between foreign and government debt. Therefore, the strict condition of a cointegrating vector 
(I, -1) is here taken as necessary and sufficient for an open-economy sustainability hypothesis in keeping 
with the intertemporal constraints. 
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fact that economy-wide sustainability will not be achieved without the appropriate 
private savings and private investment patterns. 
An interesting extreme theoretical case would be whenfo = boo Then the 'bubble term' 
would be 0 but savings and investment need not be cointegrated. That cannot be part of 
the research strategy however, as the values of fo and bo are empirically unobservable 
and because it must be very rare to have in one period foreign and government debt 
exactly equal. The latter argument of course also applies to the limit term in (5.9). 
Although ignoring that oddity for the empirical part, it may be worth to pursue it more 
deeply in further theoretical research. 
Finally, the model just outlined should be delineated from two related pieces of 
literature. Ahmed and Rogers (1995) formulate an 'economy-wide balance' and 
empirically test US and UK data for it. They do not, however, analyse in detail their 
theoretical proposition that 'total savings and total investment must move together' to 
let the government's fiscal and the country's external positions satisfy the intertemporal 
constraints. Furthermore, as stressed at the outset above their empirical application 
critically depends on distinguishing between data on foreign and government debt, and 
interest payments or at least relevant interest rates, which are not available always. The 
following sections will demonstrate that for a panel of European countries, the enlarged 
EU, data on private savings and investment exist or are plausibly proxied and so the 
open-economy sustainability is assessable. 
A paper by Matsubayashi (2005) has offered a model which also bears resemblance to 
this one. He obtains conditions for the sustainability of the current account deficits 
based on disaggregating the economy into private and government sectors. Whereas 
modelling the role of the private sector, and correspondingly also utilising the twin 
deficit identity, the research is targeted at the external sustainability. Admittedly, under 
Matsubayashi's (2005) sustainability conditions fiscal sustainability would 
simultaneously be in place, and that is implicit in his model. But the shift of focus 
differentiates it from the approach here. 
Moreover, his sustainability conditions are particularly demanding in respect of the 
many empirically observable series needed if an applied researcher wishes to follow the 
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method. In addition, the resulting policy implications may differ substantially. Whereas 
proposing an alternative route to assess external sustainability and highlighting the 
private sector's contributions, Matsubayashi (2005) therefore is related to but distinct 
from the open-economy sustainability model proposed here. My model suggests a 
simpler testable condition which, through the concern with the private sector, explicitly 
provides for an overall sustainability of the open economy. 
The open-economy sustainability model is empirically applied next. First, sustainability 
in 'old' Europe is analysed and possible MaastrichtlSGP effects are sought through the 
approaches introduced in Chapter Three. 
5.2. Open-economy sustainability convergence in 'old' Europe 
This section presents the first ,dataset used to illustrate the open-economy sustainability 
model in practice. 
Data 
The private sector savings and investment, as ratios to GDP, are mostly from the 
AMECO annual macro-economic database of the European Commission, presented first 
in the previous chapter. The database is updated as of21 May 2007 (7 May 2007 for the 
GDP data). The private sector comprises the non-financial corporations (1995 ESA 
institutional sector S.\1), financial corporations (S.12), households (S.14) and non-
profit institutions servicing households (S.15). 
Wherever AMECO data for private savings or private investment were available for 
certain years only, the full countrY series are recovered as explained in Table 5.4. That 
approach was preferred for maximum within-series consistency. If however data were 
unavailable for reconstructing the series at their full length only the missing 
observations are calculated, with AMECO data used for the rest as also explained. 
Drawing on the twin deficit national accounting identity, the following 
savings/investment transformations are applied where needed: 
/73 
• Gross private savings = gross national savings minus (a proxy for) gross 
general government savings 
• Gross general government savings = primary balance plus (a proxy for) 
general government gross fixed capital formation 
• Gross private investment (gross fixed capital formation) = gross fixed 
capital formation for the total economy minus (a proxy for) general 
government gross fixed capital formation 
And the relevant AMECO series with their codes are: 
• Gross saving at current prices, mrd, private sector. Code USGP. 
• Gross national saving at current prices, mrd. Code USGN. 
• Gross fixed capital formation at current prices, mrd, private sector. Code 
UIGP. 
• Gross fixed capital formation at current prices, mrd, total economy. Code 
UIGT. 
• GDP at current market prices, mrd. Code UVGDH. EDP reference level. 
Table 5.4 describes the data, sources and adjustments. Pre-1999 data for the Euro area 
countries are fixed to the Euro at the irrevocable Euro conversion rate. The data series 
are annual, not seasonally adjusted and expressed as GDP ratios. This dataset is used for 
the first empirical application of the open-economy sustainability model. 
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Table 5.4. Private sector savings and investment data (EUl4) 
NO. COUNTRY DATA SOURCES AND ADJUSTMENTS SPAN 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Austria 1970-2006 Private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross national savings 
(from AMECO) and general government savings. The general government savings 
calculated as the sum of general government primary balance and fixed investment (the 
latter two taken from OEeD's Economic Outlook database via SourceOECD). 
Private sector IlrOSS fixed canital formation data from AMECO. 
Belgium 1970-2006 Private IZTOSS savin2s data from AMECO. 
Private sector gross fixed capital formation data from AMECO. 
Denmark 1971·2006 Private aross savinllS data from AMECO. 
Private sector IUOSS fixed caDitai formation data from AMECO. 
Finland 1970·2006 Private sector gross savings calcu1ated as the difference between gross national savings 
(from AMECO) and general government savings. The general government savings 
calculated as the sum of general government primary balance and fixed inve~~ent (the 
latter two taken from OECD's Economic Outlook database via SourceOECD . 
Private sector 2l"OSS fixed caDital foonation data from AMECO. 
Fmnce 1970-2006 Private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross nationa] savings 
(from AMECO) and genera] government savings. The general government savings 
calculated as the sum of general government primary balance and fixed inve~~ent (the 
latter two taken from OECD's Economic Outlook database via SourceOECD . 
Private sector IrrOSS fixed caoital fonnation data from AMECO. 
Germany 1970-2006 Private RTOSS savin';!;s data from AMECO. West Gennanv only before J 991. 
Private sector gross fixed capital fonnation data from AMECO. West Gennany only before 
1991. 
Greece 1970-2006 Private sector o:ross savino:s data from Bank of Greece·. 
Private sector IrrOSS fixed caoital fonnation data from Bank of Greece·. 
Ireland 1970·2006 Private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross national savings 
(from AMECO) and general government savings. The general government savings 
calculated as the sum of general government primary balance and fixed inv~~ent (the 
latter two taken from OEeD's EconomiC Outlook database via SourceOECD . 
Private sector moss fixed caoital formation data from AMECO. 
Italy 1970-2006 Private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross nationa1 savings 
(from AMECO) and general government savings. The general government savings 
calculated as the sum of general government primary balance and fixed investment (the 
latter two taken from DECD's Economic Outlook database via SourceOECD\ 
Private sector 17I'OSS fixed caoital formation data from AMECO. 
Netherlands 1970·2006 Private o:ross savinll'S data from AMECO. 
Private sector IrrOSS fixed capital formation data from AMECO. 
Portugal 1970-2006 Private sector gross savings from AMECO from 1977 onwards. 
Before that. private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross 
national savings (from AMECO) and general government savings. The general government 
savings calculated as the sum of general government primary balance and gross fixed 
capital formation (the latter two taken from Banco de Portugal's historical statistics 
database current "rices). 
Private sector 17I'OSS fixed caoital formation data from AMECO. 
Spain 1970-2006 Private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross national savings 
(from AMECO) and generaJ government savings. The generaJ government savings 
calculated as the swn of generaJ government primary baJance and fixed investment (the 
latter two taken from DEeD's Economic Outlook database via SourceOECDl. 
Private sector 17I'OSS fixed caoital fonnation data from AMECO. 
Sweden 1970·2006 Private sector gross savings calculated as the difference between gross national savings 
(from AMECO) and general government savings. The general government savings 
calculated as the swn of general government primary balance and fixed investment (the 
latter two taken from OECD's Economic Outlook database via SourceOECD). 
Private sector gross fixed ca"ital formation data from AMECO. 
United 1970·2006 Private m'oss savino:s data from AMECO. 
Kingdom Private sector RTOSS fixed capital formation data from AMECO. 
* The pnvate sector defined as pnvate sector and publlc enterpnses under prlVatlsatlOn, current pnces 
data; acknowledgments: Sophia Lazaretou and Alexandra Voutou from the Economic Research 
Department, Bank of Greece. 
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Empirical results: unit rootsistationarity 
The strategy for research into the open·economy sustainability (convergence) mirrors 
that of Chapter Three. The private savings/private investment cointegration condition 
for the overall open·economy sustainability requires a prior testing for the orders of 
integration of the individual series. The next stage involves the cointegration regression 
of private savings on private investment applying the DOLSIDGLS estimation and 
checking for unit roots in the cointegrating vector. Furthermore, the evolution in open· 
economy sustainability is traced with the recursive estimation of the cointegrating 
(slope) parameter. Finally, the Maastricht effect is examined by estimating the total 
multiplier through an overall slope dummy as in Chapter Three. 
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 contain the results from testing the individual series in their 
levels and first differences, respectively, for the unit root/stationarity nulls. For 
robustness, again both trend specifications are used. For the majority of cases the series 
appear 1(1). Perhaps least ambiguous under the PPERRON tests, that conclusion can 
tentatively be adopted and compared with the fmdings later. 
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Table 5.5. Unit root/stationarity tests: private investment and private savings (levels) 
Serie Tests with trend") Tests without trend'!) Country 
s 
DFGLS (l.6~ DFGLS (3.61 KPSS(4) : PPERRON DFGLS : DFGLS KPSS(4) 
: (4,5) (206) : (3.6) 
Austria inv ·2.033 (1) ·1.560 (2) : 0.198" : -11.819 2.124"'(li -1.641 (2) 0.231 
SQV ·1.518 (I) -0.814 (3) : 0.178" ; -9.466 -1.339(1) ; -1.339(1) 0.335 
Belgium inv ·1.933 (I) -1.933 (I) : 0.238· ; -7.414 ·1.752(1) ; ·1.752(1) 0.239 
sav 3.623" (5) ·1.780(1) : 0.243- ; -5.748 -3.686'(5); -1.506(1) , 0.251 
Denmark tnv -2.316 (I) ·1.050 (5) ! 0.203" ; -8.047 2.146'''(1" -1.023(5) ; 0.361'" 
sav 3.543" (I) 3.543" (I) : 0.0753 : -15.790' -1.384(1) : 0.000(4) : 1.160· 
Finland inv 3.376"(1) f1.717(4) : 0.0907 : ·11.408 -1.578 (I) : ·0.942 (2) : 1.010' 
sav -2.367 (I) ; ·2.367 (I) ! 0.112 1 -20.622·· 2.257···(1):'257·"(1) ! 0.138 
France inv -2.617(1) ; -1.032 (5) ; 0.252' ; -5.890 -1.537 (I) ; ·0.978 (2) ; 0.992' 
SQV -1.073 (I) ; -1.073 (I) : 0.342· ; -4.720 -0.136(1) ; -0.136(1) ; 0.930' 
Gennany inv -2.005 (I) ; -1.591 (2) ! 0.126·" ; -8.541 -1.536 (I) ; -0.890 (4) ; 0.201 
SQV -2.698 (2) : -1.813 (I) : 0.0918 : -12.379 -1.638(1) : ·1.638(1) : 0.121 
Greece inv -2.762 (I) ; -2.762 (I) : 0.210·· ; -10.887 2.500·· (I) ~2.500" (1): 0.930· 
SQV -1.496 (I) ; ·1.110(2) : 0.207" ; -11.706 -0.691 (I) ; -0.776 (3) ; 0.772' 
Ireland inv 3.382" (9) ; -1.481 (4) : 0.167·· ; -5.869 -2.111(1); ·1.388(4) 0.308 
SQV -1.598 (I) ; -1.598 (I) ; 0.338' ; -6.243 -1.665 (I) ; -1.665 (I) 0.462··· 
Italy inv -1.422 (I) ; -1.422(1) ! 0.292- ! -7.172 ·0.705(1) ; -0.705(1) 1.520' 
sav -1.953 (I) : ·1.953 (I) : 0.208" : -6.750 -0.753 (I) : -0.753 (I) 1.730' 
Netherlands inv -2.511 (I) : -1.584 (4) : 0.15·· : ·9.860 -0.387 (4) ; -0.387 (4) 0.282 
SQV -2.624(1) ; -1.890 (4) : 0.165"'· ; -11.426 -2.687' (I) f2.08'''( 4) 0.523·· 
Portugal inv 3.773' (1) ; ·1.344 (6): 0.0809 : ·15.350 -2.674' (1); -0.908 (6) 1.03' 
sav ·1.911 (I) ; -0.574 (5) ! 0.305- ; -7.935 -1.844 (I) ; ·1.286 (2) 0.251 
Spain inv -1.232 (I) : ·1.232 (I) : 0.381' : -2.265 -1.223 (I) ; -1.223 (I) 0.382·" 
SQV -1.774 (I) : -1.774 (I) : 0.117 : -16.001 0.191 (I) : 0.191 (I) 1.630' 
Sweden inv 3.269'''(1) f3.269'''(I); 0.1 07 : -9.270 -2.686' (I) f2.113"'(2X 0.529" 
SQV -2.591 (I) ; ·2.591 (I) ! 0.121··· : -17.422·" -1.681 (I) ; -1.681 (I) i 0.815' 
United inv 3.673" (1) ;3.673" (I) ; 0.0922 ; -13.056 3.485"(1); -1.206(7) ; 0.0917 
Kingdom 
SQV 3.635" (I) ;1.104 (7) ! 0.116 : ·12.958 -3.110'(1); ·1.119(7) ; 0.160 
Notes. 1nl' and sav stand forpnvate lOvestment and pnvate savmgs, respectively, as shares ofGDP . 
• , •• and ••• denote rejection of the null at 1 %, 5% and 10%. In DGFLS, the 5% and 10% 
critical values are from Cheung and Lai (1995), while the 1% critical values are interpolated from the 
ones presented by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). In KPSS, the critical values are taken from 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). In PPERRON, the critical values are linearly interpolated from the ones in 
Fuller (1976). 
(I) Both tests with and without a trend include a constant tenn. 
(2) Lag order selected according to the minimum Schwarz information criterion 
(3) Lag order selected according to the minimum Ng-Perron (2001) modified Akaike information 
criterion. 
(4) Same tag order used as detennined by either the modified Akaike information criterion if lag 
at most 3 there, or if otherwise: by the minimum Schwarz information criterion from the DFGLS test. In 
PPERRON, that is set to correspond to Newey-West truncation lags window used in calculating the 
standard error (Le. correction for serial correlation of up to that lag order). 3 lags in the cases of private 
investment (levels, trend) for Ireland and again private investment (Jevels, no trend) for the Netherlands. 
(S) The rho statistic in the PPERRON test, Ho: rho = 1. 
(6) The brackets report the number oflags selected for each test statistic. 
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PPERRO 
NI",!!) 
-10.993·" 
-12.236··· 
-7.715 
-5.747 
·8.581 
-9.122 
-3.872 
·20.438' 
-3.678 
·3.693 
·7.748 
.13.024" 
·7.429 
-1.851 
-4.994 
-5.865 
-3.273 
·1.560 
-10.122 
-9.174 
, -7.242 
·8.911 
·2.862 
-1.676 
·7.530 
-11.525"· 
-13.107" 
-12.789··· 
Table 5.6. Unit rootlstationarity tests: private investment and private savings. (first 
differences 
Tests with trend") Tests without trendU) 
Country Series DFGLS : DFGLS KPSS(4) : PPERRON DFGLS : DFGLS (3.6) : KPSS(4) : PPERRO 
u.~ : (3,6) : (4,5) (2.6) : : : N,4,s) 
Austria t1inv .4.011'(1): ·2.019(3) 0.0652 : ~31.497· ·1.486 (2) : ·0.685 (8) : 0.0596 : ·32.844' 
Llsav ·4.845' (I): -4.845' (I) 0.0334 1 -40.572* ·3.817' (1): ·0.036 (8) ! 0.200 : ·39.303· 
Belgium Ainv ·2.637(1) : .2.637(1) 0.0579 ; -23.037" ·2.019 (I) : ·0.336 (9) : 0.173 : ·22.336· 
Llsav ·1.634 (2) : ·1.201 (4) 0.131"''' : -41.682· ·1.239 (2) : ·0.792 (4) : 0.129 : -41.733· 
Denmark Ainv 4.316' (I): -4.316' (I) 0.0449 : -27.909· .3.970'(1): ·3.970'(1) : 0.147 : ·27.306' 
.:1sav 3.198"'(1):·3.198"'(1) 0.0408 : ·30.491' 2.151"'(1): ·0.225 (9) : 0.0777 : ·30.424' 
Finland Llinv 3.299'''(1);3.299'''(1). 0.0662 : -20.983" ·2.997' (1): ·1.125 (7) : 0.0664 : ·21.065' 
.dsav 4.633' (I): -4.633' (I) : 0.0301 : -40.385' -4.600' (I): .4.600' (I) : 0.0374 : ·40.319' 
France Llinv 3.292'''(1): .Q.850(8) : 0.0698 : -21.617" ·2.803' (I): ·0.768 (8) : 0.156 : ·20.976' 
.dsav 3.285'''(1): ·1.677(4) : 0.103 ! -38.783* ·3.314'(1): ·1.738(4) : 0.168 : ·38509' 
Germany i1inv ·3.776' (1): ·2.568 (2) ! 0.0836 : -20.500" ·3.108' (I): .Q.735 (7) ! 0.091 i -21.747· 
Llsav ·2.830(1) : .2.830(1) : 0.0592 : -40.937' 2.289'''(1): ·0.367 (7) : 0.137 : ·39.893' 
Greece Llinv 3.145"'(1): .Q.951 (9) : 0.057 : ·29519' ·2.823' (1): ·0.887 (9) : 0.0779 : ·29.601' 
Llsav 4.048' (1): ·1.772 (3) : 0.0808 : -27.889· ·1.335 (2) : ·1.100 (3) 10.212 : -26.857· 
Ireland L1inv 3.561" (3): ·0.861 (8) : 0.077 : ·28.842' ·2.124 (I) : ·0.766 (8) : 0.165 : ·26.418' 
Llsav ·3.944' (I): ·1.408 (4) : 0.096 : -45.484' ·3.931'(1): ·1.358(4) : 0.102 : -45.482· 
Italy i1inv ·4.007' (I): -4.007' (I): 0.0636 : ·32.432' ·3.645' (I): ·0.659 (9) : 0.123 : -32.001· 
Llsav 3.697" (I): .().784 (9) : 0.124··· : -34.357· ·3.627' (1): ·0.752 (9) i 0.142 ! -34.295· 
Netherlands Ainv ·3.932' (3): ·2.323 (I) : 0.0952 : -23.394" ·4.054' (3);2.274"'(1) : 0.129 : ·22.975' 
Llsav 3512"(1): ·1.060(8) ! 0.0763 : -42.641· .3.421'(1): ·1.032(8) : 0.0797 : -42.634' 
Portugal Ainv 3.697" (I): ·0.881 (9) : 0.0503 : -22.517·· ·3.118' (I): .Q.283 (8) : 0.0732 : ·22.352' 
Llsav -4.130' (I): -4.130' (I) : 0.037 : ·24.269' ·4.027' (I)i ·1.344 (7) : 0.133 : -23.317· 
Spain Lfinv 3561" (I): ·3561" (I~ 0.0519 ] -26.354· ·1.501 (I) : .Q529 (4) ! 0.422···! -24.068· 
Llsav 3.077'"(1);3.077''' (I): 0.0446 : ·45.425' 2.391'''(1): ·0.968 (7) : 0.0818 
Sweden Lfinv 3.159'''(1 ),3.159'" (I): 0.064 : -19.126·· .3.153'(1): ·3.153'(1) : 0.0641 
Llsav ·5.236' (I): ·3.892' (2) : 0.0423 : -43567' .5.151'(1): ·3.807'(2) : 0.0478 
United Lfinv 3.768" (I): ·3.768" (I! 0.0414 : -23.347·· ·3.682' (I): ·3.682' (I) : 0.0509 
Kingdom Lfsav 3516" (I)! ·3.516" (I" 0.0472 : -23.294" ·3.318'(1): ·0.683(9) : 0.115 
Notes: Lfmv and odsav stand for the fIrst differences of pnvate mvestment and pnvate savmgs. 
respectively. as shares ofGDP . 
•• .. and ••• denote rejection of the null at 1%, 5% and 10%. In DGFLS, the 5% and 10% 
critical values are from Cheung and Lai (1995). while the 1% critical values are interpolated from the 
ones presented by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). In KPSS, the critical values are taken from 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). In PPERRON, the critical values are linearly interpolated from the ones in 
Fuller (1976). 
(I) Both tests with and without a trend include a constant tenn. 
(2) Lag order selected according to the minimum Schwarz infonnation criterion 
(l) Log order selected according to the minimum Ng·Perron (2001) modified Akaike information 
criterion. 
(4) Same lag order used as detennined by either the modified Akaike infonnation criterion if lag 
at most 3 there. or if otherwise: by the minimum Schwarz infonnation criterion from the DFGLS test. In 
PPERRON, that is set to correspond to Newey-West truncation lags window used in calculating the 
standard error (i.e. correction for serial corre1ation of up to that lag order). 3 lags in the cases of private 
investment (levels, trend) for lreland and again private investment (levels, no trend) for the Netherlands. 
IS) The rho statistic in the PPERRON test, Ho: rho = 1. 
(6) The brackets report the number of lags selected for each test statistic. 
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: .45.203' 
: -19.152· 
: -43531' 
: -23.295· 
: -22.642· 
Empirical results: cointegration 
Compliance with the open-economy sustainability model should be checked against the 
complexity of results from the unit root and stationarity tests above and the 
cointegration analysis below. Now the overall sustainability perspective is applied for a 
first time on 'old' Europe's private sector data. As in Chapter Three, the research 
strategy is to explore not only if the data support sustainability but when that 
sustainability has been achieved, if at all, over the period since 1970. 
Open-economy sustainability will be confirmed if private savings and private 
investment are cointegrated with a vector (I, -I). This implies that the estimated 
coefficient on the private investment series must equal I in the savings-investment 
cointegrating regression where private savings are the dependent variable. It is also 
worth reminding the 'weak' fiscal sustainability conditions following Quintos (1995) 
which, if transposed to the open-economy sustainability model, generate two further 
opportunities. First, private savings and private investment may not necessarily be 
cointegrated as long as the coefficient on the investment series lies between 0 and I. 
Second, in the case when the two series are not cointegrated the coefficient on private 
investment in the regression needs to equal I. However, as discussed these weaker 
conditions are sub-optimal in that the country may find it increasingly difficult to 
service the excess of foreign over government debt (or vice versa). Analogously, in 
Table 2.A.l the results conforming to Quintos's (1995) weak-form sustainability 
conditions are documented as a lack of sustain ability. 
Table 5.7 presents the first cointegration results about the private savings and 
investment, following the specifications and the arguments behind them from Chapter 
Three. 
The cointegrating coefficient on the investment series (jJ) is statistically significant and 
positive but below I in Austria, rejecting the unit root in the cointegrating vector, and in 
France, without rejecting the non-stationarity of the vector. These two countries 
therefore possibly comply with the weaker sustainability criterion. Greece satisfies 
another weak-form definition: the coefficient on the regressor is not statistically 
different from unity but there is no savings-investment cointegration. 
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----------------......... 
The fmdings in Table 5.7 reject overall sustainability in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Spain, where the estimated slope coefficients are statistically insignificant, and in 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom, where 
. the same coefficients lie outside the (0, I) interval. 
Ireland is the only country in 'old' Europe which appears to satisty the economy-wide 
intertemporal solvency constraint: private savings and investment are cointegrated with 
a unitary cointegrating parameter. Since the two series do not drift apart, the Irish 
policies may continue unchanged into the future with no remaining terminal debt and 
the long-run open-economy constraint will be observed. 
Thus in almost the whole of 'old' Europe overall sustainability, encompassing the 
budget and the external positions, has not been achieved over the entire observed 
period. Furthermore, compared to the results in Table 3.4 the new evidence may yield 
policy implications hinting at the role played by the private sectors in the countries 
under consideration. Despite their weak-form fiscal sustainability, most economies now 
fail to display any open-economy sustainability. It is only the weak-form fiscal 
sustainability of Ireland which turns into strong-form macroeconomic sustainability 
constraining intertemporally the budget and the current account. That suggests that the 
private sector there from 1970 until 2006 played a stabilising role to offset a possibly 
unsustainable fiscal performance by the government. On the contrary, for the rest of 
'old' Europe the results reveal the need for future changes in the behaviour of the 
private sector in order to attain the overall solvency, given that the governments failed 
the strong-form fiscal sustainability definition in Chapter Three. As in the 'statistical 
tests' strand of fiscal sustainability literature, however, the concrete policy measures 
required ex ante are hard to advise. 
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equation: 
~~f:1.:.."'_":PIIYJ1±§L._ :0.074 -"':-;0"".2;:;3"0--::-0.330---'-0:225 : 0.058--:-c0"'.2""6~3--:-:0"'.0"'973--: :0':011"" : -0.209 : 0.206 : 0.349 : 0.223 -c:-;;-:=--:-:;=,--I 
_________ n ____ ~,034) .. : (0.022)* :_(Q.Q2§)~_~ (0,0!4)*_: (0.015)* : (0.025)* :.JQ&I~)~ __ ~ (O,O~6) _ : (0.026)* : (0.053)* :_(Q,Q?2)~_I (O,O~5)*_ ;...: """:",:2'--''''';c2"-1 
INV : 0.646 : 0.093 : -0.827 :-0.140 : 0.693 :·0.287 : 0.741 : 1.015 : 2.141 : 0.186 : ·0.654 : ·0.123 : 
I-:;'o,'c,~ __ . ____ . ____ : (0.174)* : (0.123) :.<Q.~4?)~_~(0:Q6?)~*·: (0.088)* :(0.\38)** : (O.l_5.2)~i (0,115)*_ jo.l32)' : (0.294) : (o.~m~_i (0,1~3) _ ;...: ~~.-'7.'-;S:"-I 
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Sustainability inference 
Notes: 
I DOLS order auto correlation correction . 
• , •• and··· denote significance at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
SA V and INV stand for private savings and private investment, respectively, as shares ofGDP. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey.Fuller test (lag order selected using the minimum Schwarz information criterion; cointegration test critical values from MacKinnon, 
1991, Table I). 
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0.16 
0.76 
: 0.64 
0.51 
Figures 5.2-5.15 contribute to understand in more depth 'old' Europe's overall 
sustainability from a historical perspective. The figures can illustrate how sustainability 
in an open-economy context changes over time and thus demonstrate any convergence, 
i.e. the more precise timing of sustainability. The recursive estimation of the slope 
coefficients should help detect any MaastrichtlSGP effects. The technical details 
correspond to those explained about Figures 3.10-3.23 in Chapter Three. 
The recursive cointegration results overwhelmingly confirm no sustainability across the 
time periods. The estimated 95% confidence band for the coefficient in Austria (Figure 
5.2) varies between 0 and I, hence suggesting weak-form open-economy sustainability, 
only after 2000. Evidence in favour of weak-form sustainability is also provided by the 
recursions in France (Figure 5.6) after 1994 and Greece (Figure 5.8) between 1996 and 
1999. In the rest of the countries the 95% confidence bands, or parts of them, always lie 
below 0 or above I, therefore signifying absence of sustainability. The point estimate of 
the coefficient in Ireland (Figure 5.9) is stable around unity since the end of the 1980s, 
thus supporting the strong-form sustainability hypothesis, but its 95% confidence band 
leaves the (0, I) interval required under at least the weak-form definition. 
Not only is the prevailing recursive evidence against open-economy sustainability, but 
Figures 5.2-5.15 show scant support for any convergence towards it since 1985. Perhaps 
only Greece and Ireland show gradual improvement, without necessarily achieving 
long-run sustainability, with their coefficients rising to approach unity. 
A positive Maastricht effect, that is a jump or at least stabilisation in the coefficients in 
or right after 1992, without automatically resulting in sustainability, might be inferred 
only about Denmark (Figure 5.4), Italy (Figure 5.\0) and Spain (Figure 5.13). The rest 
of 'old' Europe exhibits either no visible Maastricht regime change or even a slightly 
negative effect as in Finland (Figure 5.5), France and Germany (Figure 5.7). 
In summary, the recursive analysis broadly confirms the pessimistic cointegration 
evidence from Table 5.7, but this time for the time horizon since 1985. If compared to 
Figures 3.1 0-3.23, it uncovers deterioration from the widespread weak-form fiscal 
sustainability of Chapter Three to the persistent lack of sustainability in terms of the 
overall intertemporal solvency constraint. 
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Figure 5.2. Austria: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
o 
. 
--Cointegrating parameter 
-
(private investment/GOP) 
, 
, 
..... ,95% confidence band 
. 
• . 
. 
-
"'-
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. # .............. , 
.. . . . 
. 
-
""'-..... 
---
, 
, ........... 
. 
, 
. . .................. 
.. .............. , 
. 
. .. .................................. 
. . 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20052006 
Figure 5.3. Belgium: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.4. Denmark: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.5. Finland: convergence in open-economy sustainabiIity 
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Figure 5.6. France: convergence in open-economy sustainabiIity 
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Figure 5.7. Germany: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.8. Greece: convergence in open·economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.9. Ireland: convergence in open·economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.10. Italy: convergence in open·economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.11. Netherlands: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.12. Portugal: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.13. Spain: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.14. Sweden: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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Figure 5.15. United Kingdom: convergence in open-economy sustainability 
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The hypothesis of practically non-existent Maastricht effect, as seen from the 
recursions, is further explored through the estimation of the total multiplier of 
Maastricht effect. Following the method introduced in Chapter Three, the model is 
augmented with overall slope dummies for the whole period after 1992 (Table 5.8). 
The total multiplier associated with Maastricht is significantly positive, but with 
estimated values not suggesting substantial regime changes, in Denmark, France and the 
Netherlands. The slope dummy is statistically insignificant in Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland and Sweden, which implies no Maastricht effect there. It is 
significantly negative in the cases of Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK, 
meaning that Maastricht may have even spurred policy deterioration leading to the 
violation of the overall sustainability criterion. Certainly it may be reasoned that the 
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Maastricht Treaty targeted fiscal rather than external or overall sustainability; hence it 
could be less surprising that little or no Maastricht effect is detected according to the 
total multiplier results in Table 5.8. 
The estimated overall slope (fJ + rp) rules out any macroeconomic sustainability because 
it is either statistically insignificant (in Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands) or 
outside the (0, I) range (in Denmark, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK). Insofar as Quintos's (1995) conditions can be transposed about the long-run 
sustainability incorporating the budget and the current account, weak-form 
sustainability is implied by Austria's overall slope, which is significantly positive but 
smaller than I. Also France and Ireland turn out to be weak-form sustainable: their 
overall slopes are not statistically different from I but their private savings and 
investment do not cointegrate. 
If explicitly modelling the Maastricht break, the evidence supports the economy-wide 
sustainability hypothesis only in Italy. There, the estimated overall slope is not 
statistically different from unity at the 10% significance level and the unit root in the 
cointegrating regression is rejected. 
Compared to Table 5.7, the results in Table 5.8 become more pessimistic in Ireland and 
Greece but the prevailing evidence against open-economy sustainability in the EU 14 is 
confirmed unchanged. Italy's outcome is noteworthy: the model with an exogenously 
selected break in 1992 favours the sustainability hypothesis, unlike the no-break results 
from Table 5.7. In comparison to Chapter Three where the total multiplier associated 
with Maastricht was considered, most countries lapse from weak-form fiscal into no 
macroeconomic sustainability. Again only Italy seems to have achieved the overall 
sustainability despite the weak-form result if analysing just the fiscal dimension. It may 
be argued that perhaps the private sector in that country has begun to save more; that 
calls for deeper research into the particular Italian experience. 
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Table 5.8. Cointegration analysis with a break (private savings and private investment) 
ro~y :~:D~: n ffi:OO ~: ill IT ~:n g: u:® 
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• , •• and *** denote significance at the 10/0, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
SA V and INV stand for private savings and private investment, respectively, as shares ofGDP. 
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Iag order selected using the minimum Schwarz information criterion; cointegration test critical values from MacKinnon, 
1991, Table I). 
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So the general conclusion from 'old' Europe is that the data very rarely support the 
open-economy overall sustainability definition: both across countries and along the time 
dimension for each country. For a first time subjected to an analysis of the economy-
wide budget constraint, most of the Western European economies seem to be on paths 
which are not sustainable. This suggests that previous literature, which focussed more 
narrowly either on fiscal or external sustainability rather than overall sustainability, may 
need reconsideration, as it may have provided a misleading and possibly overoptimistic 
assessment of sustainability in these economies. 
5.3. Open-economy sustainabiIity in EU accession countries: a panel 
(co )integration perspective 
I turn next to the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe: has the dual 
pressure of transition and EU accession led to overall sustainability there? The data 
from Central and Eastern Europe are presented first, followed by the first empirical 
application of the open-economy sustainability model for accession Europe. 
Data 
Accession Europe's private savings and private investment data are mostly from the 
AMECO database. The transformations and codes are as explained in the data section 
about 'old' Europe above. The series are annual, scaled to GDP and not seasonally 
adjusted. Table 5.9 describes the sources and adjustments. 
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'" The have' 
reflected in the 2006 ratio. 
gross 
gross fixed capital formation for the tota1 economy (from AMECO) and general 
government fixed investment (the latter taken from OEeD's Economic Outlook 
sector gross 
gross fixed capital formation for the tota1 economy (from AMECO) and for the 
general government (current prices, source: Statistica1 Office of the Republic of 
Slovenia). The Slovenian data are fixed to the Euro at the country's irrevocable 
Euro 
a new budget the 2006 budget and that' 
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Empirical results: panel unit roots/stationarity 
Because of the short time series from the accession countries, for the reasons and 
motivation presented in Chapter Four the panel approaches to (co )integration remain the 
only plausible research methods here. The empirical strategy shadows the previous 
chapter, all efforts being made to mitigate possible small-size power and size distortions 
as well as to extract as much individual country inference as a panel analysis allows. As 
previously discussed, the countries in the region have much in common to allow for a 
group-wise analysis. But it is not less true that the countries also differ, hence the 
analysis should benefit from the recent advances in the panel cointegration literature for 
testing and estimation of heterogeneous panels. 
As motivated in the previous chapter, the panel unit root test ofBreitung (2000) and the 
panel stationarity test of Hadri (2000), with two trend specifications each, were 
employed to analyse accession Europe's open-economy sustainability. The evidence on 
orders of integration of the panel time series in levels and in first differences is 
presented in Tables 5.10-5.13. 
Table 5 10 Panel unit rootlstationarity results· private savings (levels) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual intercepts -0.310 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept '().849 
Hadri (H) individual intercepts 4.126· 
Ho: StationatityJ90mmon unit root orocess) individual trend & intercept 6.578' 
, Notes. * denotes rejection of the null at 1 Yo. The modified Akaike mfonnatton cntenon IS used for 
automatically selecting the tag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short sample). 
The tests assume asymptotic nonnality. In the H test, the heteroscedastic consistent Z~statistic is used. 
Table 5 11 Panel unit rootlstationarity results· private investment (levels) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual intercepts ~1.431""· 
Hfl: Unit root (common unit root nrocess) individual trend & intercept 0.979 
Hadri (H) individual interceots 5.386· 
Ho: Stationaritv (common unit root nrocess) individual trend & intercept 5.089' 
Notes: • and ••• denote reJectlOn of the null at 1% and 10%. The modified Akalke mfonnahon cntenon 
is used for automatically selecting the tag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view oftbe short 
sample). The tests assume asymptotic nonnality. In the H test, the heteroscedastic consistent Z-statistic is 
used. 
The private savings and investment panels overwhelmingly support a unit root 
hypothesis for the levels data. The Breitung test, being among the best performing panel 
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unit root tests in small samples as noted in Chapter Four, cannot reject the null in the 
investment series without trend at the 1 % or 5% significance levels. So the analysis 
proceeds to checking the first-differenced panel series (Tables 5.12 and 5.13). 
Table 5 12 Panel unit rootlstationarity results' private savings (first differences) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual intercepts .3.188· 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept -4.229· 
Hadri (H) individua1 intercepts 1.960" 
Ho: Stationarity (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept 10.008' 
Notes:· and "'* denote rejection of the null at 1% and 5%. The modified Akalke mfonnatlOn cntenon 18 
used for automatically selecting the tag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short 
sample), The tests assume asymptotic nonnality, In the H test, the heteroscedastic consistent Z-statistic is 
used. 
Table 5 13 Panel unit rootlstationarity results' private investment (first differences) 
Test Exogenous variables Test statistic 
Breitung (B) individual intercepts -2.610· 
Ho: Unit root (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept -3.664' 
Hadri (H) . individual intercepts 0.692 
Ho: Stationatity (common unit root process) individual trend & intercept 5.587' 
0 Notes: * denotes rejectIon of the null at 1 Yo. The modified Akatke mformatIon cntenon IS used for 
automatically selecting the lag numbers in the B tests (preset from 0 to 1, in view of the short sample). 
The tests assume asymptotic normality. In the H test, the heteroscedastic consistent Z·statistic is used. 
As discussed in Chapter Four about the test size and power distortions, not all results 
from Tables 5.12 and 5.13 may be given equal weight based on the reported test 
statistics. Remembering the high tendency of the Hadri (2000) test to commit Type I 
errors according to Hlouskova and Wagner's (2006) findings, the preference here goes 
for the Breitung test. 
Therefore, since the prevailing evidence is that the panels of private savings and private 
investment are 1(1), the analysis moves on to the panel cointegration tests. As the open-
economy sustainabiIity model requires, the series should be cointegrated with a vector 
(1, -I), i.e. with a unitary parameter estimate on the private investment in a 
cointegration regression where savings are the dependent variable. If they are not, and 
because as seen the two series are hardly 1(0), the panel of accession countries' data will 
not support the hypothesis of compliance with the overall long-run solvency constraint. 
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Empirical results: panel cointegration tests 
The popular panel cointegration tests by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004), 
introduced in the previous chapter, are now employed first. The following panel 
regression model is considered in the empirical analysis of open-economy sustainability 
of accession Europe: 
(5.15) SAV" = a l + fJ,INV" + ell 
where SA V and INV stand for private savings and private investment, respectively, as 
ratios to GDP, a, are the individual intercepts, Pi are individual slopes <PI = pin Kao's 
test), i denotes the unit (country) and t denotes the time (year) dimension. 
Neither the Kao nor the Pedroni results presented in Table 5.14 are able to reject the 
null of no panel cointegration. Accession Europe will disclose economy-wide 
sustainability in Quintos's (1995) weak-form version at most, only if one of two further 
conditions is satisfied: if the slopes in the panel regression of (5.15) are estimated to 
equal I or to be positive but less than I. 
Table 5 14 Panel cointegration (all twelve countries) Kao and Pedroni tests , 
Test Test type Test statistic 
Kao residual cointegration, 
homogeneous coefficients (fit = P across sections); Augmented Dickey-Fuller test -0.356 
Ho: No cointegration 
Pedroni residual cointegration; Panel v-statistic test 1.052 
Ho: No cointegration 
Panel rho-statistic test HI: Cointegration, homogeneous alternative of common 0.136 
autoregressive coefficients (the 'within' dimension) Panel PP-statistic test 0.257 
Panel ADP-statistic test 1.013 
Pedroni residual cointegration; Group rho-statistic test 1.382 
Ho: No cointegration 
HI: Cointegration, heterogeneous alternative of individual Group PP-statistic test 0.544 
autoregressive coefficients (the 'between' dimension) Group ADF-statistic test 0.174 
Notes: One tag of the change m reslduals IS used In the second-stage augmented regressIOns, In view of 
the short sample. The long-run variances are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) kernel estimator 
with a lag truncation equal to 4 .I.... as suggested in Pedroni (1995). ( )'" lOO 
Before embarking on the panel regression estimation however, the analysis delves one 
step deeper into extracting some individual country inference. As discussed, such an 
exercise is inherently difficult in a panel context when the individual series are too 
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short. Being unable to assess each country separately, an alternative strategy is proposed 
as in Chapter Four: to construct sub-samples, taking one country out at a time, and 
compare the results with the full-sample evidence from Table 5.14. Table 5.15 presents 
the corresponding test statistics. 
The comparison of results between Tables 5.14 and 5.15 indicates that no individual 
country seems to have stood out, i.e. to 'distort' the inference when included in the full 
panel. But such a categorical conclusion cannot be verified econometrically because of 
insufficient country observations for an individual analysis: rather, it illustrates this '12 
minus I' alternative research route. 
The panel cointegration evidence will be incomplete if one of the strongest assumptions 
behind the Kao and Pedroni tests, that of cross-sectional independence, is not relaxed. 
This issue was discussed in more detail in the previous chapter. For robustness again, 
the recent sieve bootstrap panel cointegration test by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) is 
applied. 
The 'second generation' panel cointegration test of Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) 
complements the inference so far and provides another empirical benchmark for future 
open-economy sustainability research, in the panel cointegration domain. As underlined 
previously, the WoE test has an alternative null of cointegration which could prove to be 
particularly insightful: if not rejected, at least one country in the panel must have 
observed the economy-wide long-run sustainability criterion. 
The test is general enough to 'accommodate correlation both within and between the 
individual cross-sectional units' (ibid., p. 189) and is demonstrated to perform well in 
small samples. The panel cointegration test statistic is checked at the conventional 
critical levels from a one-tailed distribution bootstrapped after 2,000 replications from 
the sample counterpart. The bootstrapping of the critical values follows the strategy 
explained in Chapter Four for generating Table 4.12 and Figure 4.1. The bootstrapped 
critical values based on the panel of private savings and private investment data from 
accession Europe are presented in Table 5.16. Figure 5.16 displays the kernel density 
estimate of the bootstrap distribution of the test statistic. 
195 
Table 5.15. Panel cointegration (eleven countries), Kao and Pedroni tests 
Test statistic, full panel without: 
Test Test type : BG CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL RO SK SI 
Kao : : : : 
residual cointegration, Augmented : : : 
homogeneous coefficients Dickey·Fuller -1.135 : ~.I%: -0.253 : .0.280 : -0.341 : -0.881 : ...0.278 : ·O.HI: ...0.016; -0.456 : ·0.143 : ·0.189 
(fJ/ = P across sections); test 
H : No cointegmtion : : 
Pedroni Panel v-statistic 1.230 : 1.006 : 1.029: 1.045 : 0.972: 0.733 : 0.960 : 1.086 : 0.963 : 1.137 : 0.965 : 0.944 
residual cointegration; test : 
Ho: No cointegration Panel rho-statistic: 
-0.542 : 0.148 : 0.146 : 0.175 : 0.158 : 0.217 : 0.174 : 0.235 : 0.201 : 0.045 : 0.431 : 0.143 HI: Cointegration, test : 
homogeneous alternative of Panel PP-statistic 
·0.628 : 0.271 ; 0.254 : 0.269 : 0.2%: 0.052 : 0.324 : 0.476 : 0.439 : 0.146: 0.720 : 0.263 common autoregressive test 
coefficients (the 'within' Panel ADF-
0.326 : 0.988 : 1.073 : 1.061 : 0.981 : -0.187 : 1.153 : 1.426 : 1.149 : 1.009 : 1.257 : 1.099 dimension) statistic test 
Pedroni Group rho- 0.978 : 1.434 : 1.313 : 1.316 : 1.443 : 1.306 : 1.401 : 1.384 : 1.336 : 1.204 : 1.426 : 1.337 
residua1 cointegration; statistic test 
Ho: No cointegration Group pp-
·0.211 : 0.686 : 0.452 ; 0.454 : 0.805 : 0.383 : 0.708 : 0.774 : 0.668 : 0.308 : 0.7Il : 0.514 HI: Cointegration, statistic test 
heterogeneous alternative of , , , , , 
individual autoregressive GroupADF-
-0538 : 0.156 ! 0.256 i 0.039 l 0.055 l -0.361 ; 0.497 ! 0.301 l , 0.161 : coefficients (the 'between~ statistic test 0.630 : 0.022 ! 0.785 
dimension) 
, , 
Notes: One lag of the change 10 reslduals IS used ID the second-stage augmented regressions, ID view of the short sample. The long-run vanances are calculated usmg 
the Newey-West (1987) kernel estimator with a lag truncation equal to 4.I... as suggested in Pedroni (1995). ( )
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Table 5.16. Accession countries open-economy sustainability bootstrapped critical 
values, W-E test 
Test 
Westerlund and 
Edgerton (2007) 
Exogenous 
variables 
individual intercepts. 
no deterministic trend 
99% 95% 90% 
0,328 0.338 0,364 
Figure 5.16. Accession countries open-economy sustainability bootstrap distribution, 
W-E test statistic 
.36 .38 
" 
,42 
W·E 2000 test atlllia\lc 
Then in Table 5.17 the test statistic obtained from the original sample is compared with 
the bootstrapped critical values. 
Table 5.17. Panel cointegration, W-E test 
Test Exo enODS variables Test e Test statistic 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2007); individual intercepts, 
H : Cointe tion no deterministic trend Sieve bootstrap 0,242' 
Notes: • denotes rejection of the null at the one-tailed 1 % bootstrapped critical value. 
The group-mean FMOLS proposed by Pedroni (2000, 2001) used for estimating regression 
coefficients. The long-run variances are calculated using the Newey-West (1987) kernel estimator with a 
lag truncation equal to .I.... as suggested in Pedroni (1995). { )'" lOO 
And the strong rejection of the panel cointegration null, now that the assumption of 
cross-sectional independence is taken away, confirms the evidence from Table 5.14 
above. The accession countries most probably have not achieved open-economy 
sustainability if looking at the data from the past twelve years. Such a conclusion is 
unsurprising when compared to the intuition suggested initially by the seemingly large 
and varied macroeconomic imbalances illustrated by Table 5.2. Considering also the 
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pessimistic evidence from 'old' Europe above, the whole evidence points to a pan-
European absence of open-economy overall sustainability. 
Still having the option open for Quintos's (1995) weak-form sustainability, however, an 
estimation of the panel regression is needed before reaching the final verdict. That 
estimation is performed next. 
Empirical results: the panel regression estimation 
The bivariate panel regression with private savings the dependent variable and private 
investment the regressor is estimated by the FMOLS and DOLS estimators first 
introduced in Chapter Four. The motivation for choosing these estimators was also 
discussed there. The results from the estimations of the current panel are given in Table 
5.18. 
Table 5.18. Panel regression estimation results 
c try FMOLS T t statisfc DOLS Test statistic DOLS T t st fstic oun es I (K=I) (K=2) es a I 
Panel J 0.307 ·1.467 0.302 ~14.480· -0.567 -20.269' 
Bulgaria 0.278 ·0.603 0.163 -4.927* -0.162 -10.660' 
Cyprus 0.512 -0.074 0.111 ·0.784 -10.149 -14.106* 
Czech Reoublic 0.368 -0.464 0.650 -6.678* 0.647 -9.099* 
Estonia 0.462 -0.283 0.901 -0.403 1.189 2.900* 
Hun@TY 0.732 ·0.061 1.049 0.324 0.924 ·0.617 
Latvia 0.322 -0.639 0.377 ~.9&1· 0.395 -6.751* 
Lithuania -0.406 -0.419 -0.827 -4.051* ·0.853 -4.123* 
Malta 0.565 -0.255 0.947 -0.635 1.110 3.014* 
Poland 0.3 13 -0.482 -0.016 -7.690* 0.067 -8.171* 
Romania 0.315 -0.325 -0.648 -7.793* -1.132 -12.425* 
Slovakia -0.199 -1.209 0.147 ·8.883' 0.241 -9.639' 
Slovenia 0.423 -0.267 0.769 -1.660··· 0.923 -0.538 
• • Notes.· and ••• denote rejection of the null at 1 Yo and lOY<.. Ho. PI 1. K 18 the number of lead 51 lags. 
The test statistics for the estimated parameter on the panel private investment series 
easily reject the unit null in the DOLS but not in the FMOLS specification. Only in the 
one lead/lag DOLS, however, the estimated panel parameter lies between 0 and I, hence 
possibly implying weak-form overall sustainability regardless of whether the panel 
series were cointegrated or not, following Quintos (1995). Most individual country 
parameter estimates in the one lead/Jag DOLS specification also lie between 0 and 1. In 
the two leads/lags DOLS specification, the panel estimate is below 0, whereas half of 
the individual parameter estimates are outside the (0, I) interval, hence suggesting no 
sustainability whatsoever_ As far as the FMOLS results are concerned, the non-rejection 
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of the unit null means that another of Quintos's (1995) weak sustainability conditions 
may be satisfied: that in the absence of cointegration, the parameter estimate on private 
investment in the savings-investment regression must equal I. 
Nevertheless, as discussed before weak-form sustainability even if partly confirmed by 
Table 5.18, may well be regarded as a lack of sustainability. Therefore, despite these 
further panel regression estimation results, the pessimistic inference from the 
cointegration tests above is central to the conclusion that the panel of EU accession 
countries reveals no open-economy sustainability. 
A few further notes help clarify the interpretation of the findings from Table 5.18. 
Whereas the estimators adopted here are flexible enough to yield individual country 
estimates, and these are largely in line with the respective panel ones, due to the short 
series for each country the performance of the individual estimators may be quite 
unsatisfactory. This is of course a reason to focus exclusively on the panel result and 
regard the country results of secondary importance, as perhaps only complementing the 
discussion about Table 5.15 vs. Table 5.14. 
Also, it is instructive to remind that the 'group mean FMOLS has satisfactory size and 
power properties ... for small panels if T is larger than N' (Maeso-Femandez et al., 
2006, p. 507). That condition is not fulfilled here; hence the preference may go for the 
DOLS estimator. As for the latter, the loss of degrees of freedom when K = 2 admittedly 
gives further preference towards the one leadllag specification. All in all however, the 
panel DOLS estimate when K = I almost coincides with the panel FMOLS one. 
One may now surmise the following. If long-run economy-wide sustainability in 
keeping with the intertemporal constraint matters and is taken as a criterion, any 
remaining optimism about Central and Eastern Europe from Chapter Four should 
disperse. At least some countries from the region may have positioned their economies 
on fiscally sustainable paths: but in the open-economy setting, it would appear that 
overall sustainability is not present, and that these countries continue to be subject to 
significant macroeconomic imbalances. The presentiment from Table 5.2 is confirmed. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter underlines the need to extend the traditional theories of fiscal and external 
sustainability to the broader setting of the economy as a whole. It also provides first 
empirical applications based on newly constructed European datasets, to illustrate how 
the research agenda from the previous two chapters should be extended. The testable 
sustainability condition put forward is simple and empirically more accessible in terms 
of data requirements than other related propositions in the literature. 
Emphasising the key role of the private sector according to the open-economy 
sustainability model should not undermine the need for fiscal prudence by the 
authorities. If a terminal excess of foreign over government debt is to be avoided, the 
private sector needs to save continuously more than it invests. But it is equally possible 
to infer from the twin deficit identity that if foreign debt starts to exceed government 
debt, the latter may be allowed to 'catch up', leaving the private sector balance 
unchanged. Whether this will be possible without violating fiscal sustainability, is 
doubtful. But the private sector behaviour itself is not completely independent from the 
fiscal stance, and therefore fiscal policies matter in all scenarios. 
If on the other hand terminal government debt is not to exceed terminal foreign debt, 
fiscal consolidation policies are clearly needed: either so as to avoid a deterioration in 
the twin deficits, or to achieve an improvement in if, - b,), or to intervene if in some 
period government debt 'jumps'. If government debt goes up, the private sector can also 
contribute to restoring the positive difference between foreign debt and government 
debt by either continuously keeping its investment above savings, or by a one-time rise 
in investment, causing a rise in foreign indebtedness. But a higher foreign debt 
offsetting a higher government debt, although satisfYing the mathematics of the twin 
deficit adjustments, may be problematic for purely external sustainability 
considerations. Or, foreign debt may stay unchanged with rising private investment if 
the government investment financed by borrowing abroad is proportionately crowded 
out: in that scenario the government debt may still end up exceeding the external debt. 
Broadly speaking, the fiscal authorities should again watch closely the overall balance. 
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Finally, it should be emphasised that the links between overall macroeconomic 
imbalances (lack of sustainability) and remedial policy measures are as tenuous as are 
the links from fiscal or external non-sustainability to policy. The 'statistical tests' strand 
of the sustainability literature experiences the same limitations in its policy 
implications, irrespective of whether we consider fiscal, external or overall 
sustainability. 
The results from the empirical sections deserve attention on their own but also provide 
the benefit of hindsight for Chapters Three and Four. For 'old' Europe, sustainability 
seems an unrealised goal no matter if the fiscal balance is considered alone or in a 
unified analytical framework with the current account. Neither have Maastricht, the 
SOP or the adoption of the Euro been instrumental in shaping sustainable policies: little 
sustainability in the EU14 countries is confirmed across both 'closed-' and open-
economy specifications. 
For accession Europe, the twelve years of data unveil instability which is judged here 
through the overall sustainability criterion. The more optimistic discussion about the 
accession countries could remind the need for rapid enhancements in technology and 
infrastructure there which has required much faster private investment growth, thus 
skewing the savings-investment balance and as a result violating the open-economy 
sustainability. But the recent times of large private investment may payoff in the future 
and restore that sustainability. Also, the years of structural reforms and general 
economic uncertainties may have lowered savings in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
the new consumer credit access may have dissuaded households from saving: but these 
may also turn out temporary phenomena. So one may hope that with future longer time 
series from a possibly 'more settled' post-accession period, an open-economy 
sustainability analysis will prove more favourable for that group of countries. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
What is laid down, ordered. factual is never enough 10 embrace the whole 
truth: life always spills over the rim of every cup. 
- Boris Pastemak (1890 - 1960) 
The fiscal stance is sustainable if today's government debt outstanding can be repaid 
eventually without any need for the government to change its fiscal policies in the 
indefinite future. According to this definition, the solvency of the Treasury will not be 
jeopardised as long as the current government debt equates to the present value of future 
budget surpluses, or their excess over deficits. Such an intertemporal budget constraint 
may be respected even if in some periods the budget is not balanced; hence the 
government may still run deficits for some time and safely finance them with new debt. 
Series of past fiscal data can be tested statistically for compliance with the constraint. 
Assuming that the same fiscal policies which have generated the historical data will 
continue, the long-run fiscal sustainability is confirmed when the tests prove that the 
intertemporal budget constraint has so far been observed. 
This definition of fiscal sustainability is adopted here and applied to the European 
Union countries. The first aim of the thesis is to research whether fiscal policies in 
Europe have been sustainable: but the overall evidence, across a multitude of empirical 
methods and the diverse economies from both 'old' and accession Europe, is 
pessimistic. Even if solvency is not an urgent concern, changes in the public fmances 
are necessary if there are deviations from the path of long-run sustainability, hence the 
analysis is a timely reminder of the need for fiscal reforms in Europe. The long-run 
fiscal sustainability should not cease to be a priority because fiscal policy changes may 
be difficult to implement. Recently Joaquin Almunia, the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Commissioner, argued that the rising 'pressure on age-related expenditures, and 
consequently on public finance positions, reinforces the need to keep fiscal policies in 
check and maintain a focus on the longer-term sustainability of public finances' (EC, 
2008a). Persistently loose fiscal policies pose a threat to price stability but the adverse 
effects may run the other way round too. As the European Commission acknowledged 
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last summer, 'the current economic juncture with strong inflationary pressures is 
reducing the room for manoeuvre in the conduct of policies' (EC, 2008b). The global 
competitive pressures may necessitate tax cuts in Europe and further impede the fiscal 
consolidations needed for restoring fiscal sustainability. 
To support the achievement of sustainable public finances, the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992 and the SGP in 1997 introduced two numerical fiscal rules in the EU. These rules 
constrain national deficits and debts and apply to all Member States, even though the 
enforcement mechanism is stronger for the EMU members. The first rule allows 
cyclical fluctuations in the budget within a reference value of 3 percent for the ratio of 
planned or actual government deficit to GDP at market prices. The second provision is 
that the gross general government consolidated debt at nominal value should not exceed 
60 percent of GDP at market prices. The MaastrichtlSGP rules reflect an alternative 
view on fiscal sustainability: they limit deficits and debt in the short run instead of 
'waiting' for future budget surpluses to payout accumulated debt and satisfy the 
intertemporal budget constraint in the long run. Whereas such exact numerical fiscal 
rules are easy to monitor and may justify concrete fiscal adjustments, and are therefore 
atrractive for policy purposes, it is intriguing to see if they have brought in long-run 
fiscal sustainability. The existing empirical literature disagrees about how effective 
Maastricht and the SGP have been in bringing public fmances in line with the 
intertemporal constraint. So the second aim of this thesis is to check the hypothesis that 
the fiscal rules in Europe played a role in any particular timing of fiscal sustainability. 
Empirically verifiable in the EU15 group of countries where long fiscal time series 
exist, that hypothesis is not confirmed. The imposition of the fiscal rules in Europe 
cannot be given credit for any fiscal consolidations along the road to the single currency 
to achieve fiscal sustainability in the long run. 
In 2004 and 2007 the European Union enlarged with twelve new members from Central 
and Eastern Europe. The third research question of this thesis is whether, based on the 
accession countries' historical record, fiscal policies in the region can be categorised as 
'sustainable'. Those countries have undergone remarkable fiscal adjustments but even 
after their EU entry fiscal challenges remain. The new members must comply with the 
rules of the SGP and do not have an 'opt out' clause regarding the eventual adoption of 
the Euro. The dual pressures of transition from central planning and accession to the EU 
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have necessitated a thorough makeover of the institutions and changes in the fiscal 
practices; hence that region of Europe provides a unique field for empirical analysis. 
Yet fiscal sustainability studies on the accession countries have been rare, arguably due 
to data limitations resulting from the very short time series available there. This thesis 
fills a sizeable gap in the literature with an application of the formal methods of fiscal 
sustainability assessment to the twelve EU accession countries. An original dataset is 
compiled to cover more countries with longer data series than ever before, and new 
breakthroughs in the econometrics of panel time series, themselves only recently 
employed in the fiscal sustainability area, are exploited. Thus one of the first and 
certainly the most exhaustive fiscal sustainability analysis for accession Europe so far is 
made possible. The panel as a whole turns out. to confirm fiscal sustainability: 
nevertheless, caution is advised because of possible small-sample size and power 
distortions. And the evidence is not robust enough to claim that each country 
individually has been sustainable since the mid-\990s. 
The economy does not consist of a government sector only and therefore fiscal 
sustainability does not guarantee that other imbalances do not occur. A country with 
sustainable public finances may nonetheless run persistent current account deficits, 
accumulate foreign debt and compromise its external solvency. The negative balance in 
the current account may be a result oflooser fiscal policies but the external imbalances 
in turn present an additional source of risk to fiscal sustainability. The government may 
wish to curtail domestic demand to reverse the current account balance but this may 
weaken the fiscal sustainability in the long term. Acknowledging that both fiscal and 
external sustainability should be analysed together and in a unified framework, the 
fourth main aim of this thesis is to bridge the conditions for budget and external 
intertemporal solvency. The existing literature contains practically no models for the 
intertemporal constraining of the economy-wide balance. That has required the 
derivation of an original model which is theoretically sound and not particularly 
demanding in terms of the empirically observable variables. The thesis thus upgrades 
traditional fiscal sustainability studies and, by encompassing both the government sector 
and the external position, essentially yields a framework for testing open-economy 
sustainability in the long-run. The condition for compliance with the overall 
intertemporal constraint turns out to be that private savings and private investment 
move together in the long run. So the sustainability-related government stabilisation 
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policies should take into account the role of the private sector. The first empirical 
application of the model reveals that in almost the whole of , old' Europe economy-wide 
sustainability is not achieved over the last nearly four decades. Maastricht and the Pact 
have not led to transition towards more economy-wide long-run sustainability. When 
the open-economy sustainability assessment is performed on data from the twelve 
accession countries, the empirical results disperse any optimism remaining from the 
previous narrower focus on fiscal sustainability in that region of Europe. 
As the preceding chapters unfold, the thesis addresses these four aims of the research 
agenda. The contents of the thesis sequentially deal with whether 'old' Europe has 
achieved long-run fiscal sustainability, any MaastrichtlSGP effects in that respect, the 
formal fiscal sustainability analysis of accession Europe and the extension to open-
economy sustainability. 
In summary, Chapter Two outlines the foundations of fiscal sustainability analysis and 
prepares the subsequent empirical applications with a context of the theoretical 
literature and a choice of research methods. After presenting the simple arithmetic of 
the intertemporal budget constraint, the chapter sub-divides the literature into two main 
approaches: the 'constrained sustainability' and the 'statistical tests'. The chapter 
reviews some theoretically designed sustainability indicators and legislated practical 
fiscal rules, including the MaastrichtlSGP and the UK budgetary rules. An advantage of 
the 'statistical tests' approach is the more direct targeting of the intertemporal budget 
constraint condition. The statistical tests serve well the research questions of the thesis 
because they enable the research into the power of the European fiscal framework to 
align public finances with the definition of long-run fiscal sustainability. The chapter 
presents Hamilton and Flavin's (1986) framework which is recognised as the genesis of 
the 'statistical tests' approach. Further works which have remained seminal even among 
the most recent empirical studies are then presented before the chapter discusses the 
criticism by Bohn (1991b and 1995) that fiscal sustainability should be studied 
statistically in a stochastic setting. The chapter puts forward arguments for the 
continued empirical application of the stationarity and cointegration conditions for 
fiscal sustainability, in spite of the recent critique of Bohn (2007) who challenges the 
necessity of these conditions. A special section in the chapter finally outlines another 
literature trend: the nonlinear fiscal adjustments. 
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The hypothetical gradual convergence towards or away from fiscal sustainability is the 
main subject of Chapter Three. The empirical applications in it address the two 
sequential research questions: have the EU 15 countries achieved long-run fiscal 
sustainability, and if so have they become more sustainable due to Maastricht and the 
SGP. The thesis favours the following testable fiscal sustainability criterion: 
cointegration between total revenues and total expenditures, along with unitary 
cointegrating parameter on the latter. This criterion remains necessary and sufficient 
even in a stochastic environment and it accommodates the proposed research strategy. 
The assessment of the evolution in sustainability utilises a few complementary 
approaches: cointegration regressions, recursive estimations of the slope parameters, 
and tests for Maastricht regime shifts. The study is based on annual general government 
series of total revenues and total expenditures, as shares of GDP, from fourteen 'old' 
Europe countries between 1970 and 2006. The comprehensive statistical assessment of 
the fiscal performance of 'old' Europe provides no evidence that long-run fiscal 
sustainability has been attained. And the UK outcome is particularly negative. Neither 
does Maastricht, the Pact, or the actual advent of the Euro seem to have mattered in 
streamlining any efforts to run public finances in keeping with the intertemporal 
constraint. In other words, no convergence in fiscal sustainability in 'old' Europe is 
evident since the early 1990s. 
With Chapter Four the thesis covers for the first time all the twelve EU accession 
countries with an original set of annual data on total revenues and total expenditure, as 
shares ofGDP, from 1995 until 2006. The variety of panel time series methods exceeds 
any of the European panel sustainability studies so far. This chapter also stands out 
because it relaxes for the first time in accession Europe the strong assumption of cross-
sectional independence in the panel data. The panel unit root and panel stationarity tests 
suggest that the series of revenues and expenditures are rather J(I). Then the panel 
cointegration tests following Kao (1999) and Pedroni (I 999, 2004) provide evidence in 
favour of cointegration. When applied to sub-samples of countries, made up of the full 
sample minus one country at a time, the Kao and Pedroni tests show that all the 
accession countries exhibit similar cointegration evidence. When the arguably strong 
assumption of cross-section independence is relaxed and the recent sieve bootstrap 
panel cointegration test in Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) is performed, the support 
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for a cointegrated panel seems robustly confirmed. The combined evidence from the 
panel cointegration tests and the group-mean panel FMOLS and DOLS estimators of 
Pedroni (2001) confirms fiscal sustainability for the panel as a whole. The results 
suggest that at least some accession countries have rather achieved fiscal adjustment in 
keeping with the long-run sustainability definition. But the short and narrow dimensions 
of the panel call for extra caution in the interpretation of results. Furthermore, the 
evidence does not suffice to prove any fiscal sustainability in individual countries: in 
that respect, more country-level analyses are required. The latter will not be possible 
until future much longer data series from the region become available. 
Chapter Five is devoted to the model relating fiscal and external solvency. A simple 
testable condition for the overall sustainability of an open economy is derived: private 
savings and private investtnent should be C/(I,I) with a cointegrating vector (I, -I), 
unless they are both individually 1(0) which also implies overall sustainability. The 
relevant datasets from 'old' and accession Europe are then constructed, with the same 
time spans and frequency as in the previous two chapters, respectively, and the 
condition for having economy-wide sustainability is first empirically checked. Almost 
everywhere in 'old' Europe the evidence is that the private savings and private 
investtnent drift apart. Hence, some terminal debt will remain and the intertemporal 
open-economy constraint will be violated if the existing policies continue unchanged. In 
the model where no Maastricht regime change is explicitly considered, only Ireland 
displays strong-form macroeconomic sustainability. With an exogenously selected 
break in 1992, Italy confirms economy-wide sustainability. Compared to the findings 
from Chapter Three, most economies lapse from weak-form fiscal sustainability into no 
overall sustainability, but Italy stands out: its earlier weak fiscal sustainability evidence 
gives way to an economy-wide sustainability. That suggests that the private sector of 
that country in the period from 1970 until 2006 played a stabilising role to offset a 
possibly unsustainable performance by the government, given that the strong-form 
fiscal sustainability definition is violated in Chapter Three. When the recursive 
approach to sustainability from Chapter Three is extended to the open-economy 
sustainability model, no MaastrichtlSGP effects are visually detected. Finally, the study 
of the accession countries demonstrates that the panel as a whole seems to have 
deviated off the long-run overall equilibrium consistent with the economy-wide long-
run solvency constraints. This contrasts with the fiscal sustainability result of Chapter 
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Four. Likewise, whereas the thesis surmises that some Central and Eastern European 
economies may have exhibited fiscal sustainability individually, in the open-economy 
setting the imbalances prevail. 
To recapitulate briefly, the thesis extends the existing literature in the following 
theoretical and empirical ways. It provides new individual country fiscal sustainability 
assessments for a comprehensive set of fourteen 'old' EU members and the results can 
be compared with previous studies of those economies. The thesis proposes a way to 
assess fiscal sustainability convergence over time and provides its first empirical 
application on 'old' Europe to sift out the true contributions of the MaastrichtlSOP rules 
to long-run fiscal sustainability. The thesis is by far the most comprehensive so far in 
analysing fiscal sustainability in the accession countries, with its original dataset, an 
application of recent advances in the panel (co )integration literature and robustness 
checking through a diverse research agenda. The thesis puts forward a theoretical model 
incorporating the current account in an economy-wide sustainability analysis, and the 
model is illustrated with separate empirical applications on 'old' Europe, including an 
adaptation of the gradual convergence assessment, and accession Europe. 
Some policy implications from the thesis are worth summarising. The first one to note is 
that since most countries over most of the period reviewed have not complied with the 
fiscal sustainability definition, policy changes are to be expected if authorities are keen 
to restore long-run sustainability. For Western Europe in particular, the empirical 
analysis sheds new light on the rationale behind the European fiscal rules. One may 
however claim that the results above do not immediately relate to the efficiency of the 
fiscal rules but rather remind that the fiscal arrangements under Maastricht and SOP do 
not necessarily conform to the definition of long-run sustainability. For Central and 
Eastern Europe, the formal econometric analysis cannot confirm the hypothesis of 
successful fiscal adjustment for each country individually, and fiscal discipline at the 
national level is advisable in order to satisfY the intertemporaI budget constraint. 
Chapter Five emphasises the importance of extending traditional fiscal sustainability 
theory to the open-economy world and so the key role of the private sector is 
highlighted: but nevertheless, there remains a need for fiscal prudence by the 
authorities. The lack of compliance with the open-economy sustainability condition 
prevails in the full ensemble of the enlarged European Union: across countries, periods 
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and research methods. The latter confirms that the macroeconomic balances are 
dynamic and rather fragile. 
The thesis, however, deals with historical data and is therefore backward-looking and 
by definition limited in what it can suggest as concrete recommendations for future 
changes in policy. Whereas admittedly this is a generic limitation of the 'statistical 
tests' strand of fiscal sustainability literature, the thesis is not safeguarded against other 
possible limitations too. These are mostly rooted in certain technical aspects around the 
empirical strategies applied here. In Chapters Three and Five, although the data series 
span nearly four decades and should suffice to examine long-run statistical relationships 
between macroeconomic variables, in the recursive estimations the time series are 
sometimes not particularly long. That may have affected the robustness of the 
econometric inference. In Chapters Four and Five, although the research strategy 
justifies a focus on the cointegration conditions for fiscaVoverall sustainability, the 
initial panel unit rootlstationarity tests do not allow for the strong assumption of cross-
sectional independence to be relaxed. In Chapters Four and Five, even if the panel 
approach is the only feasible way to extend the sustainability assessment into the region 
of accession Europe, the otherwise potentially very revealing individual country 
evidence can be suggested only within limits. Not least, although the rich evidence from 
the first empirical applications of the original open-economy sustainability model is 
duly discussed, a more intuitive insight into the rationale behind open-economy 
sustainability may be pursued and the policy implications thereof may need to be 
considered in further directions. 
It is indeed the future research directions which may address some of the afore-
mentioned weaknesses of this study. Future work may also extend the contributions of 
this thesis and equip fiscal sustainability practitioners with tools to tackle better the 
complexities of the real world and uncover larger portions of life's 'whole truth'. For 
example, more country-specific analysis in 'old' Europe, especially where longer time 
series of data are available, may elucidate some issues only briefly hypothesised for 
individual countries in Chapters Three and Five. Certainly in accession Europe, when 
future longer national data series become available, individual country analyses need 
also be attempted. The open-economy sustainability model outlined in Chapter Five 
may be deepened in at least two theoretical directions. First, although the weak-form 
fiscal sustainability conditions following Quintos (\ 995) are referred to in the economy-
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wide analyses of the thesis, a formal mathematical proof may be worth trying. Second, 
even if rarely likely in the true data generating processes, further theoretical research 
may explore in more deptb tbe 'oddity' of having foreign debt exactly offsetting 
government debt in one particular time period. If tbe latter occurs, it is possible tbat in 
the long run the difference between foreign and domestic debt will equal zero, implying 
an adjusttnent in the twin deficit identity. Furthermore, as new literature has emerged to 
study fiscal sustainability under the condition of multicointegration (Leachman et al., 
2005), an analogous open-economy empirical analysis may be performed if tbe private 
savings and private investtnent exhibit different orders of integration. Last but not least, 
the research into both fiscal and open-economy sustainability may proceed with 
incorporating nonlinearities in the fiscal policy, following another recent trend in the 
literature. Whereas space and time limits have confined this thesis to the linear world, a 
future extension beyond it may alter tbe evidence regarding tbe convergence in fiscal 
and open-economy sustainability in Europe. 
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